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This dissertation is a study of how the news media cover the campaigns of third-
party gubernatorial candidates.  The study has two parts: a content analysis that examines 
press coverage of the 2002 gubernatorial campaigns in California, Oregon, Wisconsin, 
and Maine, and a series of in-depth interviews with eight political reporters who covered 
two of those races. 
The content analysis shows that newspaper coverage of Greens and Libertarians is 
significantly different from the major parties.  Third-party candidates are featured less 
prominently than are Democrats and Republicans; sources from within minor parties are 
quoted less frequently than are officials from the major parties; the news frames adopted 
by reporters often come from a two-party perspective; and third-party candidates are 
separated from their major-party rivals.  The exception to this coverage was found in the 
Maine press, which provided the 2002 Green gubernatorial candidate with almost equal 
coverage to the Democrats and Republicans. 
The long interviews suggest that reporters view campaigns almost exclusively as 
a contest between people and believe they have an economic incentive to narrow the field 
of candidates to make campaign coverage more manageable.  The interviews also 
identified five criteria reporters use to determine each candidate’s newsworthiness.  To 
get on the media agenda, the reporters said, candidates must (1) demonstrate a high 
degree of public support; (2) show that their issues resonate strongly with the voters; (3) 
have strong name recognition; (4) run a serious campaign; and (5) raise enough money to 
be competitive in the general election.  Such criteria work to the strengths of the major 
parties and the weaknesses of minor-party candidates. 
In short, reporters accept the hegemony of the two-party system without question 
and have, in many ways, been co-opted by the Democrats and Republicans.  Rather than 
encouraging free flowing debate during an election campaign, the news media act as 
barriers to American political discourse, excluding marginalized voices from the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Third-party and independent candidates have played an important role in 
American politics.  They have raised issues that the two major parties have ignored 
(Magarian 1992; Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus 1984); pushed for and won policy 
innovations, such as a woman’s right to vote (Sifry 2003); served as barometers of the 
public’s discontent with the status quo (Cook 1989); and, in the words of one New York 
politician, promoted and expanded democracy by “offering voters a broad field of 
candidates and programs” (Christman 1993). 
 But third-party and independent political candidates often face uphill battles when 
seeking elected office (Bell 1977; Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus 1984; Winger 1997).  
Legal, cultural, and institutional barriers all converge to make it difficult for those not 
affiliated with the Democratic or Republican parties to meet such basic political 
requirements as getting on the ballot or financing meaningful campaigns (Dwyre and 
Kolodny 1997; Magarian 1992).  In Florida, for instance, a third-party candidate who 
wishes to run for the U.S. Senate must collect 200,000 signatures to qualify for the ballot 
(Herrnson and Faucheux 1999).  Moreover, federal campaign finance laws often provide 
substantial funds to major-party candidates while withholding public monies from third-
party contenders until after an election—and then only if the third-party candidate 
received more than 5 percent of the popular vote (Dwyre and Kolodny 1997). 
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 As if these hurdles were not large enough, third-party and independent political 
candidates are often ignored by the news media (Joslyn, 1984; Rosenstone, Behr, and 
Lazarus 1984; Sifry 2003; Stempel 1969; Stempel and Windhauser 1984; Stovall 1985; 
Zaller and Hunt 1994; Zaller 1999).  When they do get exposure, minor-party politicians 
are usually portrayed as inconsequential players or spoilers who have little chance of 
winning.  If they have any impact at all, we are told, it is usually to tip the election in 
favor of a major-party candidate, leaving citizens with a sense that they will be wasting 
their vote if they cast a ballot for anyone other than a Democrat or Republican (Herrnson 
and Faucheux 1999). 
 When reporters are asked about such practices, many argue that it is up to them to 
weed out the serious contenders from the likely losers.  Veteran political correspondent 
Jules Witcover, for instance, freely acknowledged that “if a guy is a bomb, it’s our job to 
ignore him” (quoted in Zaller and Hunt 1994, 376).  Likewise, the Boston Globe’s Curtis 
Wilkie said before one presidential debate that if it were up to him, he would exclude 
third-party contenders from all such forums and include only the Democratic and 
Republican party candidates “alone” (Hellinger 2000, 19).  Such attitudes seem ironic 
given that reporters and editors profess deference to the First Amendment, only to display 
callous indifference when third-party candidates complain that their exclusion from news 
coverage is, in many ways, denying them their right of free speech. 
 Yet despite these admissions by some in the profession, scholars have paid little 
attention to the type of coverage third-party and independent candidates usually receive 
from news organizations.  Most of the research on third parties has focused on political 
issues such as the American voting system (Brams and Fishburn 1978; Richie and Hill 
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1996), the American party system (Bibby 1997; Bibby and Maisel 2003 and 1998; 
Harmel 1997; Herrnson 1997; Lawson 1997; Lowi 1983; Ranney and Kendall 1954), the 
exclusion of third-party candidates from political debates (Eisner 1993; Hellinger 2000; 
Levine 2001; Magarian 1992), voter attitudes toward third parties (Collet 1996; Donovan, 
Bowler, and Terrio 2000; Lacy and Monson 2002; Reiter and Walsh 1995), explanations 
as to why third parties fail to win elections (Abramson et. al. 1995; Dwyre and Kolodny 
1997; Winger 1997), and the practice of fusion—or when a minor party cross-endorses a 
major-party candidate (Argersinger 1980; Hasen 1997; Michelson and Susin 2004; 
Scarrow 1986; Spitzer 1997).  There is also an abundance of research that examines 
third-party candidates who either won elective office or were major factors in a 
campaign, including studies about H. Ross Perot, Jesse Ventura, Lowell P. Weicker Jr., 
Bernard Sanders, and Ralph Nader, although most of this research pays little attention to 
the role of the mass media (see Endersby and Thomason 1994; Frank and Wagner 1999; 
Gillespie 1993; Green and Binning 2002 and 1997; Gold 1995 and 2002; Harold 2001; 
Koch 1998; Lacy and Burden 1999; Lentz 2002; Levine 2001; McCann, Rapoport and 
Stone 1999; Mughan and Lacy 2002; Parenti 1975; Rose 1994; Stone and Rapoport 2001; 
Zaller and Hunt 1994 and 1995; Zaller 1999). 
 The few studies that do analyze press coverage of third-party candidates are 
limited in scope in that they examine only one campaign, emphasize story counts, or 
focus exclusively on presidential politics.1  Some of the early studies on the press and 
minor parties, for example, did little but document that third-party presidential contenders 
                                                 
1 The only study found that examines news coverage of a third-party candidate who ran for something other 
than president – Jesse Ventura’s successful bid to become governor of Minnesota in 1998 – examined how 
the former professional wrestler was covered by the press in his capacity as an entertainer rather than as a 
representative of the Reform Party (Frith 2005). 
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generally receive less coverage than Democrats and Republicans (Rosenstone, Behr, and 
Lazarus 1984; Stempel 1969; Stempel and Windhauser 1984).  Later research moved 
beyond a pure analysis of story volume to examine such issues as why the press has 
traditionally ignored minor parties at the national level (Zaller 1999), how the news 
media has covered independents like John Anderson (Stovall 1985), why third-party 
contenders such as George Wallace have successfully gotten the news media’s attention 
(Pirch 2005), and how even a popular independent like Perot could not circumvent the 
traditional news media (Zaller and Hunt 1994 and 1995). 
 However, while each of these studies contributes greatly to our understanding of 
the challenges third-party presidential candidates face when they mount national 
campaigns, they leave a gap in the literature when it comes to minor parties at the state 
level.  Filling this gap is important because third parties have had greater success in state 
politics than they have had running for president.  While no candidate from a minor party 
has ever occupied the White House, independent and third-party contenders have won 
thirteen gubernatorial elections in the 20th century, including contests in Minnesota in 
1930, 1932, 1934, 1936, and 1998; Wisconsin in 1934, 1936, and 1942; Alaska and 
Connecticut in 1990; and Maine in 1974, 1994, and 1998 (Gillespie 1993; Gold 2002; 
Reiter and Walsh 1994; Third Party Watch 2005).2  Moreover, minor-party and 
independent gubernatorial candidates have made major inroads throughout the country in 
recent years, with such nominees as Peter Camejo of California, Jonathan Carter of 
Maine, David Bacon of New Mexico, Richard Mahoney of Arizona, Thomas Golisano of 
New York, Gary Richardson of Oklahoma, Tom Cox of Oregon, and Ed Thompson of 
Wisconsin all polling between 5 and 15 percent of the vote in 2002 (Green Party Election 
                                                 
2 This list is limited to candidates who did not use fusion to win an election. 
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Results; New York Times, 7 November 2002; St. Louis Post Dispatch, 7 November 2002; 
Third Party Watch). 
 Given this history and the fact that an independent candidate could conceivably 
win a three-way contest for governor with less than 35 percent of the vote in some states, 
it would seem that reporters covering gubernatorial campaigns would have less 
justification for ignoring candidates from minor parties than do national reporters 
covering presidential races.  Is this, in fact, the case?  Are third-party gubernatorial 
candidates also ignored or covered differently from major-party contenders, or are they 
given equal coverage?  What criteria do journalists use to make these decisions and from 
where did those criteria come?  Finally, if third-party candidates for statewide office are 
treated differently from their major-party opponents, is this because—as reporters often 
say—those candidates will most likely either lose the election or have little impact on the 
contest, or are there institutional and political biases at work that predispose reporters 
toward what they conceive as “mainstream” candidates?  What are the ramifications of 
such biases for the political system? 
 This dissertation seeks to examine these questions through a study of four 
gubernatorial campaigns in which a third-party candidate was involved.  Using a 
combination of content analysis and long interviews with journalists, the study will 
examine the patterns that characterize the coverage of third-party gubernatorial 
candidates as compared to their Democratic and Republican opponents; it will compare 
coverage in the national versus the regional press to determine whether journalists at 
different levels adhere to different sets of guidelines; and it will explore the reasons 
reporters give for the decisions they make on the campaign trail.  The focus here is not to 
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document story volume, but rather to examine how third-party gubernatorial candidates 
are portrayed when they do receive coverage. 
The four campaigns that are analyzed come from the following 2002 contests: the 
California race between Democrat Gray Davis, Republican Bill Simon, and Green Peter 
Camejo; the Maine election between Democrat John Baldacci, Republican Peter 
Cianchette, and Green Jonathan Carter; the Oregon campaign between Democrat Ted 
Kulongoski, Republican Kevin Mannix, and Libertarian Tom Cox; and the Wisconsin 
contest between Democrat Jim Doyle, Republican Scott McCallum, and Libertarian Ed 
Thompson.  The reason these four campaigns were chosen is explained in Chapter 3, 
which outlines the methodology of this study. 
 Such an analysis is important to explore for at least three reasons that will be 
discussed below.  First, the exclusion of minor-party voices from election news coverage 
undermines the American tradition of open debate and serves as an example to illustrate 
how other unconventional voices may go uncovered during national or state public policy 
debates.  Put another way, the study could provide clues about other blind spots the news 
media may have concerning legitimate viewpoints that are perceived to come from the 
fringe of society.  Second, by consistently narrowing political discourse to the positions 
of two dominant parties, journalism risks opening the door to political movements that 
seek to erode First Amendment guarantees.  Third, minor parties have historically made a 
positive contribution to the political debate in this country.  Why such voices are 
excluded from the modern news media—the main conduit through which ideas enter the 
public realm—is thus important to understand because such practices risk denying 
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citizens the benefit of hearing potentially good ideas from marginalized corners of 
society.  
The American Tradition 
 The first justification for this dissertation is a normative one: that the news media 
undermine the American tradition of open debate in the so-called marketplace of ideas by 
excluding third-party candidates from their election coverage.  Put more positively, the 
press could better enhance political discourse if it were more amenable to nontraditional 
viewpoints that usually find it impossible to compete with the two major parties. 
 This is not to suggest that all third parties should be given equal coverage with the 
Democrats and Republicans, or even with each other.  Obviously, journalists have limited 
resources and must make editorial decisions.  In addition, not all third-party candidates 
are serious or have the appropriate experience for the job they seek.  They run for fun or 
to express misguided anger at “the system.”  Others even campaign for a joke—as radio 
personality Howard Stern almost did in 1993 when he toyed with the idea of running for 
governor of New York on the Libertarian ticket.  But there are other third-party 
contenders who take their decision to campaign seriously.  Even if they strongly doubt 
their ability to win, they enter an election because they are trying to make a statement, 
build a movement for the future, offer ideas that are not being discussed, or represent a 
voice that might otherwise go unheard.  Does America suffer in any way when the press 
turns a deaf ear to that voice?  It is a hard question to answer.  Yet, if we as a society are 
truly committed to open debate—to the concept that all ideas get a fair shake so that the 
best ones can be chosen to solve social, political, and economic problems—then we owe 
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it to ourselves to better understand why certain voices are consistently sidelined while 
others are allowed to dominate our discourse. 
 How third parties are covered in the news media is not an idle concern.  The 
notion that American democracy should function as a marketplace of ideas in which truth 
emerges from free and open debate is deeply rooted in our culture.  First introduced by 
John Milton in the 17th century and later expanded by John Stuart Mill, the idea that all 
reasonable opinions should be allowed to flourish in the public square has long been used 
to justify freedom of speech over the oppression of tyranny.  In his famous essay on the 
liberties of man, Mill (1859, 1978 reprint,16) argued that “the peculiar evil of silencing 
the expression of an opinion is that it is robbing the human race, posterity as well as the 
existing generation—those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold 
it.” 
 Such views gave birth to what has since been dubbed the libertarian theory of the 
press, which assumes that each individual is a rational creature who can choose between 
right and wrong as long as the news media help society “discover truth … by presenting 
all manner of evidence and opinion as the basis for decisions” (Siebert, Peterson and 
Schramm 1963, 51).  Expanding on this in 1947, the Commission on Freedom of the 
Press said that the mass media should act as a forum from which all ideas can be heard 
and debated.  The commission said:  “It is vital to a free society that an idea should not be 
stifled by the circumstances of its birth.”  It acknowledged that the press “cannot and 
should not be expected to print everybody’s ideas,” but added that “all important 
viewpoints and interests in the society should be represented in its agencies of mass 
 9 
communication,” including those with which news organizations disagree (A Free and 
Responsible Press 1947, 23-24). 
 The marketplace metaphor has evolved over the years but still holds its grip on 
our national conscience.  While Meiklejohn (1961, 19) recorded “a friendly disavowal” 
of the “Miltonian faith that in a fair fight between truth and error, truth is sure to win,” he 
nevertheless said that “the people need free speech because they have decided, in 
adopting, maintaining and interpreting their Constitution, to govern themselves rather 
than to be governed by others.”  In addition, Chafee (1954) pointed out that all 
viewpoints should be welcome in the marketplace so as not to drive potentially dangerous 
ideas into hiding, where they could brew undetected until they posed a real threat to 
society. 
The continued power of the marketplace metaphor is evident in that it has moved 
beyond academic circles and has been incorporated into the lexicon of American civil 
law (Hopkins 1996; Napoli 1999).  When Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes proclaimed in 
Abrams v. United States (1919) that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to 
get itself accepted in the competition of the market” (630), he did more than offer an 
eloquent dissent in a case that upheld the conviction of five Russian immigrants for 
publishing revolutionary pamphlets—he gave power to a 250-year-old metaphor that has 
since been used by the U.S. Supreme Court to “bolster free expression in virtually every 
area of First Amendment jurisprudence …” (Hopkins 1996, 41).  In the 80 years since 
Abrams, the Court’s use of the marketplace concept has increased dramatically as the 
justices have recognized that “there is not a single, universal marketplace of ideas, but 
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numerous mini-marketplaces, each with its own dynamics, parameters, regulatory 
scheme, and audience” (Hopkins 1996, 48. See also Baker 1978). 
Likewise, the Federal Communications Commission has cited the metaphor in 
making policy for the broadcast industry, although in recent times the FCC has moved 
toward an economic interpretation that has led to deregulation rather than a democratic 
interpretation that has fostered an increased flow of information (Napoli 1999).  In any 
case, some scholars have come to see the mass media as the modern-day marketplace 
(Lichtenberg 1987)—a notion that has been adopted by public officials like the late 
Senator Paul Wellstone, who leaned heavily on the marketplace concept to argue for 
improvements in the news media by saying that a free society can only function 
effectively when citizens have “access to a wide and diverse range of opinions, analyses, 
and perspectives” (Wellstone 2000, 552). 
 The notion that American democracy should operate as a marketplace of ideas is 
particularly salient during political campaigns—a time when the views of different 
candidates should be competing for the votes of the citizenry.  It is during the weeks 
before an election that the public “wants and expects” the news media to present “diverse 
points of view” (Immerwahr et. al, 1982, 178-179).  Meyrowitz (1995), for example, has 
demonstrated that voters approach campaigns through a prism he calls “public logic,” in 
which citizens look for candidates “with new ideas” and view campaigns as an 
opportunity to foster “a national dialogue on key issues” (48).  From this perspective, 
voters seem to assume that they have a right—or perhaps, a hope—that they will be given 
a wide-range of viewpoints from which to choose. 
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 But let’s not be naïve.  While this brief review is meant to illustrate how America 
has long been wedded to the belief that a healthy democracy is one that tolerates, accepts, 
and is exposed to many different opinions, it is also true that America has never actually 
achieved the complete openness that the marketplace metaphor is meant to describe (see 
Barron 1967).  Moreover, there is much scholarship that questions whether the public 
even demands that such a marketplace exist.  The classic election studies of the middle 
20th century, for example, showed that most voters pay little attention to campaigns and 
tend to vote according to such factors as family, religious, or ethnic background rather 
than a careful consideration of each candidate’s issue positions (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and 
McPhee 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960).  More recent research has 
found that journalists need not write about politicians from outside the mainstream 
because busy voters demand to hear only about candidates who are deemed important 
enough for them to spend valuable time learning about (Zaller 1999).  Given such 
conclusions, it would seem to matter little whether news organizations provide the public 
with information about third-party candidates because few people will care about it 
anyway. 
 From a normative sense, though, none of this should matter.  The marketplace 
metaphor is an ideal that history says is important to us.  Starting with 17th century 
philosophers and embraced by present day courts, policymakers, citizens, and scholars, 
the concept embedded in the marketplace of ideas goes to the core of how we see 
ourselves.  It is a place where we as a society believe we should be—and journalism is 
part of the mix.  This is not to say that we have failed as a society or that journalism is in 
crisis just because some voices are silenced in the news media.  Far from it.  But if we 
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continue to believe that our democracy grows healthier when a wide-range of opinion is 
allowed to flourish in the public square, then it is worth studying why the news media 
consistently ignore certain views.  Third parties represent just one of those voices, but an 
understanding of these movements may open our eyes to other ways in which the news 
media may be stifling debate and undermining our notions of who we are as a society. 
First Amendment Restraints? 
 A second reason this study is worth pursuing is related to the first: news 
organizations have a self interest in understanding how journalistic norms fail to broaden 
the political debate beyond its current confines.  Such practices undermine what 
journalism should be and may give government an opening to one day regulate the press.  
Granted, just because third-party candidates are usually ignored during election 
campaigns does not mean that American journalism is bad or that the government will 
suddenly step in to restrict press freedom.  But how news organizations approach minor 
political parties is indicative of how they cover other viewpoints that do not comport with 
immediate social norms.  It shows how dissent in general is portrayed by the news media, 
and it points to larger patterns of coverage that violate the tenets of journalism and could, 
over time, lead to political movements that seek government regulation to curtail the 
autonomy the news media now enjoy. 
This is not as farfetched as it may seem.  The Commission on Freedom of the 
Press hinted at government regulation in 1947, when it called on news organizations to 
recognize that the freedoms they enjoy under the First Amendment come with certain 
obligations—namely, that the press has a social responsibility to reflect a wide-range of 
viewpoints in its coverage of public affairs.  While the commission strongly supported a 
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news media free from the shackles of government, it nevertheless argued that press 
liberties were being jeopardized by corporate media owners who were consolidating their 
control over the communication industry and engaging in self-serving, profit-driven 
activities that were inflammatory, sensational, and narrowing the range of American 
political discourse.  The press must act to correct these problems itself, the commission 
said, or an outside agency like government might have to step in.  In a report it released 
after nearly two years of study, the commission summed up its philosophy this way: 
If modern society requires great agencies of mass communication, if these 
concentrations become so powerful that they are a threat to democracy, if 
democracy cannot solve the problem simply by breaking them up—then those 
agencies must control themselves or be controlled by government.  If they are 
controlled by government, we lose our chief safeguard against totalitarianism—
and at the same time take a long step toward it (A Free and Responsible Press 
1947, 5). 
 
 The commission proved to be prescient.  Twenty years after the release of its 
report, a George Washington University law professor, Jerome A. Barron, created a stir 
when he called for a new interpretation of the First Amendment that would force news 
organizations to open their stations and news pages to viewpoints that usually fall outside 
the political mainstream.  In arguing for legislative and judicial action to regulate print as 
well as broadcast news organizations, Barron said that media monopolies and 
technological developments in the communication industry had changed the media 
landscape from the one envisioned by the founding fathers.  “First Amendment theory 
must be reexamined,” Barron (1967, 1642) wrote, “for only by responding to the present 
reality of the mass media’s repression of ideas can the constitutional guarantee of free 
speech best serve its original purpose.” 
 The crux of his position rested on the notion that American constitutional theory 
was based, at least partially, on the flawed assumption that there is an open “marketplace 
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of ideas” that automatically allows for the free flow of viewpoints as long as government 
does not get in the way of the speaker.  But if such a marketplace ever really operated in 
the United States, Barron argued, “it has long ceased to exist,” leaving the country with a 
dangerously outdated vision of the First Amendment that has evolved into a “rationale for 
repression” (1642).  Said Barron: 
Our constitutional law has been singularly indifferent to the reality and 
implications of nongovernmental obstructions to the spread of political truth.  
This indifference becomes critical when a comparatively few private hands are 
in a position to determine not only the content of information but its very 
availability, when the soap box yields to radio and the political pamphlet to the 
monopoly newspaper (Barron 1967, 1643). 
  
 Like the requirements imposed on broadcasters through the FCC’s fairness 
doctrine, Barron said newspapers should be forced by law to open their pages to 
comments by the general public.  This “right of access to the press,” as he called it, 
“could be rooted most naturally in the letter-to-the-editor column and the advertising 
section” (1667).  He said newspapers should be legally compelled to provide a rational 
explanation for why an individual’s letter or advertisement was not printed, adding that 
editors and publishers should no longer be permitted to reject unpopular viewpoints on 
arbitrary grounds.  Only through such government action, Barron argued, could the 
country secure “an effective forum for the expression of divergent opinions” (1678). 
 Barron’s views were ultimately rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1974 
case Miami Herald v. Tornillo, but his controversial proposal sparked a “right-of-access” 
movement that reverberated throughout news organizations and the legal system during 
the 1960s and 1970s.  Citing Barron’s proposal, freelance writer Hazel Henderson said, 
“The battle now shaping up over the public’s right of access to the mass media may well 
be the most important constitutional issue of this decade” (Columbia Journalism Review 
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1969, 7).  Gilbert Cranberg reported that “even severe critics of the press consider 
Barron’s prescription for making newspapers accountable to government strong 
medicine,” but he pointed out that Barron’s proposals were resonating with such groups 
as the American Civil Liberties Union, which passed a resolution during its 1968 biennial 
conference that urged the ACLU’s national board of directors “to file suits to establish a 
legal right of access to the press” (Saturday Review 1970, 48).  That Barron’s piece was 
being taken seriously within the news media was made even more evident in 1969 when 
the Freedom of Information Center at the University of Missouri’s School of Journalism 
published a report outlining the pros and cons of a right-to-access law, concluding that: 
All in all, it is not far-fetched to predict that the courts and legislatures of the 
land might one day be tempted to find in a right of access and a right of reply a 
way to get at the death of newspaper competition and the alleged one-sidedness 
of the American press (Access to the Press: A New Right? 1969, 8). 
  
 Could a similar movement occur today?  The prospects seem unlikely.  But 
history can be cyclical, and given that the consolidation of media ownership has only 
increased in the years since Barron wrote his piece (see Bagdikian 2000; McChesney 
1999), it does not seem beyond the realm of possibility that a new call for government 
regulation of the press could some day come from segments of society that are 
consistently sidelined.  For one thing, many of Barron’s views still resonate with 
contemporary theorists.  Lichtenberg (1987) has written that “regulation [of the press] is 
needed just because private power poses a grave threat to the independence and integrity 
of the press” (353); Graber (1986) has suggested that “the definitions for what constitutes 
monopoly control might be made more rigorous for the media than for other businesses” 
(273); and Bunker (2000) has pointed out that several constitutional theorists are now 
arguing that the First Amendment can be violated not just by government—which has 
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been the traditional understanding of free speech doctrine—but also by “private action,” 
that is the activities of “private actors to suppress speech…” (2)  In addition, given the 
consolidation of the media that followed the 1996 Telecommunications Act, some 
political advocacy groups “have argued that federal regulations should apply to the 
content of various media, defining what material promotes or undermines the public 
interest” (Croteau and Hoynes 2001, 211).   
 Such statements should give the news media pause.  With views like these 
circulating through society, it is no exaggeration to suggest that the news media may one 
day find itself fighting to protect its very rights if large segments of the population come 
to believe that they are not being completely served by the current media structure.  
Again, this is not to suggest that government action is imminent because a third-party 
candidate is ignored by the press, but such practices do point to larger patterns of how the 
news media ignore unconventional voices, something that could lead to public frustration 
and long-term consequences. 
Historic Role of Third Parties 
 Finally, news coverage of third-party candidates is a subject worth exploring 
simply because of the historic role minor political organizations have played in American 
politics.  From their attacks on the institution of slavery in the 19th century to their 
success in helping to win such reforms as tough child-labor laws, free public education, 
strong business regulation, direct election of senators, and woman’s suffrage, third parties 
have, in the words of one scholar, “made the United States a more just and democratic 
society” by serving as “essential vehicles for popular discontent” and helping to 
“stimulate dialogue” about vital social issues (Magarian 1992, 879-880; see also Sifry 
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2003 and Smallwood 1983).  While the positions that third parties have taken throughout 
their history were often viewed as extreme or radical at the time, many of these stands 
eventually made their way into mainstream society to become the order of the day.  The 
influence they have exerted over the political process has come both directly, such as 
when a third party wins an election and actually implements its policies (Gillespie 1993), 
and indirectly, or when a third party movement and its ideas are absorbed into one of the 
major parties (Rapoport and Stone 2005; Sundquist 1973).  In either case, minor political 
organizations have made their mark. 
 Admittedly, it is often impossible to draw a direct correlation between the 
positions taken by a third party and the public policies eventually adopted by 
government.  The point is not that a third party must be given sole and unequivocal  
credit for a particular reform to make it worthy of attention, but rather that minor parties 
deserve consideration because they have often been at the forefront of important social 
issues that the two major parties had initially refused to address (particularly at election 
time).  If history suggests anything, it is that movements that seem unconventional at the 
moment should not automatically be disregarded as unrealistic, irrelevant, or extreme 
because they may one day hold sway with a majority of the population. 
 The influence of third parties has historically been felt most strongly at the state 
and local level, where independents and minor-party contenders have won office and 
implemented policy.  In Vermont, the left-wing Progressive Coalition controlled the 
Burlington mayor’s office and held seats on the city’s Board of Alderman throughout the 
1980s.  The party continued to exert influence on state politics during the following 
decade and even elected one of its members, Bernard Sanders, to the U.S. House of 
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Representatives in 1990 (Gillespie 1993).  That same year, Independent Lowell P. 
Weicker Jr. became governor of Connecticut, where he battled Republicans and many 
Democrats in the state Legislature before narrowly winning passage of a controversial 4-
percent income tax to help close a budget deficit that had grown steadily for years under 
the leadership of the two major parties.  Eight years later, the Reform Party’s Jesse 
Ventura was able to put his fingerprints on Minnesota politics after he surprised the 
establishment in 1998 to capture the statehouse in St. Paul.   
 The recent third-party victories in New England and the upper Midwest are not 
unique, though.  Throughout the early 20th century, third-party movements made their 
mark on state politics by winning elections outright or taking control of one of the major 
parties.  The radical Nonpartisan League, for example, infiltrated the North Dakota 
Republican Party and used it to pass legislation that created a state-controlled bank and 
gave women the right to vote; the Farm-Labor Party was the dominant political force in 
Minnesota politics throughout the 1920s and 1930s, when it controlled the governorship 
and held a majority of the state’s congressional delegation; and Wisconsin’s Progressive 
Party established public works projects to help destitute citizens during the Great 
Depression and pushed through the nation’s first program to provide unemployment 
insurance for those without a job (Gillespie 1993). 
 In other cases, third parties have strongly influenced the Democrats and 
Republicans at the national level, with the most recent example being the long-term 
fallout from Ross Perot’s 1992 presidential campaign.  According to Rapoport and Stone 
(2005) and Stone and Rapoport (2001), the Republican Party moved quickly to absorb 
Reform Party supporters into its fold following the 1992 election, adopting many of 
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Perot’s themes as its own.  The Contract with America, for example, “emphasized Perot 
issues of a balanced federal budget, reform, and limiting American commitment to 
internationalism” while omitting any “reference to Republican priorities such as stopping 
abortions and promoting free trade that united the base of the Republican Party but were 
strongly opposed by supporters of Ross Perot” (Stone and Rapoport 2001, 52).  The 
maneuver, the authors argue, led directly to the so-called Republican Revolution of the 
mid-1990s and George W. Bush’s presidential victory.  According to their analysis of the 
1994 midterm and 2000 presidential elections, Stone and Rapoport (2001) found that 
Republican candidates for the U.S. House won more easily in congressional districts 
where Perot ran well two years earlier, while at the presidential level, Bush was far more 
likely than Al Gore to win nonsouthern states in which Perot received strong support at 
the polls.  “Without Perot’s historic third-party candidacy in 1992,” the authors 
concluded, “the 2000 presidential contest would not have required 35 extraordinary days 
beyond November 7 and numerous court decisions to settle” (Stone and Rapoport 2001, 
56). 
 Aside from the influence third parties have exerted at the state level or Perot’s 
continued effect on contemporary national politics, minor parties have also helped 
influence the course of history on several major issues that have faced the nation 
throughout its history.  The remainder of this section, then, will look at one of those 
issues: the fight over slavery.  This example is not meant to be an exhaustive historical 
recounting, but rather a brief examination to illustrate a specific role that minor parties 
played in forcing policymakers to confront perhaps the biggest domestic issue ever to 
face the United States.  In doing this, my hope is to show that, at least in some cases, if it 
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were not for a third-party entering the political fray, certain issues may not have been 
discussed at all—or the debate over them would likely have been delayed to some point 
in the future. 
 Slavery.  Starting with the creation of the Liberty Party in 1840 and culminating 
with the replacement of the Whigs with the newly formed Republicans in 1856, no other 
issue in American history has been the catalyst for more third-party efforts than the 
nation’s debate over slavery (Nash 1959).  In the two decades before the Civil War, three 
major national third-party movements challenged the two-party system in an attempt to 
thrust the issue of African bondage onto the national stage.  Until these third-party 
movements surfaced in the late 1830s, the two major parties had been content to keep the 
slavery issue on the backburner where it could do little damage to their national 
standings.  In 1827, for example, former Democratic President Martin Van Buren argued 
that “national parties were the means of keeping the slavery issue quiet,” adding twenty 
years later that his party should nominate candidates “who have not committed 
themselves to either side of this important and delicate question [slavery]” (Sundquist 
1973, 40, 52). 
 Liberty was routed in 1840 but rebounded four years later when its presidential 
candidate more than tripled the party’s nationwide vote and won enough support in New 
York to affect the outcome of the election, handing the White House to Democrat James 
K. Polk over his Whig opponent, Henry Clay.  Recognizing that the antislavery 
movement was stronger than initially thought, northern politicians from both major 
parties “moved as far toward the abolitionist pole as necessary to absorb most of the 
movement…” (Sundquist 1973, 47).  This effectively ended Liberty as a player in 
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presidential politics, but its very existence sent a signal to politicians in the North that 
their survival could hang on how they addressed what had become known as the South’s 
peculiar institution. 
 Still, the issue carried great risks for the Whigs and Democrats, each of which 
entered the 1848 presidential election without any intention of discussing the volatile 
issue.  But that strategy was thwarted when disgruntled members of both parties, along 
with abolitionists and former Libertymen, joined forces in yet another third-party effort to 
push slavery into the spotlight.  This time operating under the banner of Free Soil, 
organizers of the new party nominated a recent abolitionist convert in Van Buren and 
drafted a platform that proposed to stop the spread of slavery into the western territories 
and abolish slavery in the District of Columbia.  “Political reality” may have “inhibited 
both major parties … from making any blatant appeals to the slavery restriction faction,” 
one historian has said, but “the clash over the extension of slavery was brought before the 
public … through a third party” (Mazmanian 1974, 36-37). 
 Van Buren captured 10 percent of the popular vote nationwide, and thirteen of the 
party’s congressional candidates won seats in the House of Representatives (Rosenstone 
et al. 1984; Sundquest 1973).  Although the party began to break apart shortly after the 
election, its strong showing at the polls was an indication that “the question of slavery in 
the territories could no longer be brushed aside” (Mazmanian 1974).  A third party had 
made a major impact on the American political system. 
 With slavery now squarely in the middle of the nation’s debate, the country 
underwent a major political realignment (Sundquist 1973).  The Whigs and Democrats 
tried once again to put the issue behind them, crafting the Compromise of 1850 by 
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granting concessions to both sides of the dispute.  But the compromise proved 
unsustainable.  No longer able to hold its regional factions together, the Whig Party 
collapsed as a major force in American politics and the newly formed Republican Party 
stepped in to fill the void.  Campaigning on a platform to contain slavery, Republican 
congressional candidates effectively took control of the House of Representatives in 
1854, and the party’s 1856 presidential candidate took 33 percent of the popular vote, 
carrying all but five free states.  Four years later, the party captured the White House 
under Abraham Lincoln. (Gienapp 1985; Mazmanian 1974). 
 Would slavery have become the issue that it did had it not been pushed so 
fervently by third parties?  It is hard to imagine that it would not have.  But the history of 
the United States is one in which minor parties were, in fact, intricately involved in the 
debate over the enslavement of black Americans.  Indeed, the antislavery societies that 
sprang up throughout the North had first tried to work within the two-party structure but 
grew frustrated as they were consistently forced to choose a candidate who was “the least 
hostile” to the antislavery cause (Nash 1959, 24).  The third-party movements that 
followed, although ignored at first, gave antislavery societies another outlet in which to 
express their grievances—and they used these mechanisms to eventually bring change to 
American society. 
******** 
 What I hope this discussion has done is provide at least three reasons why this 
dissertation is important.  It is designed to answer the “so what” question, if you will.  To 
summarize, this dissertation hopes to add to the literature by focusing on an area that has 
yet to be fully studied: how third-party gubernatorial candidates have been covered by 
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regional and national news media.  It is my hope that this study of statewide races will 
provide a different perspective than the traditional examination of third-party presidential 
candidates.  It is harder for reporters to dismiss minor-party gubernatorial contenders 
given the fact that a candidate can win a statewide contest with less than 35 percent of the 
vote.  This is far different from the winner-take-all Electoral College system used in a 
presidential campaign, which gives journalists legitimate cover to ignore third-party 
candidates who have virtually no chance of winning.  Because this is less true at the state 
level, this study of gubernatorial elections may have a better chance of identifying other 
factors that may come into play when reporters and editors make coverage decisions.  
The key questions are:  How is the coverage of third-party gubernatorial candidates 
different from that of the Democrats and Republicans?  How do reporters approach 
gubernatorial campaigns that involve a third-party candidate?  And what factors can we 
identify to account for any differences in the coverage? 
Plan for Dissertation 
 The analysis will begin with a literature review in Chapter Two that examines the 
usefulness of studying campaigns.  Previous research, including the classic studies of the 
1940s and 1950s, found that campaigns have little affect on voters.  Chapter Two 
indicates, however, that while many campaigns do not matter, some do—and for this 
reason, they are worth examining.  Next, Chapter Two will review the literature on third 
parties by focusing on three questions:  Is the two-party system natural to American 
politics?  Why do some people vote for third-party candidates?  And why do third parties 
typically lose elections?  The chapter will then examine the role of the press during 
political campaigns, focusing on agenda setting, story framing, and priming before 
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turning its attention to how the press covers third-party candidates specifically.  Finally, 
the literature review will end by introducing three possible explanations for why minor 
parties are treated differently by the news media.  These theories include Zaller’s (1999) 
Rule of Anticipated Importance, Meyrowitz’s (1995) notions of journalism logic, and 
Gramsci’s (1971) concept of political hegemony. 
 Chapter Three outlines the methodology of the study, explaining how the content 
analysis and long interviews were completed.  The chapter also includes a justification 
for combining qualitative and quantitative techniques in a single study and why it was 
important in this case.  Chapters Four and Five outline the results of the study, looking 
first at the findings of the content analysis and next at the observations from the long 
interviews. Chapter Six is the concluding chapter and includes a discussion of the 
findings, their potential ramifications, limits to the study, and potential avenues for 
additional scholarship.  The appendices at the back of the book contain the code book 






Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 This dissertation is a study of how the news media cover the campaigns of third-
party gubernatorial candidates, focusing specifically on the 2002 elections in California, 
Oregon, Maine, and Wisconsin.  Before outlining the study’s methodology and reporting 
its results, it is important to first put this project in the proper context with a discussion of 
three broad issues that will be addressed throughout this literature review. 
 First, this chapter will examine whether campaigns are even worth studying at all 
given the vast amount of scholarly research that suggests they matter little to election 
outcomes.  Second, the literature review will consider the past research on third parties to 
examine three questions: Is the two-party system natural to American politics?  Why do 
some people vote for third-party candidates?  And why do third parties typically lose 
elections?  Third, the chapter will look at the role the news media typically play in 
campaigns and how the actions taken by reporters may or may not influence public 
perceptions of the candidates.  As part of this discussion, the literature review will 
examine theories of agenda setting, framing, and priming.  In addition, this section will 
analyze the scholarship on press coverage of third-party candidates, and it will offer three 
possible explanations as to why journalists treat minor-party politicians differently from 
those who come from the Democratic and Republican establishment. 
 In general, the literature cited in this chapter supports the view that campaigns are 
worth studying because they are moments in the nation’s history when voters are tuned 
into politics and learn about the issues and policy choices that confront them.  The 
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literature also indicates that while the two-party system developed naturally from the 
constitutional system established by the founders, the nation’s history is full of examples 
of third-party efforts to challenge the status quo.  While those efforts have rarely met with 
success at the ballot box—particularly at the presidential level—they have nevertheless 
provided an outlet for various forms of political dissent, allowing them to voice their 
opinions and at times affect the policy debates at the nation’s power centers.  Finally, this 
chapter will show that the news media still play an important role in bringing political 
information to the public and influencing the nation’s agenda.  Through the use of certain 
news frames, the literature suggests, reporters narrow the political debate by determining 
which candidates are legitimate and viable and which ones are from outside the 
mainstream and likely losers.  Such reporting decisions, the literature shows, are based on 
long established journalistic norms that reflect both the pragmatic need to use limited 
resources wisely and the (unconscious?) acceptance of elite hegemony. 
Do campaigns matter? The Minimal Effects View 
 There is considerable doubt in the political science literature about the 
effectiveness of political campaigns to persuade voters and change the outcome of 
elections.  From the earliest days of research into American voting behavior, scholars 
have illustrated that most citizens cast their ballots in consistent and predictable ways 
based not on the messages they receive from campaigns but on such factors as their party 
identification, awareness about political issues, religious affiliation, and socioeconomic 
status (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, McPhee 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 
1960; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1968).  The notion that campaigns have minimal 
effects has been further supported by evidence that voters reject political messages that 
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contradict their personal values (Zaller 1990); that most citizens do not alter their 
political opinions enough during campaigns to change their original vote choice (Finkel 
1993); and by the fact that political scientists have developed election prediction models 
that can accurately and consistently forecast the outcome of presidential elections even 
before a single campaign event is held or ballot cast (Abramowitz 1988; Gelman and 
King 1993).  Campaigns have been seen as so inconsequential by some, in fact, that 
Downs (1957) posited that it is irrational for the democratic citizen to pay close attention 
to election contests because the benefits derived from gathering political information are 
outweighed by the costs of acquiring such knowledge. 
 Yet despite this evidence, candidates spend millions seeking public office, and the 
news media spend millions covering them.  In the last presidential election, for example, 
President Bush and his Democratic opponent, John Kerry, reportedly spent more than 
$600 million in their race for the White House (San Antonio Express-News, 2 January 
2005).  One year later, New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg spent $80 million in his re-
election campaign despite the fact that he consistently led his Democrat opponent by 
almost 30 percentage points (Washington Post, 5 November 2005); and in 2006, spending 
in the Massachusetts governor’s race toped $42 million, “obliterating” the state’s 
previous record set four years before (Boston Globe, 7 November 2006, A1). 
 It is not just campaign spending that points to a general belief that campaigns 
make a difference.  Journalists too have historically attributed Election Day results 
partially to the quality of a candidate’s campaign.  White (1961) stated eloquently in his 
analysis of the 1960 presidential election that the campaign is a time when “the citizens—
as they gather at rallies or read their newspapers or sit at home watching the candidates 
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on TV—will be able to stew, mull, reflect and argue, until finally there simmers down in 
the mind and belly of each individual his own decision on choice of the national 
chieftain” (211).  Likewise, McGinniss (1969) argued that election outcomes were being 
cynically manipulated by a partnership of politicians and advertising executives; and 
Smith (1988) concluded that “it was Bush’s symbolic politics—largely negative 
advertising on television attacking Dukakis—that won him the presidency” in 1988 
(685).  More recently, Associated Press political correspondent Walter R. Mears reported 
that the three debates scheduled between Al Gore and George Bush would be “crucial” in 
determining who would win the support of “undecided voters” in 2000 (Washington 
Times, 18 September 2000, A16), and four years later the New York Times attributed part 
of Bush’s re-election to the fact that he “ran a very effective campaign” (Nagourney, 
2004, 1). 
 So who is right?  Are campaigns fruitless efforts to change public opinion, as 
much of the political science literature suggests, or do they matter to the election 
outcome, as many politicians and journalists seem to think? 
 The early research into American voting behavior was fairly pessimistic about the 
ability of campaigns to significantly alter individual opinion and change the outcome of 
an election.  One of the first attempts to examine how voters make up their minds was the 
Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1968) study in Erie County, Ohio, during the 1940 
presidential election.  In that work, the authors found that a citizen’s political orientation 
is heavily influenced by a variety of social pressures that come from his or her family, 
religious organization, workplace, social clubs, and neighborhood.  In many cases, the 
authors showed, these social pressures are fairly consistent and push voters toward one or 
 29 
the other political party, such as when a blue-collar worker from a lower-class 
neighborhood is inclined to join the Democrats while a business executive from a 
wealthy community naturally affiliates with the Republicans. 
These findings were reinforced in a follow-up study of voters in Elmira, New 
York, during the 1948 election.  In that research, Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 
(1954) concluded that party identification and voting behavior are formed early in life, 
are determined greatly by the person’s immediate environment (family, community, 
religion), and are fairly stable over time—so that a person born into a strong Democratic 
family will likely join the Democratic Party and consistently vote for Democratic 
candidates for most of his or her life.  These conclusions were further buttressed by 
Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960), who found that voters do not know 
enough about public policy to base their vote on such issues, relying instead on partisan 
cues to help them filter campaign events, interpret political activity, and evaluate 
candidates.  For most voters, Berelson et al. (1954) said, campaigns do more to reinforce 
their preexisting views than to persuade them to take on alternative positions.  Moreover, 
it is these partisan voters—the very voters who are least likely to be influenced by the 
campaign—who are most likely to pay attention to what the candidates are doing and 
eventually cast a ballot on Election Day (Campbell et al. 1960).  The citizens most 
susceptible to changing their political preferences are those who pay little attention to 
politics, ignore campaigns until the final days, and often decide not to vote (Berelson et 
al. 1954). 
Subsequent research at the individual and aggregate levels supported many of the 
findings of the early studies by suggesting that campaigns most likely have minimal 
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effects because other variables too easily explain voting behavior.  Fiorina (1981), for 
example, expanded on the notion of retrospective voting first developed by Key (1966) to 
argue that voters often identify with a party and cast a ballot based on the past 
performance of the incumbent, rewarding those who perform well and punishing those 
who do not.  Other studies have shown that elections are often decided based on national 
economic conditions (Bartels 1992; Bloom and Price 1975; Fair 1978; Frankovic 1985; 
Keeter 1985; Kramer 1971; Markus 1988, 1992; Quirk and Dalager 1993), the popularity 
of the incumbent (Abramowitz 1988; Frankovic 1985; Howell 1982; Rosenstone 1985), 
or the policy preferences of the voters (Markus and Converse 1979; Page and Jones 
1979)—all factors that are in place well before a campaign gets underway. 
It is true that some scholars and journalists began questioning whether 
partisanship was still the driving force behind American voting behavior—with some 
even claiming that the two major parties were dead or in serious decline (Broder 1971; 
Burnham 1970; Fiorina 2002; Joslyn 1984; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976; Niemi and 
Weisberg 1976; Wattenberg 1984).  However, more recent research has found support for 
the conclusions of the 1940s that a person’s vote choice can be accurately predicted based 
on partisan affiliation (Bartels 2000; Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002; Miller 1991; 
Pomper 1998). 
Miller (1991), for example, illustrated that while the correlations between party 
identification and vote choice declined somewhat in the 1960s and early 1970s, it rose 
steadily throughout the following decade, concluding that “there is no indication from 
any recent election that party identification is less relevant to the vote decision in the 
1980s than it was three decades earlier” (565).  Zaller (1990) added to this body of 
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knowledge, showing that citizens filter political messages through their own values, 
accepting those that are consistent with their principles and rejecting those that are not.  
In a book he published two years later, Zaller (1992) also found that political awareness 
is directly tied to political polarization, with citizens who are highly aware of politics 
forming consistent and stable opinions that become even more entrenched when the 
debate among political elites becomes more partisan, such as during campaigns. 
Along these lines, Green, Palmquist and Schickler (2002) have pointed out that 
partisanship is particularly strong among those Americans who actually take the time to 
vote; and Bartels (2000) showed that “the impact of partisanship on voting behavior has 
increased markedly in recent years, both at the presidential level and at the congressional 
level” (35), a phenomenon he attributed partially to the influence of ideological extremes 
in both major parties.  Finally, in his attempt to “reexamine” the minimal effects model, 
Finkel (1993) maintained that most voters during the 1980s chose a presidential candidate 
before the national conventions and that attitude changes during the campaigns of 1980, 
1984 and 1988 accounted for a net impact of between 1 and 3 percent.  He added that 
while campaigns have the potential to bring significant changes at the ballot box, they 
typically serve more to activate the existing political predispositions of the electorate. 
To summarize, then, minimal effects theory is based on the notion that campaigns 
have little impact on the outcome of elections because (1) most voters, particularly those 
who pay close attention to politics, are highly partisan and have already decided for 
whom they will vote well in advance of the campaign season; (2) the voters who do make 
up their mind during the campaign make up a small portion of the overall electorate and 
are usually less likely to pay attention to events that occur on the campaign trail; (3) 
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elections results are too easily explained by other factors, such as the popularity of the 
incumbent and national economic conditions; and (4) most voters do not change their 
opinion enough during a campaign to alter their original vote choice.  Taken as a whole, 
this evidence strongly suggests that campaigns have little effect, thus raising serious 
questions about whether it is worth studying campaigns at all, let alone those involving 
third-party candidates with small partisan constituencies. 
Evidence of Campaign Effects 
 The answer is not so simple, though, and through the years enough evidence has 
surfaced to suggest that while not all voters are influenced by campaign events, some are, 
and while not all campaigns change enough minds to alter election outcomes, some do 
(Allsop and Weisberg 1988; Campbell 2000, 2001; Fenno 1996; Herr 2002; Holbrook 
1996, 2002).  Moreover, there has been discussion in the literature over just want 
constitutes a campaign effect, with some scholars arguing that campaigns should be 
viewed beyond just how they impact the election results to a broader definition that 
considers how campaigns stimulate learning within the electorate and force political 
leaders to reconnect with their constituents (Fenno 1996; Kahn and Kenney 2001).  To 
this school of thought, studies that fail to find strong campaign effects are simply looking 
in the wrong place.  In short, there may be evidence to support the notion that campaigns 
are worth studying because sometimes they help determine who wins and other times 
they serve a larger democratic function. 
Even the early election studies of the 1940s and 1950s suggested that campaigns 
might have some effects.  For example, one type of voter who may be prone to campaign 
persuasion are those who face what Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1968) called 
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“cross-pressures”—internal conflicts that make it difficult for them to decide between the 
Democratic and Republican candidates during an election.  Such conflict arises, the 
authors argued, when a voter has contradictory personality or social characteristics that 
make him or her inclined to support aspects of both political parties—such as a 
traditionally Democratic-leaning Catholic might experience if he or she were also part of 
the upper class, which would normally vote Republican.  Campbell, Converse, Miller, 
and Stokes (1960) concurred, saying this “psychological conflict” within the voter may 
occur when a person associates with groups that have a “political heterogeneous 
membership” (80)—that is, a voter has friends, family members, and coworkers who 
have opposing political views.  How voters resolve these conflicts sheds light on how 
these citizens are different from those who do not face cross-pressures as well as the 
impact a political campaign may have on helping voters make their decisions. 
In Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet’s study (1968), the authors suggested that 
many cross-pressured voters will delay their vote decision until late in the campaign.  
“The more evenly balanced these opposing pressures were,” the authors said, “the longer 
the voter delayed in making up his mind” (Lazarsfeld et al, 56).  In addition, Lazarsfeld, 
Berelson, and Gaudet said some voters delayed their decision in hopes that the internal 
conflict they felt would be resolved before they were forced to cast their ballot.  “A 
person might hope that during the campaign he could convince other members of his 
family, or even more, he might give the family every chance to bring him around to their 
way of thinking,” the authors wrote, adding—and this is key—that a cross-pressured 
voter “might wait for events in the campaign to provide him with a basis for making up 
his mind” (Lazarsfeld et al. 1968, 61). 
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The conclusions suggest that cross-pressured voters are influenced by both their 
immediate environment as well as campaigns.  For instance, Lazarsfeld et al. said cross-
pressured voters are heavily influenced by friends, coworkers, and family members, often 
basing their voting decision on the opinion of “the person who saw them last before 
Election Day” (67, 69).  However, the authors pointed out that because they are easily 
influenced, cross-pressured voters may also be more susceptible to the campaign 
messages of each candidate, particularly those they hear toward the end of the election 
cycle.  This carries great importance for political professionals, who may seek to target 
cross-pressured voters in the late stages of the campaign.  Lazarsfeld et al. (1968) 
recognized this point, explaining that “such conflicting pressures make voters ‘fair game’ 
for the campaign managers of both parties, for they have a foot in each party” (61). 
From this particular point of view, the heavy campaigning of both parties at the end of 
the campaign is a good investment for both sides … We will recall that the people who 
make up their minds last are those who think the election will affect them least.  It may 
be, then that explicit attempts by the candidates and their managers to prove to them that 
the election will make a difference to them would be more effective than any amount of 
continued argumentation of the issues as such (Lazarsfeld et al. 1968, 61). 
 
 Along these lines, Zaller (1992) showed that citizens who either have high or low 
political awareness are the least likely to change their views—the highly aware because 
they are interested in politics and have solidly formed opinions, and citizens who have 
little awareness because they are not receiving political messages and so cannot be 
persuaded either way.  Those who are moderately aware about politics, Zaller said, can 
be influenced by elite discourse because they receive enough information to absorb 
political messages, but they do not pay enough attention to distinguish the partisan cues 
behind the message and so have more difficulty rejecting ideas that may conflict with 
their political values.  Given this assessment, while campaigns might not reach the highly 
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partisan or the uninvolved, they could persuade moderately aware voters enough to 
influence the outcome of an election—particularly one as close as the 2004 Bush-Kerry 
contest. 
In addition, Zaller indicated that the intensity and type of a message can also 
impact the message’s influence.  High-intensity messages, such as those during a 
campaign, may have more influence because they are more likely to get through even to 
those citizens who pay little attention to politics.  Moreover, Zaller says citizens who are 
highly aware can still be persuaded by political messages when those messages are 
separated from ideology—in other words, when the citizen cannot tie the message to 
either the Democrats or Republicans.  Admittedly, campaigns are a time when messages 
are directly linked to political parties, meaning that highly aware citizens should be 
capable of distinguishing between those they will accept and those they will reject.  
However, research has also shown that political messages that are not connected directly 
to partisan cues may filter down to voters before a campaign actually begins and, 
therefore, have influence once candidates begin making their appeals.  Lang and Lang 
(1966) showed that some messages take root between elections and can persuade voters 
before they can identify them with certain parties or candidates.  In their assessment, 
Lang and Lang suggest that the news media—through its use of certain news frames—
often determine which issues will dominate a campaign long before a campaign begins, 
thus creating a cumulative effect on the public that comes into play once two candidates 
face off against each other. 
Campbell (2000) expanded on this line of thought, developing what he called “the 
theory of the predictable campaign” (28) in which he established that “the reason … 
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elections are predictable is not that campaigns have no effect, but that campaign effects 
themselves are largely predictable” (187).  In other words, Campbell said, campaigns 
must operate within a certain context based on such factors as the partisanship of the 
electorate, the state of the economy, and the popularity of the incumbent.  This context 
then shapes the actions taken by politicians during the campaign as well as how receptive 
voters are to the campaign messages they receive in a given year.  Under this reasoning, 
the real question about presidential campaigns is not so much whether they matter, but 
how much they matter … Perhaps the best characterization of campaign effects is that 
they are neither large nor minimal in an absolute sense, but sometimes large enough to be 
politically important (Campbell, 2000, 187, 188). 
 
While many scholars who challenge the minimal effects paradigm head-on 
acknowledge that most campaigns have swayed too few voters to make much difference 
in the majority of American elections, they nevertheless contend that there are numerous 
cases in which a campaign either increased the vote total of one of the candidates or, in 
some instances, actually determined the winner of a presidential contest. 
Campbell (2000), for example, found that campaign effects account for an 
average net change in the national vote of 6 to 9 percent, a differential that was able to 
turn the tide in at least two elections during the 20th century—1948 and 1960.  Later, 
Campbell (2001) added three other elections to this list, saying that campaign effects may 
have contributed to the outcomes of the 1976, 1980, and 2000 presidential contests.  His 
analysis found support in Holbrook (2002), who illustrated that Harry S. Truman’s 
aggressive Whistle-Stop campaign in 1948 was directly responsible for the Democrat’s 
victories in California, Illinois, and Ohio—three states that allowed him to capture the 
White House.  Without this strategy, Holbook maintains, the Chicago Tribune’s famous 
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Election Day headline declaring Republican Thomas Dewey the winner would have been 
correct and the newspaper would have been spared decades of embarrassment. 
Other studies report similar campaign effects, even in cases in which the election 
outcome was never in doubt.  Shaw’s (1999a) analysis of the three presidential 
campaigns between 1988 and 1996 showed that a candidate could increase his level of 
support by as much as 2.1 percent if he devoted three additional days to a particular state; 
Herr (2002) found that Bill Clinton was able to use public appearances in 1996 to capture 
votes that would otherwise have gone to Republican Bob Dole or independent Ross 
Perot; Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde (1991) indicated that Bush’s decision in 1988 to 
consistently attack Michael Dukakis was effective at swaying undecided voters because 
the Democrat did not respond; Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) reported that exposure 
to political advertisements can influence less partisan voters and boost a candidate’s share 
of the vote by nearly 5 percentage points; and Petrocik (1996) developed the concept of 
“issue ownership” to show that presidential candidates between 1960 and 1992 were able 
to win elections when the issues they defined as their own dominated the campaign 
discourse. 
In addition to studies that examined overall changes in the vote, some research 
indicates that certain campaign events have more powerful effects than others.  Shaw 
(1999b) found that campaign speeches have minimal impact on the electorate, but 
presidential debates and national conventions have larger and longer lasting effects on 
voters, a contention that was held up by Campbell, Cherry and Wink (1992) and Geer 
(1988).  Holbrook (1996) uncovered similar effects in his studies of presidential politics 
from 1952 to 1992.  It is true, Holbrook said, that economic conditions and the general 
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political mood of the country are major factors that tend to push the electorate toward a 
predetermined election outcome, but he added that public opinion does change—
sometimes significantly—in response to major campaign events such as national 
conventions and televised debates. 
Studies of congressional contests have also revealed evidence of campaign 
effects.  Jacobson (1990) showed that challengers in House elections can increase their 
vote share by as much as 12 percent if they have enough money to compete; Fenno 
(1996) reinforced this notion with a qualitative examination of U.S. Senate races from the 
1970s to the 1990s that found numerous cases in which poorly run campaigns cost 
incumbents their seats; Herrnson (1989) revealed that the outcome of close congressional 
races can be determined by money and campaign services (polling data, media kits, legal 
advice, and strategic support) that are infused into the campaign by the national parties; 
and Jacobson and Kernell (1981) maintained that while national conditions shape the 
context of elections for the U.S. House and Senate, a well-run campaign can mean the 
difference between winning and losing a congressional seat. 
 In summary, the current research suggests that campaigns are indeed worth 
studying because (1) some voters, such as those who face cross-pressures or are naturally 
less partisan, can be influenced by the information they receive during a campaign; (2) 
certain campaign events, such as political debates and national conventions, can have 
long-term impact on voter perceptions; and (3) there are at least a handful of presidential 
election outcomes that appear to have been decided by the campaign strategies employed 
by the candidates, most notably those of 1948 and 1960 and possibly those in 1976, 1980, 
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and 2000.  Given this research, then, it would seem that campaigns may indeed matter—
at least some of the time. 
Aside from the studies mentioned thus far that try to measure how certain 
campaign events change public opinion, some scholars insist that campaigns matter not 
because of how they alter individual vote choice or election results, but rather for the vital 
role they play in American society.  To them, campaigns are not so much contests 
between individuals as they are key moments in the nation’s political life cycle—a time 
when elected leaders are required to reconnect with their constituents (Alvarez 1997; 
Fenno 1996; Kahn and Kenney 2001; Shaw 1999a), citizens learn about the issues and 
choices before them (Bartels 1988; Brians and Wattenberg 1996; Drew and Weaver 
2006; Dutwin 2000; Franklin 1991; Holbrook 1999; Jamieson, Hagen, Orr, Sillaman, 
Morse, and Kirn 2000; Kahn and Kenney 2001; Lodge, Steenbergen and Brau 1995; 
Popkin 1991; Weaver 1996), and democratic institutions and values are legitimized 
(Gronbeck 1978; Katz 1997; Pomper 1967).  Campaigns have come to be seen as so vital, 
in fact, that to most Americans “it is difficult to imagine a truly democratic process 
without [them]” (Shaw 1999a, 345). 
Fenno (1996), for example, concluded that campaigns were important because 
they are “an integral part of the continuous negotiating process by which elected officials 
forge and test, reforge and retest, their connections with their constituents” (154).  It is 
through this ritual, he said, that candidates are forced to leave the insolated confines of 
elective office and reacquaint themselves with the community and people they represent.  
This process is so important to the continued health of representative democracy, he 
added, that the study of campaigns should move “beyond the dominating focus on voters 
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and beyond the dominant notion that campaigns are worth studying only to explain 
electoral outcomes toward the study of representation” (Fenno 1996, 336). 
Other studies have documented that voters use campaigns to gain knowledge 
about the political system and learn about the issue positions of candidates (Brians and 
Wattenberg 1996; Holbrook 1999).  Jamieson et al. (2000) illustrated that citizen learning 
is particularly strong during campaigns that are hotly contested.  In their analysis of the 
2000 presidential primary season, for instances, Jamieson et al. found that citizens in 
battleground states not only learned more about issues from the campaign than did those 
in less competitive states, they used the information they acquired to shape their voting 
decisions.  Similar results were reported by Dutwin (2000), who found that Republican 
presidential candidate John McCain was more easily recognized in states where he 
campaigned heavily than he was in states were he appeared less often (90 percent to 70 
percent). 
Finally, campaigns are seen as important by some because they strengthen 
democratic institutions.  Neubauer (1967) pointed out that “by definition, political 
democracy in nation-states requires some minimal level of citizen participation in 
decision making,” a process that has traditionally been played by elections and 
campaigns (1002).  It is through that process of electioneering, some have said, that 
society legitimizes its institutions and reaffirms its commitment to core democratic 
principles.  As one scholar wrote, campaigning 
ultimately legitimates itself as much as it does its instrumental output.  As people engage 
in campaign activities, they symbolically reinforce the values for which the activities 
stand.  Each time one waits in a long line to vote, one is committed even more deeply to 
the value of voting—“participatory democracy.”  Each time one hands out campaign 
literature on a street corner, the literature itself acquires more significance because we 
value “political information” as a systemic “right.”  Each time a debate is held, America’s 
commitment to “open inquiry” and “freedom of examination” deepens.  Each time a baby 
is kissed, another citizen discovers that “the people count.”  And each time another 
 41 
candidate says “I was a poor boy myself,” the American Dream is born anew.  Thus each 
time the country spends its tens of millions on an election, it commits itself to as much if 
not more the next time; that is not only a matter of inflation but of moral dedication as 
well.  Hence, presidential campaigning is an almost insidiously self-reinforcing or self-
justifying activity (Gronbeck 1978, 272-273). 
 
The point here is that campaigns serve a higher purpose.  They matter not solely 
because of what they have to say on Election Day, but because they bring citizens closer 
to their elected leaders, educate voters about important issues, and bring legitimacy to 
government.  It is perhaps these last points that have the greatest implications for a 
dissertation that examines how third-party candidates are covered in the news media.  For 
if the definition of campaign effects no longer rests entirely on electoral outcomes, then 
how political reporters cover minor-party contenders moves beyond a simple discussion 
of fairness to a broader debate about the long-term health of our democracy. 
Literature on third parties 
 Throughout the years, scholars have shown a fascination with third parties, 
producing a rich body of literature that examines everything from the role minor parties 
have played in American history to explanations as to why certain people may be 
predisposed to voting for “alternative” candidates.  As early as 1933, Hicks proclaimed 
that third parties had successfully influenced the two major parties throughout the 19th 
and early 20th centuries, bringing about such changes as “the abolition of slavery, the 
restoration of ‘home rule’ in the South, the regulation of the railroads by state and nation, 
the revision of the banking and currency systems … [and] the conservation of natural 
resources” (27).  While third-party candidates had not won many elections, he wrote, 
“what is of infinitely greater consequence is the final success of so many of the principles 
for which they have fought” (Hicks 1933, 26). 
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 Since then, other scholars have attempted to document these successes, examining 
such issues as the formation of the National Progressives of America to fight for the 
regulation of big business (McCoy 1957), the creation of the Republican Party in the 
North in the 1850s to fight the expansion of slavery (Gienapp 1985; Mazmanian 1974), 
the influence of the Conservative Unionists during the 1864 presidential election (Harris 
1992), and the rise and fall of the Progress Party in the 1890s (Argersinger 2002; Key 
1952).  Still other studies have taken a closer look at the American Labor movement of 
the 1930s (Lovin 1976), how environmental and cultural factors helped the Socialist 
Party gain support in  the West during the early 20th century (Berman 1990), and how the 
National Women’s Party was able to successfully push for a constitutional amendment on 
women’s suffrage after the state-by-state battles advocated by the more moderate 
National American Woman Suffrage Association yielded small gains (Cott 1984; Graham 
1983-1984; Lunardini and Knock 1980-1981). 
 A common thread that runs through each of these studies is the notion that 
American democracy has thrived because minor parties have challenged the two-party 
system.  In raising issues that the two major parties had chosen to ignore, some have 
implied, small political movements have forced an array of subjects onto the national 
agenda and helped move America closer to one of its stated ideals—the concept that all 
people have a voice in the marketplace of ideas.  As one group of scholars put it: 
Third parties are … in fact necessary voices for the preservation of democracy.  They 
represent the needs and demands of Americans whom the major parties have ignored…  
In short, third parties should not be viewed as organizations that stand outside the 
mainstream of the American political system.  They are very much a central part of it.  
Minor parties provide voters with an important opportunity to express their discontent.  
This makes third party support one of the clearest barometers we have of the electorate’s 




 Given the significance of third parties throughout American history—a subject 
that was thoroughly covered in Chapter 1—this section of the literature review will turn 
its attention to three major questions of importance for this dissertation.  First, why does 
the United States have a two-party system and is this a natural part of American politics?  
Second, who votes for third-party candidates and under what circumstances?  Third, why 
do minor-party candidates usually lose elections?  A fourth question—how has the press 
treated so-called alternative candidates when they seek national and state office?—will be 
discussed in more detail at the end of this chapter.  The answers to all these questions, 
however, will establish the context through which third-party candidates are currently 
viewed in the American political environment. 
Debating the American party system. 
 Perhaps the biggest advocate of a multiparty system in America is Cornell 
University government professor Theodore Lowi, who has long said that the time is right 
for a third party in the United States to emerge.  In 1983, Lowi wrote an article for the 
journal PS in which he called on the American Political Science Association to begin a 
dialogue that would directly confront the conventional wisdom that two major parties 
were a natural part of American political culture.  Arguing that the post New Deal era had 
“produced conditions inhospitable to a national two-party system” (700), Lowi (1983) 
said that the Democrats and Republicans alone “simply cannot grapple with the complex 
alternatives facing big, programmatic governments in a manner that is meaningful to 
large electorates” (705). 
 In his paper, however, Lowi acknowledged that America would never move 
toward a multiparty system unless it first dismantled nine myths that, he said, help keep 
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the two-party system in place: (1) American democracy has always been based on a two-
party system; (2) the two-party system brings significant public benefits, such as 
automatic majorities and stable government; (3) the two-party system is natural to the 
political framework established by both the Constitution and state statutes (namely the 
Electoral College and the single-member district system for Congress); (4) voting for 
third-party candidates is tantamount to wasting your vote; (5) a vote for a third-party 
candidate helps elect the worst of the two major-party contenders; (6) multiple party 
representation in Congress would bring chaos to the system; (7) a third-party presidential 
candidate who won enough electoral votes to push the election into the U.S. House would 
result in a constitutional crisis; (8) third parties that do well at the polls would give a 
small minority veto power over the majority; and (9) a third-party president would be 
unable to govern because Congress would be controlled by one of the two major parties. 
 Lowi said that many of the political scenarios listed above either already exist, 
were nonsense on their face, or would not present the problem that critics of a multiparty 
system predict.  “In the first place,” he wrote, “if a two-party system is so natural, why 
are there so many rules and laws defending it?” (702).  He questioned why voters should 
have to choose between two major-party candidates “if they have concluded that both 
major candidates are worst” (703); he said it was doubtful that two parties automatically 
form majorities given that historically there has been little party cohesion in Congress; 
and he disputed the notion that third parties would create havoc in the system, arguing 
that “the defenders of the status quo will always invoke the specter of constitutional crisis 
when in fact constitutional crisis is contemplated by the Constitution itself” (704).  He 
added: 
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Party systems, like governments, are to a large extent built on myths.  And as with 
government myths, party system myths are a powerful defense against criticism and 
change…  During the past 20 years or more, the reality of the American party system has 
deviated so far from the ideal image that the myths supporting it should have been 
exposed for what they are.  But myths die hard, as long as high priests in academe and 
journalism rise to their defense (Lowi 1983, 700-701). 
  
In another article written more than a decade later, Lowi (1999) called the current 
two-party system “brain-dead,” adding that the political domination of the Democrats and 
Republicans “would collapse in an instant” without the array of state election laws that 
protect them against serious outside competition (171).  He said that when political 
parties are new, they are innovative and democratic.  But as they become entrenched in 
the establishment, those same organizations become less dynamic, more interested in 
preserving their own power, and act to thwart serious debate on important public policy 
problems.  The final result, Lowi (1999) said, are two major parties that must “be all 
things to all people” (178)—a position that helps them garner the 51 percent support 
needed at the polls to command control over the government, but one that forces them to 
compromise on too many of their principles to be effective once they attain power.  
“What a liberating effect this would have on party leaders and candidates, to go after 
constituencies composed of 34 percent rather than 51 percent,” he wrote.  “In a three-
party system, even the two major parties would have stronger incentives to be more 
clearly programmatic, since their goal would be realistic and their constituency base 
would be simpler” (Lowi 1999, 178). 
Lowi’s position is seconded by Lawson (1997), who maintains that America 
already has a multiparty system but that it is severely constrained by the Democrats and 
Republicans.  Contending that a multiparty system “is more natural” than the “bi-
hegemonic” one present in the United States (59), Lawson said changes in American 
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electoral laws that would allow third parties to flourish would increase free expression, 
provide better protections for minority rights, enhance majority rule, and significantly 
increase voter participation.  She said several measures can be taken to avoid the 
government paralysis of other multiparty systems, such as instituting run-off elections 
and maintaining a certain number of single-member congressional districts; and she 
called for five changes in election law to end the domination of the two major parties, 
including the abolition of laws that discourage the formation of new parties, public 
financing for all campaigns, an end to private donations and the use of personal bank 
accounts to operate campaigns, free media to all candidates, and a move toward 
proportional representation in Congress rather than the current use of single-member 
districts. 
 Other ideas. Other ideas have also been put forth.  Fresia (1986) has called for 
proportional representation in Congress as well as changes in the Constitution that would 
replace the Electoral College system of electing presidents with a direct vote by the 
people—with runoffs, if necessary.  That view found support in Richie and Hill (1996), 
who said a system of proportional representation would open the door to new political 
parties, thus increasing political participation by giving voters more choices.  Said the 
authors: 
The implications of proportional representation will be clear to those who believe more 
credible third parties would strengthen our democracy.  Today, third-party candidates are 
usually ignored because winning 10 percent of the vote makes them at best “spoilers.”  
Third parties are trapped in a vicious cycle of marginalization: many potential supporters 
will not want to waste their votes on sure losers because it would take votes away from 
their “lesser of two evils.” [Proportional representation] would dramatically change this 
calculation. It would free people to vote their hearts, not their fears, thereby breaking the 
two-party stranglehold on representation and promoting the new voices and real choices 
we urgently need (Richie and Hill 1996, 24-25). 
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 Other scholars have suggested a system known as “approval voting,” in which 
voters can cast ballots for as many candidates as they want in a given race (Brams and 
Fishburn 1978; Brams and Merrill 1994).  Such a system, advocates contend, is “more 
sincere and more strategyproof” than the single-ballot system used in the United States 
and would allow voters to choose two or three candidates in a multi-candidate race for 
Congress, giving voters a greater number of choices and increasing the chances that 
voters will “report their true preferences” on Election Day rather than defaulting to the 
Democratic or Republican nominee (Brams and Fishburn 1978, 832).   
 Brams and Fishburn (1978) say that an approval voting system would likely 
change the outcome of many elections, such as New York state’s three-way U.S. Senate 
campaign in 1970.  In that race, the authors point out, the conservative James R. Buckley 
was elected with only 39 percent of the vote, beating the two liberal candidates, Charles 
E. Goodell and Richard L. Ottinger, who split the majority vote.  The authors said that 
with an approval voting system, many people who voted for either Goodell or Ottinger 
would have voted for both, increasing the chances that one of the two left-wing 
candidates would have won.  “If approval voting had been used,” the authors write, “the 
outcome probably would have been different since a number of the 61 percent who 
supported either Goodell or Ottinger would have voted for both Goodell and Ottinger in 
an attempt to ensure that Buckley would not win” (Brams and Fishburn 1978, 832). 
 Brams and Merrill (1994) continued this analysis of approval voting in another 
study that examined the 1992 presidential election to determine whether Perot would 
have won if voters were free to cast ballots for multiple candidates.  The study concluded 
that Perot would have “at least doubled his vote total,” but it would not have changed the 
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outcome of the election.  Instead, the paper said that an approval voting system would 
likely have given Clinton the victory with more than 50 percent of the popular vote. 
(Clinton won the election with 43 percent of the vote.) 
 Defending the two-party system.  But not everyone agrees with the notion that 
structural changes should be implemented to foster multiple parties.  Some scholars 
maintain that a public discourse that is limited to the major parties or a small number of 
candidates actually brings political stability, legitimacy, and accountability to the 
American electoral system (Bibby 1997).  Government is better able to serve the public, 
Broder (1971) has said, if its under the control of two healthy major parties rather than if 
it is divided between multiple smaller ones.  He said that if the Democratic and 
Republican parties were to weaken or collapse, it would make government less effective, 
lead to public frustration, and raise the specter that voters could eventually support a 
demagogue who threatens democratic institutions. 
 From a practical standpoint, Romance (1998) warned that America might head 
down a dangerous path if it chose to open the Pandora’s box of Constitutional 
amendments and other legal changes that would be required to increase multiparty 
participation in politics.  “Before we start changing laws and spending time and money 
reforming the system,” he said, “we should be reasonably sure of what we are doing.  Let 
me be clear, a multiparty system would mean significant changes in our political 
practices and, possibly, would necessitate major reforms to the foundation of our political 
order” (Romance 1998, 33). 
 To these scholars, there are many advantages to the current system that 
encourages only two major parties.  First, the two-party system makes it easier for voters 
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to hold leaders accountable because it is clear which party controls government and is 
responsible for the results of policy; second, two-party systems avoid gridlock in a 
diverse nation like the United States because it forces people from a wide-range of 
political perspectives to work together in governing coalitions; third, the two-party 
system naturally developed through the separation of powers concept enshrined in the 
Constitution; and fourth, a two-party system avoids extremism by encouraging moderate 
parties that can only win if they appeal to a wide group of voters (see Bibby 1997; Bibby 
and Maisel 2003; Romance 1998). 
 Beyond this, the two-party system is directly tied into the very fabric of American 
culture.  Although it is true that the Founding Fathers would have preferred a politics free 
from partisan factions, there is no denying that “the constitutional structure they put in 
place practically guaranteed the development not only of parties but of a particular kind 
of party system: two-party democracy” (Reichley 1992, 28).  In addition, the United 
States is different from other western countries that have developed multiple parties, 
Reichley (1992) says, because American politics has been historically centered around 
two ideological traditions: a republican tradition with links to Alexander Hamilton and a 
liberal tradition that comes from Thomas Jefferson.  While both ideologies “cherish 
individual freedom,” Reichley says, republicanism emphasizes the rights of investors and 
others to promote economic growth while liberals focus on individual liberty and the 
“almost unlimited right to socially unrestrained expression and behavior not physically 
harmful to others” (3, 4).  This political culture, Reichley maintains, makes it highly 
unlikely that America will ever move beyond two major parties, adding that “a two-party 
system representing these two traditions is in this sense natural to our politics” (4). 
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 Third parties—past and future.  Yet despite these powerful forces that work 
against third parties, these small movements have not only been part of the country’s 
political system for more than 200 years, some predict they will continue to grow.  
Smallwood (1983) pointed out that “the overall performance of third parties has been 
stronger than might be expected in light of the cultural and institutional influences that 
have helped to reinforce the two-party monopoly” (13); White and Shea (2000) maintain 
that while “the chips are clearly stacked against third parties … it seems entirely likely 
that minor parties will find the political environment in the next millennium more 
hospitable than during the past one hundred years” (296, 299); and—in a kind of 
manifesto of Green Party philosophy—Rensenbrink (1992) wrote: “… Greens will be 
more and more successful, even in the conventional sense.  Over the long haul, they and 
their message for the world will prevail” (234). 
 Why the confidence? 
 And if it is true that American politics has naturally gravitated to just two major 
parties, why is it that third parties have been so consistently part of the political 
landscape? 
Theories of third-party voting. 
 There have been several attempts over the years to answer these questions by 
forming general theories to explain when third parties form and why voters cast ballots 
for them.  Although many of these theories grow out of the analysis of individual third-
party movements, a number of patterns have emerged in the literature. 
 One of the most popular explanations for third-party voting is that certain citizens 
are predisposed to support minor candidates.  These citizens make up what has been 
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dubbed an “alternative culture” (see Gold 2005, 524) in which age, education, 
occupation, distrust of government, and political cynicism all act as predictors of the 
third-party vote (Converse, Miller, Rusk, and Wolfe 1969; Elliott, Gryski and Reed 1990; 
Hetherington 1999; Ladd 1981; Lipset and Raab 1970; McEvoy 1971; Phillips 1982; 
Reiter 1977; Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus 1996; Southwell and Everest 1998).  
Peterson and Wrighton (1998), for example, found that low-partisan independents who 
shared a strong distrust in government were more likely than other citizens to vote for 
third-party presidential candidates, while Elliott, Gryski and Reed (1990) concluded that 
“more educated voters … may be more prone to support third party efforts” (130).  Other 
studies showed that Perot received a higher percentage of the vote from citizens who 
expressed cynicism about politics (Southwell and Everest 1998) as well as those who 
were under the age of 30 (Southwell 2002); and Converse et al (1969) indicated that 
younger voters, particularly those from rural areas in the South, were predisposed to vote 
for George Wallace’s independent candidacy in 1968. 
 Gold (2005) challenged this notion of an “alternative culture,” arguing that his 
study of three successful gubernatorial third-party candidates found no evidence of a 
predisposition predicated on age, education, and socioeconomic status.  Instead, Gold 
said that citizens who supported such alternative candidates as Walter Hickel in Alaska, 
Lowell P. Weicker Jr. in Connecticut, and Angus King of Maine made up what he called 
a “culture of independence” (538) that included voters who were not registered in a 
political party and who had voted for a minor-party candidate in the past—in Gold’s 
words, those who had “demonstrated a past relationship with a third party” (538).  These 
 52 
results supported his previous findings in a study of minor-party success in Maine in 
1994 and 1998 and Minnesota in 1998 (Gold 2002). 
 Local explanations. Reiter and Walsh (1995) agreed that there was little evidence 
of an “alternative culture,” but said their analysis of three statewide elections indicated 
that support for third parties at the local level was based more on local factors than any 
broad characteristics that could be applied to the national electorate as a whole.  For 
example, the authors contend that James Longley was able to win the 1974 gubernatorial 
election in Maine as an independent because of his reputation for integrity and his 
hometown appeal, while the 1990 victories of independents Weicker in Connecticut 
(governor) and Bernard Sanders in Vermont (U.S. Congress) were based on their strong 
name recognition and attractive ideologies that stressed fiscal conservatism and social 
liberalism.  In Weicker’s case, many Democrats were willing to abandon their own 
candidate and vote for the A Connecticut Party contender not because they were tired of 
the two-party system but because they saw it as the best way to ensure that conservative 
Republican John Rowland did not capture the statehouse (Murphy 1992).  Likewise, 
Endersby and Thomason (1994) demonstrated that Sanders capitalized on local 
conditions to win his first term to Congress, putting together a coalition of liberal 
Democrats who had no one else to support because their party had nominated a weak 
candidate and conservative Republicans who were angry with their party’s moderate 
incumbent, Peter Smith. 
 Distrust in government?  Others have disputed the contention that voter cynicism 
is a driving force behind third-party voting.  Although he did not take on the notion of an 
“alternative culture” directly, Koch (1998) nevertheless demonstrated that it is the 
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support of third-party candidates that leads to an increased distrust in government rather 
than the other way around.  Arguing against the edict that “models of third party support 
assume causality flows from political cynicism to candidate support” (142), Koch’s 
analysis of data gathered by the American National Election Study showed that those 
who voted for either President George Bush or Democratic candidate Bill Clinton in 1992 
actually expressed more cynicism toward government when surveyed in 1990 than did 
those who eventually voted for Perot.  However, Koch’s study found evidence that Perot 
supporters became more cynical toward government as the campaign went on. 
Did Perot himself, with his incessant rhetoric on the problems of the contemporary 
political order modify and politicize his supporters’ political cynicism, creating 
distinctions between Perot voters and others that did not exist prior to his candidacy 
…The picture that emerges is of a group of citizens who were generally similar to other 
voters in 1990 and 1991 in terms of their discontent with the contemporary political 
process and its leaders, but who became exceptionally more cynical during the 1992 
election as a result of the Perot candidacy (Koch 1998, 144, 146). 
  
 Geographic explanations. Geographical explanations have also surfaced to 
explain minor-party success, with some states showing stronger patterns of third-party 
support than other states.  During the 2000 presidential campaign, for example, Ralph 
Nader did particularly well in Alaska, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Colorado, Hawaii, 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont—all states that also gave significant support 
to Ross Perot in the 1990s and John Anderson in 1980 (Allen and Brox 2005).  Taking a 
slightly different tact, Elliott, Gryski and Reed’s (1990) analysis of state legislative races 
between 1976 and 1984 found stronger support for third parties in the West than in the 
South. 
 Part of the reason for these geographical differences, the scholarship has shown, is 
that some states have implemented election laws that make it easier for smaller parties to 
compete with and occasionally defeat the Democrats and Republicans (Gillespie 1993; 
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Lentz 2002; Winger 1997).  In New York, for example, the so-called “fusion” laws 
permit minor parties to cross-endorse major-party candidates, a practice that allows them 
to demonstrate their electoral power and have a say in public policy (Scarrow 1986; 
Michelson and Susin 2004).  Other states, such as Maine, have generous public financing 
statutes that provide statewide candidates of any party with substantial funds as long as 
they demonstrate a measure of public support and agree not to raise money from private 
sources (Chapter 14: The Maine Clean Election Act).  In addition, Ventura was assisted 
by Minnesota’s liberal regulations that made it easier for him to get on the ballot, register 
new voters as late as Election Day, gain access to public financing, and participate in the 
gubernatorial debates—all factors that led the news media to take his candidacy seriously 
(Frank and Wagner 1999; Lacy and Monson 2002; Lentz 2002).3 
 Three reasons for third-party voting. The most comprehensive attempt to form a 
theory of third-party voting, though, was put forth by Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus 
(1996), who said there are three reasons why people will vote for a minor-party 
candidate: when citizens believe that the major parties have deteriorated to the point 
where they no longer function effectively; when an attractive third-party candidate is on 
the ballot; or when voters begin to feel loyalty to a minor party.  The authors contend that 
“the third party route is a path of last resort” for most voters, but they add that citizens 
will eventually cast their ballot for a minor-party candidate when it becomes clear that 
“further action within the major parties would prove fruitless,” particularly when the 
                                                 
3
 In Minnesota, the Reform Party was considered a major party in 1998 because its candidates had won 
more than 5 percent of the vote in the previous statewide election.  Ross Perot had won 24 percent in the 
1992 presidential election and Dean Barkley had won 5 and 7 percent of the vote in the 1994 and 1996 U.S. 
Senate contests. 
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major parties have either mismanaged the economy or nominated unqualified candidates 
who are unacceptable to the electorate (Rosenstone et al. 1996, 126). 
 These arguments have found some support in the literature.  Examining the 
presidential campaigns between 1976 and 1988, for instance, Chressanthis and Shaffer 
(1993) concluded that voters gravitate to third-party candidates when they perceive that 
the major parties have failed to address major national problems.  Similar results were 
reported by Collet (1996) in his analysis of National Election Survey data over the second 
half of the 20th century as well as McCann, Rapoport and Stone (1999) in their 
examination of Perot’s initial support in the early days of the 1992 campaign.  Lentz 
(2002) suggests that the same may be true at the state level, pointing out that Ventura was 
able to win the Minnesota governorship in 1998 partially because the Democratic Party 
was fractured and partly because voters were angry with the two-party system. 
 Gold (1995) agrees with this assessment, but adds that third parties also do well 
when the major-party candidates are unattractive, when the third-party candidate is 
prestigious, during periods of low partisanship, and when one of the major candidates has 
such a large lead over the other major-party candidate that voters feel they can cast a 
ballot for a minor party without fear of “wasting” their vote (Gold 1995, 752-753).  Still 
others have indicated that some citizens make a rational choice to vote for third parties, 
using their ballot to transmit an individual preference that “in the aggregate” they hope 
will be “interpreted as a signal to alter the direction of current policies as run by the 
major parties” (Chressanthis 1990, 193). 
 The Rosenstone et al. (1996) contention that some third-party voting is based on a 
loyal following of party constituents has also been supported by scholarship.  Doctrinal 
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parties such as the Libertarians, Socialists, and Communists have attracted highly 
committed followers who identify with and actively work to build these organizations 
(Gillespie 1993).  Allen and Brox (2005) demonstrated that most of Nader’s voters during 
the 2000 presidential election would have supported other third-party candidates or 
would not have voted at all had Nader not been in the race; and Donovan, Bowler, and 
Terrio (2000) showed that support for third-party candidates in California is based 
somewhat on a group of party loyalists who vote for minor candidates regardless of who 
the two major parties nominate.  Through an analysis of minor-party voting in the Golden 
State, the authors conclude: 
[W]e find a core of loyal (registered) supporters of these small parties.  The fairly 
substantive independent effect of minor party registration across high-visibility and low-
visibility state offices suggests that many minor party loyalists select small-party 
candidates regardless of the stakes of the office or their evaluations of major party 
candidates.  Rather than being attracted to prestigious candidates, some voters are 
probably attracted to these small parties because of the positions they take on public 
issues or because of some sort of socialization process that led them to become loyal to 
the party.  At present only a small proportion of the electorate fall into this category 
(Donovan, Bowler, and Terrio 2000, 67). 
 
 Why third parties form. A related questions is why do third parties form in the 
first place.  Looking at the protest movements that consistently developed during the 19th 
century, Hicks (1933) wrote that “third parties have come about as natural by-products of 
our diverse sectional interests” (27) while Mazmanian (1974) said simply that third 
parties are a product of times of crisis.  Key (1952) maintains that many dissident 
movements begin as pressure groups and only form into alternative political parties when 
the major parties fail to give those groups “a real hearing” (300), a contention that finds 
support in several recent studies of individual third-party movements (Cott 1984; Graham 
1983-1984; Lunardini and Knock 1980-1981; White and Shea 2000).  Sifry (2003) takes 
a slightly different position, saying that third-party movements blossom when the two-
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party system becomes corrupt, leaving the public with the impression that the major 
parties act with impunity in a system that does not hold them accountable. 
 Nevertheless, Sifry has tried to move the debate beyond an analysis of why and 
when third parties find support to a discussion of how minor parties may thrive in the 
future.  According to his analysis, a third party will become a serious long-term challenge 
to the Democrats and Republicans only when it lets go of presidential aspirations and 
starts building a grassroots organization that can consistently field candidates for lower 
offices such as governor, state legislature, and city council.  It is through such party 
building, Sifry says, that a minor party might eventually grow into a national movement 
with broad support, a contention that has found support among other scholars (see Lowi 
1999).  Holding up the Greens, Libertarians, New Party, and Labor Party as four small 
organizations with the potential to grow national followings, Sifry says that voters will 
only begin to take these third parties seriously when they can demonstrate progress 
toward electoral success and when they can jump three major hurdles: money, 
organization, and public awareness.  Until then, Sifry says, third parties may find it 
difficult if not impossible to attract the national following that will eventually be needed 
to challenge the Democrats and Republicans. 
 This last point leads to our third question: Why do third parties consistently lose? 
Why third-party candidates lose. 
 One of the biggest explanations for why third-party candidates usually fail at the 
ballot box rests with the partisanship of the American electorate.  According to this 
analysis, most voters are simply too loyal to one of the major parties as well as the 
political system as a whole to abandon the Democrats and Republicans for the politically 
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unknown (Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus 1996; Zaller and Hunt 1995).  This loyalty to 
the major parties makes the cost of voting for third-party candidates too high for most 
citizens (Downs 1957), while the partisanship of most voters creates an electorate that 
tends to interpret campaign issues from the perspective of the party with which they 
identify (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960).  The “habitual loyalties” of most 
voters, Zaller and Hunt (1995, 120) said, means that “candidates cannot … run outside of 
the system; they must somehow run through it.” 
 Structural barriers. But even running through the system is difficult because of 
the many structural barriers in place that make it difficult for minor parties to compete on 
a level playing field (Lowi 1999; Rosenstone et al. 1996).  Dwyre and Kolodny (1997) 
have pointed out that election laws in many states make it difficult for minor-party 
contenders to get on the ballot or raise money to finance their campaigns.  For example, 
third-party candidates at the federal level cannot receive public funding unless they first 
receive 5 percent of the vote, meaning that this money is not available to them when it is 
most needed—before the election (Dwyre and Kolodny 1997). 
 This observation is buttressed by examinations of Perot’s 1992 campaign, where 
the exception may prove the rule.  Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus (1996), for instance, 
have said that “what distinguishes Perot from his predecessors, foremost, and what 
explains much of his phenomenal showing in 1992, is money, and plenty of it” (232).  
The millions Perot had to spend was unusual for a third-party candidate, the authors said, 
adding that his money allowed Perot to break two other barriers that often restrain third-
party challengers: he received extensive media coverage and he appeared “shoulder-to-
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shoulder with both major party candidates in televised presidential debates” (Rosenstone 
et al. 1996, 232.) 
 Gold (1995) agreed: 
The evidence presented here suggests that systematic explanations for third party success 
are of limited use in explaining Perot’s breakthrough, especially when compared to 
previous third party experiences. By process of elimination, one must conclude that the 
candidate’s ability to spend money—at a level that rivaled the expenditures of the major 
parties—was indeed the single most important factor in explaining the Perot phenomenon 
(770). 
 
 In addition to the lack of money, some scholars have pointed out that third-party 
presidential candidates will continue to face an uphill battle as long as the United States 
continues to use the Electoral College system and its winner-take-all method of allocating 
most electoral votes (Abramson, Aldrich, Paolino and Rohde 1995).  At the congressional 
level, Abramson et al. (1995) said, minor parties will have difficulty winning because 
American elections are decided on a single ballot without runoffs.  While minor-party 
candidates might do well in a voting district—and even finish second in some—they 
cannot get a plurality in any one district to win a seat in the legislative body, the authors 
contend.  Although they said that “the psychological effects of the plurality-vote system 
are … difficult to document,” they point out that “the argument that voters should avoid 
wasting their votes on a candidate who has little chance of winning is well known to 
politicians and has been used frequently by them” (Abramson, Aldrich, Paolino and 
Rohde 1995, 354). 
 The effect of this psychological barrier between third-party candidates and voters 
has been seen as so powerful that it has been given the status of a physical law—to be 
specific, “Duverger’s law,” after the political scientist who first articulated the notion that 
election regulations can dictate the type of party system that exists.  Under this reasoning, 
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voters operating in a winner-take-all election system like that in the United States will be 
reluctant to cast their ballot for a third-party candidate because they do not want to waste 
their vote or contribute to the election of their least favorite candidate.  As Duverger 
himself (1972) put it:  “The simple-majority single-ballot system favors the two-party 
system” while “the simple-majority system with second ballot and proportional 
representation favor multi-partyism” (217, 239).  Although Duverger’s law has been 
ridiculed by some (Lowi 1999), others contend that it has stood the test of time and found 
support in countless studies over the years (Riker 1982). 
 Exclusion from debates. Another reason that third parties fail to resonate, some 
scholars say, is that their candidates are often excluded from debates, particularly at the 
presidential level.  This is an important factor given that debates have been shown to 
provide important information to voters, who then use what they learn to make voting 
decisions (Campbell, Cherry and Wink 1992; Frank and Wagner 1999; Geer 1988; 
Holbrook 1996; Lentz 2002; Shaw 1999b).  For example, Frank and Wagner (1999) 
contend that Ventura’s participation in the six debates held during the 1998 Minnesota 
race was the “single, identifiable turning point in the campaign,” allowing the former 
wrestler to move ahead of Democrat Hubert Humphrey III and Republican Norm 
Coleman by the second week in October (19).  That analysis was buttressed by Lentz 
(2002), who said “it is difficult to convey how much better Ventura seemed to perform 
than Humphrey and Coleman.  Many observers noted that he seemed full of common 
sense, much better able to fix problems that could be fixed and leave alone those that 
could not” (40).  Both studies point out that it was not until Ventura was able to use the 
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debates to gain traction that he then began getting the press coverage needed to be 
considered a legitimate contender. 
 The consistent exclusion of third-party candidates from debates has led several 
scholars to call for reform.  After the disputed 2000 presidential election, Levine (2001) 
said that the country needs to examine how the Commission on Presidential Debates 
decides who is permitted to participate in these nationally televised forums.  For example, 
Levine pointed out that Ross Perot met the commission’s three-part criteria for inclusion 
in 1996 but was not initially invited to participate in the debates between then-President 
Bill Clinton and Republican challenger Robert Dole. 
 Levine also questioned whether the public is served by the commission’s criteria, 
which says that to be invited to a presidential debate a candidate must show evidence of a 
national organization, signs of newsworthiness and competitiveness, and indications of 
popular support.  He pointed out that Green Party presidential nominee Ralph Nader 
could only meet two of the three criteria in 2000 and so was not invited, while Reform 
Party presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan’s unsuccessful bid the same year did not 
meet any of the criteria.  Under this system, Levine (2001) said, a third-party candidates’ 
First Amendment rights to free expression are abridged, adding: “Although there is a 
difference between the Sedition Act of 1798 and the CPD [Commission on Presidential 
Debates], the outcome remains the same—that some aspects of the freedom of speech 
guarantee of the candidate has been abridged” (2225). 
 Kraus (2000) concurs, saying the criteria used to determine who is included in 
presidential debates should be changed to make it easier for third-party candidates to 
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participate.  He says that the question should be less centered on a candidate’s ability to 
win an election and more focused on the ideas that candidate can bring to the table. 
Ideally, the eligibility of a third or minor party presidential candidate to debate ought to 
depend on achieving the following: 1) legally qualified as a presidential candidate on the 
ballot of all 50 states, and 2) legally eligible for federal matching funds.  Popularity in the 
polls, or having a likely chance of winning, ought not to be part of the criteria in deciding 
who should debate.  Views expressed by minor party candidates may be helpful in the 
selection process, may influence the agenda of the discussion, and may bring compelling 
ideas to the debate rostrum (even though the candidate has little chance of being elected) 
(Krause 2000, 262). 
 
 Third-party deficiencies.  But not all the blame for minor-party problems at the 
ballot box can be laid on structural barriers.  Minor parties often fail to win elective office 
because they nominate candidates who are either unknown or blatantly unqualified for 
the positions they seek (Rosenstone et al. 1996).  In other cases, third parties pursue 
political strategies that lead to their own demise.  Berggren (2005), for example, said that 
Ralph Nader’s 1996 and 2000 presidential campaigns may have given the Green Party a 
short-term boost, but the party’s continued reliance on a candidate-centered strategy 
could lead to long-term problems once Nader decides either to stop running or to abandon 
the party for another tactic. 
 Such fates have befallen other minor parties that found they could not survive 
their famous patrons.  The Reform Party all but died with the departure of Ross Perot 
(Green and Binning 2002; Sifry 2003. See also McCann, Rapoport and Stone 1999) while 
the Bull Moose, Progressive, American Independent, A Connecticut, and Minnesota 
Independent parties all dissolved once they lost the big names at the top of their tickets, 
namely Theodore Roosevelt, Bob LaFollette, George Wallace, Lowell Weicker, and Jesse 
Ventura, respectively (Berggren 2005; Rosenstone et al. 1996).  In Connecticut, for 
instance, Weicker failed to build a truly three-party system in the state after his 1990 
gubernatorial victory because his A Connecticut Party was unsuccessful at registering 
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new voters or recruiting their own candidates for local and statewide offices (Rose 1994).  
As Berggren (2002) put it: 
Candidates can only take minor parties so far.  When the candidate goes or the campaign 
dissolves, party collapse or party anonymity is not far behind.  This is the inevitable 
downside to the candidate-centered politics.  A celebrity candidate, such as Nader, can 
create parties or jumpstart them.  They can provide instant credibility, create enthusiasm 
and interest among voters and pundits, or maybe even fund their own campaigns … But 
minor parties that live by candidate-centered politics can die by it too, and die rather 
quickly (10). 
 
 Third parties also tend to attract small constituencies.  Several scholars have 
indicated that any gravitation of voters toward independent candidates represents only a 
temporary aberration in the political system that has little long-term consequences for the 
two major parties.  Looking at four presidential campaigns that involved independent 
challenges (1968, 1980, 1992, and 1996), Abramson, Aldrich, Paolino and Rohde (2000) 
found “little erosion of support for the major political parties” (495).  The authors said it 
was true that support for the third-party candidates in those races was based on 
“dissatisfaction with the major-party candidates,” but they added that support for the 
Democrats and Republicans had not deteriorated enough to open the door for a serious, 
long-term third-party challenge (495).  Moreover, the authors said that while party 
loyalties had declined somewhat from the mid-1960s to about 1978, partisanship has 
rebounded since 1980—an analysis that has been supported by additional research 
(Bartels 2000; Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002; Miller 1991; Pomper 1998). 
 “Although there may be occasional victories by third-party candidates, such as 
Jesse Ventura’s victory in the 1998 Minnesota gubernatorial election,” Abramson et al. 
reported, “we see little in the way of short-term prospects for a new political party” (516).  
For a third-party to capture the White House, they added, it would need a strong 
candidate with a real issue agenda that is attractive to the electorate.  As the authors put 
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it, “…the third party must also be able to attract the resources—money, media attention, 
and activists—that would make it possible for the party not just to win the occasional 
elective office but to win a larger number of such offices at all levels of government” 
(Abramson, Aldrich, Paolino and Rohde 2000, 519). 
 They are not alone in this analysis.  Although Collet (1996) reported that a 1995 
Los Angeles Times survey found that half of the public considered the two-party system 
to be “unsound” and an NBC/Wall Street Journal poll reported that 82 percent of 
Americans said the two-party system either had “real problems” or “is seriously broken” 
(433), his analysis pointed out that none of the third-party and independent candidates 
who mounted serious challenges in the 1980s and 1990s had built a “top-to-bottom party 
organization” that would allow it to run serious candidates for statewide and legislative 
elections on a consistent basis (435).  
 In addition, few voters are willing to give their unqualified support to a third 
party, the study found, and many have doubts that a third party could govern in a system 
dominated by Democrats and Republicans.  Collet also reported that voters “show more 
antipathy toward the ‘system’ itself—the two parties together in an abstract sense—rather 
than the Republicans and Democrats in particular” (436).  He concluded that while voters 
at times desire a change in the current party system, there are still many questions about 
whether they would support a specific third party. 
 Stolen issues.  Finally, when third parties do resonate with the public, the major 
parties often steal their issues, eventually rendering the party irrelevant (Lowi 1999;  
Reichley 1992).  In addition, Harold (2001) has suggested that minor parties often lose an 
opportunity to influence the political system because they reject all offers of compromise 
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and insist on ideological purity.  Targeting Nader’s 2000 presidential campaign in 
particular, Harold said that the Greens may have increased their influence over public 
policy if Nader had been willing to work more closely with Democrats rather than 
insisting that they were one-in-the-same with the Republicans.  “By rejecting the 
coalitions that were being built between Democrats and Greens online, Nader may have 
missed a unique opportunity,” Harold (2001, 599) wrote, adding: 
Perhaps, for third parties like the Greens, the key to success is not to resist being co-opted 
by the corrupt system—hence maintaining pure authenticity—but strategically to allow 
themselves to be co-opted in productive ways (599). 
 
 To summarize, the literature on third parties leads to several conclusions.  First, 
despite the passionate arguments made by some advocates of a multiparty system, it 
appears unlikely at this time that the nation will move beyond the current system 
dominated by the Democrats and Republicans.  Supporters of the present political 
structure not only make many compelling arguments for keeping the two-party system in 
place, but there are currently no serious movements underfoot to change the U.S. 
Constitution or state laws to remove some of the barriers that inhibit third-party activity.  
Moreover, few third parties stick around long enough to pose a serious threat to the 
Democrats and Republicans.  As Hofstadter (1955) put it: “Third parties are like bees; 
once they have stung, they die” (97).  In this sense, it appears that a two-party system is 
probably a natural outcome in the American political environment.  
 Second, even in a system that makes it difficult for them to operate, minor parties 
have nevertheless consistently challenged the two major parties, raising issues and 
influencing public policy throughout American history.  At times, minor parties have 
attracted small but loyal followings that have worked on their behalf regardless of what 
the Democrats and Republicans were doing.  At other times, they have given an angry 
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electorate an opportunity to protest the polices of the major parties and signal their 
discontent with the system as a whole.  While this has led to little electoral success at the 
national level, some independent candidates have won elections at the state level, where 
they have captured governorships as well as congressional seats.  This has been 
particularly true in places like Maine and Minnesota, where election laws are more 
favorable to third-party participation. 
 Finally, some scholars have said that third-party candidates should be considered 
important not because of the influence they can bring to election results but because of 
the ideas they can bring to the campaign.  Their participation in political debates, for 
example, could not only influence the dynamic of the overall campaign, but it could force 
the two major-party candidates to address issues that would otherwise go unanswered.  
Hicks (1933) himself pointed out that the importance of third parties does not rest in their 
success or failure at the ballot box, but rather in the different perspective they bring to 
issues of public importance—a perspective, he reminds us, that the two major parties 
have often adopted. 
 It is perhaps this last point that is the most poignant and leads to a crucial question 
for this dissertation:  How do third-party candidates get those ideas into the public 
domain?  The answer, of course, points partially to the press. 
The role of the news media in political campaigns 
 It has generally been accepted that journalists play a vital role in American 
political campaigns at the state and national level.  Since the world of politics is often 
“out of reach” to the citizenry in that most people will have no direct contact with the 
candidates or the campaigns (Lippmann, 1922, 18. See also Patterson 1980), the main 
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conduit through which citizens have traditionally received information about public 
affairs is the mass media, particularly television (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987).  It is through 
the news media, Lippmann (1922) said, that the democratic citizen is able to reach 
beyond his or her personal experience and learn about “vast portions of the world that he 
could never see, touch, smell, hear, or remember” (18).  Without this capability to learn 
about events for which the public does not participate in directly, Lippmann said, 
representative government itself could not work successfully. 
But the press is more than just a neutral channel that links the public to the 
broader world of electoral politics.  As society has learned more about the function of the 
mass media in a democracy, scholarship has demonstrated that in addition to being a 
provider of information about campaigns, the mass media can be an active participant in 
the political process too.  Among other things, studies show that the press can set the 
nation’s political agenda (McCombs 2004; McCombs and Shaw 1972; Iyengar and 
Kinder 1987), organize elections by determining which candidates are the most viable 
(Davis 1994; Graber 1997; Joslyn 1984; Patterson 1980 and 1994), shape candidate 
images through the use of certain news frames (Davis 1994; Jamieson and Waldman 
2003; Joslyn 1984; Patterson 1980 and 1994; Zaller and Hunt 1995), and act as 
“guardians of political norms” by legitimizing important political institutions (Graber 
1997, 3; Blumler 1978). 
While reporters are sometimes uncomfortable with the notion that they are more 
than just neutral bystanders, they nevertheless acknowledge that they play an 
extraordinary role in helping the body politic choose its leaders, with many journalists 
viewing themselves as public representatives charged with scrutinizing candidates to 
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determine which ones are most suitable for elective office (Zaller and Hunt 1995).  
Political reporter Jules Witcover (2001), for instance, has observed that it is the 
journalist’s duty to watch presidential contenders and “take their measure for American 
voters” (4).  Likewise, Joann Byrd (1998) of the Seattle Post-Intelligencer wrote that 
journalists not only cover politics, they often play a major part in determining which of 
the major-party nominees will be the likely winner.  The Washington Post’s James R. 
Dickenson (1987) once referred to the press as the nation’s “screening institution,” 
adding that the demise of old-time party bosses makes the news media the de facto judge 
of a candidate’s moral character (A21).  And long-time ABC-News White House 
correspondent Sam Donaldson (1999) defended his “bulldog” approach to political 
journalism by claiming that he was “looking for straight answers on topics the public has 
an interest in” (288). 
The central role ascribed to the press in the political process has often made it a 
lightning rode for criticism.  Although on its best days the news media have been viewed 
as the watchdog of government and the main firewall between freedom and despotism 
(Chafee 1954; Hocking 1947; Meiklejohn 1961; Streitmatter 1997), the press has also 
come under sometimes aggressive attack from both the right and the left, with 
conservatives claiming that reporters have a liberal bias (Efron 1971; Goldberg 2002; 
Rusher 1988) and progressives arguing that the press is a mechanism of social control 
designed to protect elite power centers (Altschull 1995; Parenti 1993).  Still others 
contend that rather than holding up a mirror to society and objectively reporting each 
day’s events, the news media construct reality through the use of story selection and news  
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frames that emphasize certain aspects of an issue while ignoring others (Berger and 
Luckmann 1967; Edelman 1988; Entman 1993; Iyengar 1991; Tuchman 1978). 
That the news media serve a political function in American democracy should 
come as no surprise to critics, though.  Since the early days of the Republic and the 
formation of the partisan press in the 1790s, newspapers have always been an organ of 
political argument and opinion (Emery, Emery, and Roberts 2000).  Allies of Secretary of 
State Thomas Jefferson, for instance, were so concerned about the power of newspapers 
to shape political events that they convinced editor Philip Freneau to move to the new 
federal capital in Philadelphia in 1791 to start a Republican newspaper to counter the 
acerbic political writings of Federalist John Fenno’s Gazette of the United States, which 
was widely seen as the voice of Jefferson’s rival, Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton 
(Smith 1977). 
Although the press began the move away from editorial argument and more 
toward objectivity and news in the 1830s with the advent of the commercially oriented 
penny newspapers, the American news media nevertheless maintained its place as a 
purveyor of political information throughout the 19th and 20th centuries (Schudson 1978).  
During the progressive era, for example, the so-called muckraking reporters of weekly 
and monthly magazines were said to drive government policy through a series of exposes 
on everything from the oil industry to municipal corruption (Emery, Emery, and Roberts 
2000; Leonard 1986; Stephens 2007; Streitmatter 1997).  Later in the century, reporters 
would be blamed for losing the Vietnam War and praised for uncovering the Watergate 
scandal (Emery, Emery, and Roberts 2000; Stephens 2007; Streitmatter 1997).  And, as 
the growth of television helped nationalize the news media starting in the 1960s, 
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electronic journalism began to change the political landscape so that politicians began to 
measure their success “as much by seconds on the evening news as by polls…” 
(Schudson 1995, 173). 
Many scholars believe that the political role of the news media has expanded in 
recent years due to several legal, economic, and political changes that occurred in the 
1970s.  These include modifications in the Federal Communications Act that allowed 
news organizations to cover political campaigns without worrying about the strict 
requirements of the equal time rule, the consolidation of news media into larger 
organizations with more financial resources to devote to politics, and the political reforms 
of the McGovern-Fraser Commission that altered the presidential nomination process by 
replacing national conventions with a system of open caucuses and statewide primaries 
(Davis 1994; Joslyn 1984; Patterson 1994).  These new political rules at the presidential 
level, Bartels (1988) says, reduced the power of party insiders and increased the influence 
of the news media by throwing the nomination to rank-and-file voters.  Politicians no 
longer had to curry favor with party bosses but instead made direct appeals to citizens 
through the press.  The result was three major changes to American presidential elections: 
an increase in the number of primaries used to select delegates to the national 
conventions; a larger number of candidates entering the primaries; and a significant boost 
in the power of the news media in the nomination process (Bartels 1988). 
Although this general consensus about media influence has recently been 
contested by those who believe that party leaders are beginning to regain control over 
presidential nominations (Cohen, Karol, Noel, and Zaller 2001), the notion that reporters 
are still a power to be dealt with holds tremendous sway in political circles.  For one 
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thing, scholars have spent the past 40 years justifying their research on press and politics 
by consistently paying homage to the power of American journalism in the electoral 
system (see Benoit, Stein and Hansen 2004; Graber 1971; Kahn 1995; Steele and 
Barnhurst 1996; Stevens, Alger, Allen, and Sullivan 2006; West 1994).  Even in the age 
of the Internet, USA Today’s Peter Johnson (2007) recently reported, presidential 
candidates find it difficult to bypass the traditional news media when trying to reach large 
segments of the electorate—a contention that has been supported by several studies 
finding that conventional news organizations are the dominant force for political news on 
the Web (Margolis and Resnick 2000; Pew Research Center 2000; Resnick 1998; Singer 
2000).  When it comes to election campaigns, Davis (1994) says, “we expect the news 
media to organize and mobilize public opinion” through “the process of winnowing 
candidates and organizing the agenda for the public discussion…” (4). 
 The importance of the press in American elections is reflected in the wide range 
of academic studies designed to identify and explain the patterns of political news 
coverage in the American media.  For example, scholarship has compared the campaign 
coverage of television and print journalism (Johnson 1993; Robinson and Sheehan 1983); 
examined coverage of gubernatorial and senatorial campaigns by both newspapers and 
local TV stations (Kahn 1991; Kahn 1995; Ostroff 1980; Ostroff and Sandell 1989; 
Stevens, Alger, Allen, and Sullivan 2006); analyzed the decreasing length of candidate 
sound bites on the national news (Bucy and Grabe 2007; Hallin 1992; Kendall 1993; 
Steele and Barnhurst 1996; Stevens et al. 2006); and documented the often negative—but 
sometimes positive—tone of political coverage in the news media (Benoit, Stein, and 
Hansen 2004; Flowers, Haynes, Crespin 2003; Lichter 2001; Reber and Benoit 2001; 
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Robinson 1976; Robinson and Sheehan 1983).  Still other studies have looked at the 
themes used by national and regional newspapers in their election coverage (Graber 
1971; Rozell 1991; Shaw and Sparrow 1999); the influence of the civic journalism 
movement on newspaper reporting practices (Kennamer and South 2002); reporters’ 
reliance on official government sources for political information (Dunn 1969; Sigal 
1973); the differences in how the press frames gubernatorial candidates based on race and 
gender (Banwart, Bystrom and Robertson 2003; Devitt 2002; Jeffries 2002); and the age-
old debate over media bias (Beniger 2001; D’Alessio and Allen 2000; Edwards and 
Cromwell 2006; Efron 1971; Lichter, Rothman, and Lichter 1986; Morris 2007; Rusher 
1988; and Stevenson et al. 1973). 
 Each of these studies adds to our knowledge about how politics is covered in the 
United States, but there are three areas of research that deserve special attention for this 
dissertation.  The sections that follow will examine some of this work, focusing on (1) the 
agenda setting function of the press, (2) the press’s obsession with the contest aspect of 
the campaign, and (3) how the news media cover dissent in general and third-party 
candidates specifically.  The chapter will end with a brief discussion of why third-party 
candidates are covered differently by the news media, focusing on three theories: Zaller’s 
(1999) Rule of Anticipated Importance, Meyrowitz’s (1995) description of journalistic 
logic, and Gramsci’s (1971) notion of hegemony. 
Agenda setting 
 For more than half a century now it has been understood that the mass media help 
set the nation’s political agenda by choosing which candidates and issues to highlight and 
which ones to leave out.  As early as 1938, an analysis of British newspapers by a 
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nonpartisan group of academics and professionals concluded that “perhaps the influence 
of the press may best be estimated by considering it as the principal agenda-making body 
for the everyday conversation of the ordinary man and woman” (Report on the British 
Press, 263).  This concept was articulated in the United States 25 years later by Cohen 
(1963), who famously wrote that the news media “may not be successful much of the 
time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers 
what to think about” (quoted in Baran and Davis 2000, 300). 
 The agenda-setting tradition has come a long way since these observations, and 
today it is generally accepted that the press does more than just tell citizens what issues to 
think about—it tells voters how to think about them (McCombs 2004; McCombs 2005, 
544).  This leap beyond a simple understanding of how issue salience is transferred from 
the media to the public began in about 1984, when scholars started exploring the impact 
media messages might have on the formation of candidate images, issue knowledge, and 
the attributes voters associate with “objects” in the news (Weaver 1996).  The result has 
been a deeper appreciation for not only basic agenda-setting effects, but also what 
scholars now call “attribute agenda setting” and  “agenda building” (McCombs 2004, 98-
118; McCombs 2005, 544-549).  The remainder of this section will provide a brief review 
of the literature in each of these three subareas. 
 Basic agenda setting.  In its most basic conceptualization, agenda setting is the 
notion that the news media help set the public agenda by emphasizing certain issues and 
making them more prominent in the collective mind of a community (McCombs 2004; 
McCombs 2005).  The empirical analysis of this theory began with McCombs and Shaw 
(1972), whose examination of undecided Chapel Hill voters during the 1968 presidential 
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election demonstrated a strong correlation between the issues accentuated by print and 
broadcast journalism and the issues citizens cited as the most important facing the nation.  
Funkhouser (1973) reported similar results one year later, saying that “the amount of 
coverage in the media apparently is strongly related to the general importance of issues in 
the public’s estimation…” (71) 
 Follow-up studies analyzing the presidential elections of 1972 and 1976 showed 
that media agenda setting (1) was strongest among voters with higher levels of exposure 
to the press, (2) occurred more frequently during the early primaries than during the fall 
election, (3) was more significant for issues with which voters had less personal 
experience, and (4) was more pronounced when the source of the news was deemed 
highly credible (McLeod, Becker, and Byrnes 1974; Shaw and McCombs 1977; Weaver, 
Graber, McCombs, and Eyal 1981; Winter 1981). 
 Other studies reported that newspapers had stronger agenda-setting effects than 
television (Palmgreen and Clarke 1977; Tipton, Haney, and Baseheart 1975; Williams 
and Larsen 1977); media influence increases as coverage of an issue intensifies (Brosius 
and Kepplinger 1990; Winter 1981); newspapers could set the public agenda on some 
issues but not on others (Smith 1987); and weak partisans are more susceptible to media 
influence than are voters who strongly identify with one of the major political parties 
(McLeod, Becker, and Byrnes 1974).  Still others have reported contradictory results 
regarding the power of television to influence the public’s agenda, with some studies 
concluding that TV news had virtually no impact on candidate images during a campaign 
(Patterson and McClure 1976) and others finding that citizens frequently use television to 
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learn about candidates and issues (Chaffee and Frank 1996; Zhao and Chaffee 1995; 
Weaver 1996). 
 Iyengar and Kinder (1987) challenged some of these early assertions about the 
broadcast media, particularly Patterson and McClure’s claim that the network news “fails 
to have any meaningful effect on the viewers’ feelings about the candidates and 
knowledge of the issues” (Patterson and McClure 1976, 144).  Conducting 14 
experiments on the agenda-setting effects of TV news, Iyengar and Kinder found that 
public concerns closely matched the issues discussed on the broadcasts—with the effect 
lasting for at least one week.  What’s more, the authors’ examination of time-series data 
going back seven years indicated a strong correlation through time between what 
television says is important and what the public believes is important.  “By attending to 
some problems and ignoring others,” Iyengar and Kinder (1987) wrote, “television news 
shapes the American public’s political priorities” (33). 
 Agenda setting effects have also been found outside the context of election 
campaigns.  Bosso (1989) showed that while famine had been an annual tragedy for 
Ethiopia for most of the 1970s and early 1980s, it only became a problem for the 
American public when Tom Brokaw broke the story on NBC News in October 1984.  
Winter and Eyal (1981) found strong agenda-setting effects on the part of the news 
media, with survey respondents naming civil rights as a major national issue in the weeks 
following heavy front-page coverage of the problem in the New York Times.  Gross and 
Aday (2003) demonstrated that local television news coverage of crime played a major 
role in making that issue salient for heavy TV consumers.  Hester and Gibson (2007) 
showed that public concern over same-sex marriage was closely linked to their exposure 
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to newspaper coverage of the issue; and Brosius and Kepplinger (1990) demonstrated a 
two-way flow to agenda setting, with television coverage of certain issues causing 
problem awareness within the public and problem awareness within the public sometimes 
causing television coverage. 
 Taken together, the data strongly supports an agenda-setting function for the news 
media, albeit with limits to that power.  But the press does more than just set political 
priorities through the transfer of issue salience from the news pages to the public 
consciousness—it may also determine how issues and candidates are interpreted by the 
body politic. 
 Attribute agenda setting.  Research over the past 20 years indicates that by 
emphasizing certain characteristics—or attributes—of a particular issue or candidate, the 
news media makes those characteristics more significant in the public mind (McCombs 
2005; Son and Weaver 2005).  This effect, which has been called attribute agenda setting, 
is based on the notion that the news media play an active role in both framing political 
issues and priming the public in how it should feel about those issues (Weaver 2007).  
Both framing and priming have significant ramifications for political campaigns, for as 
Weaver (1994) puts it:  “By making certain issues, candidates, and characteristics of 
candidates more salient, the media can contribute significantly to the construction of a 
perceived reality that voters rely upon in making decisions about whether to vote and for 
whom to vote” (349). 
 The concept of framing has been given many definitions in the literature but 
generally refers to the context in which a reporter portrays a person, issue, or event in the 
news.  Just like a window frames what a person can see from inside a house looking out, 
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so too do the news frames journalists employee highlight certain aspects of an issue or 
person while hiding others.  Callaghan and Schnell (2001) say that frames “define policy 
debates and structure political outcomes” (185).  Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) say 
that framing “refers to modes of presentation that journalists and other communicators 
use to present information in a way that resonates with existing underlying schemas 
among their audience” (12).  And Weaver (2007) maintains that “the perspective and 
frames that journalists employ draw attention to certain attributes of the objects of news 
coverage…” (142). 
 But perhaps the most comprehensive definition came from Entman (1993), who 
said that “framing essentially involves selection and salience,” adding that “to frame is to 
select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (52).  In short, 
Entman said, journalists use news frames to define problems, diagnose causes, make 
moral judgments, and suggest remedies. 
 Related to this is the concept of priming, which Kim, Scheufele, and Shanahan 
(2002) say is “the impact that agenda setting can have on the way individuals evaluate 
public officials by influencing the thematic areas or issues that individuals use to form 
their evaluations” (8).  In other words, journalists place the attributes of political 
candidates and issues within a certain framework that is then used by the public to 
interpret, evaluate, and eventually form judgments about those candidates and issues.  
Because voters cannot always remember everything they’ve learned about a particular 
candidate, the news media essentially primes voters by calling attention to certain 
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issue/candidate attributes and thus encouraging voters to consider these characteristics 
when making judgments at the ballot box. 
 Attribute agenda setting and its two companions (framing and priming) have all 
found support in the literature.  Iyengar and Kinder (1987), for instance, reported that 
broadcast journalism often establishes the context through which many voters form their 
opinions about politicians who seek public office.  It is through this priming function, the 
authors said, that television news “can shift the grounds on which campaigns are 
contested” and thus “may … determine who takes office … and who is sent home” 
(Iyengar and Kinder 1987, 121).  Likewise, Iyengar (1987 and 1991) found a strong 
connection between the episodic and thematic frames used by broadcast journalism and 
how people explained or understand such issues as poverty and terrorism.  When the 
press framed poverty in terms of individuals, he said, citizens tended to blame the poor 
for their condition.  When TV framed poverty in terms of government policy, he added, 
citizens blamed “the system” (Iyengar 1987 and 1991). 
 Other studies also lend support for attribute agenda setting.  In their examination 
of the 2002 Texas gubernatorial and U.S. senate elections, for example, Kim and 
McCombs (2007) reported that the candidate attributes highlighted by the news media 
were the same attributes identified by the public as the most significant to consider when 
making voting decisions.  Moreover, the study reported that the public also adopted the 
media’s portrayal of each attribute as either positive, neutral, or negative—then used 
those positive-to-negative impressions to form judgments about the candidates.  These 
conclusions were supported by several other studies analyzing how the public embraces 
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the media’s representation of a candidate’s professional and personal characteristics 
(Golan and Wanta 2001; Kiousis, Bantimaroudis and Ban 1999; Min 2003). 
 The literature also indicates that how national and international news events are 
framed can have a significant impact on public perceptions of the president.  Krosnick 
and Kinder (1990), for example, found that the news media’s attention to revelations 
about the Iran-Contra scandal caused a priming effect that reduced President Reagan’s 
standing in the polls.  In addition, Krosnick and Brannon (1993) showed that President 
Bush’s performance ratings increased after the 1991 Gulf War partially because media 
coverage of the crisis helped push the public to assess the president’s performance mostly 
on Bush’s managing of the conflict rather than his handling of other foreign policy 
matters.  Son and Weaver (2005) added to this discussion, demonstrating that the agenda-
setting function of the media occurs over the long term rather than the short term.  In 
other words, it is the cumulative coverage of an issue or candidate that creates the 
strongest effects on public opinion, the authors said. 
 Kim, Scheufele and Shanahan (2002) analyzed the effects of attribute agenda 
setting during the hotly debated decision by the city of Ithaca, New York, to approve a 
large shopping complex in 1999 that would allow national retail chains into the 
community.  The analysis showed a connection between the debate as it unfolded in a 
local newspaper and the way that residents viewed the dispute.  According to the authors, 
heavy newspaper readers were more likely than light newspaper readers to cite the pro-
con arguments that had been reported in the Ithaca Journal when expressing their 
opinion on the development.  As the authors said: “By covering certain aspects of an 
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issue prominently, we found, mass media can influence how salient these aspects are 
among audience members” (Kim, Scheufele and Shanahan 2002, 20-21).  
 What this research suggests is that the press is anything but a neutral bystander in 
the political process.  Through the news frames reporters choose, they “promote a 
particular interpretation” of an event (Entman 2007, 164) and tell readers “which policy 
issues to use as criteria to evaluate the candidates” (Ramsden 1996, 66).  But the press 
does not work alone in creating frames and priming voters.  A major question that 
researchers have asked over the years is: If the media sets the public agenda, who sets the 
media’s agenda? 
 Agenda building.  News is created—and agendas are built—through a complex 
negotiating process that occurs each day between reporters and sources, both of whom 
face their own pressures and operate within boundaries dictated partially by 
organizational structures and professional norms (Berkowitz 1992; Sigal 1973).  This 
relationship is in a constant state of flux in which power to influence the news agenda 
continuously shifts between the holders of information and the journalists themselves 
(Reese 1991).  Along the way, this process is affected by such factors as journalistic 
competition, the tenets of objectivity, reporting routines, and newsroom culture 
(Berkowitz 1992; Sigal 1986).  Yet of all the dynamics that go into producing news and 
eventually building the media/public agenda, “those governing the choice of sources are 
of prime significance” (Gans 1980, 281).  As another scholar put it:  “What the news is 
depends very much on who its sources are” (Sigal 1973, 189). 
 Research over the past 35 years suggests that reporters rely most heavily on elites 
to tell their stories, particularly government officials.  This was thoroughly documented 
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by Sigal (1973) more than three decades ago and has since been supported by numerous 
follow-up studies.  In one examination of the New York Times, Washington Post, and four 
North Carolina newspapers, for example, Brown et al. (1987) found that U.S. and other 
public officials dominated the coverage in all six newspapers between 1979 and 1980, 
accounting for more than half of all sources appearing on the front pages of the two 
national dailies.  While the local papers were more apt than the national publications to 
quote activists and other community organizers, the study said, the newspapers in North 
Carolina nevertheless still used a predominant number of state and local officials on their 
news pages.  This was particularly true for routine stories, Brown et al. (1987) said, 
adding that there “seems to be a clear indication of the dominance of elite news sources” 
in the press (49). 
 Berkowitz (1987) reported similar results in a duplicate study that focused on 
television.  His content analysis of network and local newscasts in Indiana found that at 
both the national and local level, nearly half of all sources appearing in the broadcasts 
were affiliated with some government agency.  What’s more, most of the men and 
women who were quoted on these broadcasts came from the top echelons of government 
rather than from lower-level positions.  Finally, Berkowitz found that three-quarters of 
stories that appeared on TV, whether on the network news or a local broadcast, were 
based on routine events, which typically give the holders of information more power than 
the journalists. 
 In another study conducted several years later, Berkowitz and Beach (1993) said 
that reporters will turn to a more diverse mix of sources when writing either nonroutine 
stories or articles that include a great deal of conflict.  However, this is only true when 
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reporters are writing about communities in which they are familiar.  When reporting from 
new locations, the authors said, journalists turn to the most recognized sources—
government authorities—regardless of whether the story is routine, nonroutine, or 
conflict. 
 More recently, one study concluded that the New York Times, the Washington 
Post, the Los Angeles Times, and the Anchorage Daily News used mostly power elites to 
tell the story of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, including important representatives from the 
oil industry as well as from the U.S. and Alaskan governments (Smith 1993).  Wieskamp 
(2007) showed that government officials were portrayed as voices of authority in helping 
to frame the link between immigration and crime during a high profile trial in Minnesota 
in 2005; Alexseev and Bennett (1995) indicated that the U.S. press tends to limit public 
debates within a framework dictated by government representatives, thus removing much 
chance “for the public to become actively involved in policy issues in ways that might 
define new policy options” (409); and Mason (2007) found that Australian reporters 
relied predominantly on “sources from the main institutions of society, particularly 
government sources” in reporting on major crises, such as the 1987 coup of the Fijian 
Parliament. 
 This tendency on the part of reporters to turn to government authorities and other 
elite sources can be attributed to several factors and “should not be viewed … within the 
framework of conspiracy and social control,” says Berkowitz (1987, 513).  Rather, 
scholarship indicates that the structure of news organizations, journalistic routines and 
pressures, and the concept of objectivity all play pivotal roles in pushing reporters toward 
what they consider to be the most credible sources of information. 
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 Tuchman (1978), for example, says that because newspapers and television 
stations must produce fresh news each day to sell to consumers, they have had to develop 
an organizational structure that guarantees their ability to regularly collect and process 
enough material to fill the daily news hole.  Using the metaphor of a news net, Tuchman 
said journalists are able to haul in a daily catch of information because they have been 
organized into a “beat system” that stations them in geographical and institutional areas 
where they believe news will occur on a regular basis.  Since these beats usually include 
such places as City Hall, the police station, and other locales of centralized power, 
Tuchman says, they create journalistic routines that guarantee reporters will be in daily 
contact with elites each day.  In a sense, he writes, the news net “imposes order on the 
social world because it enables news events to occur at some locations but not at others” 
(Tuchman 1978, 23).  The result is a media agenda built through the prism of those who 
hold power—or in Tuchman’s words, a reality that has been “constructed” for public 
consumption. 
 Sigal’s (1973) research also examined the impact of the reporter’s daily 
environment on his or her ability to collect the news.  His comprehensive examination of 
how news is made showed in part that reporters were simply one component of a much 
larger organization that dictated their professional customs.  For one thing, Sigal said, the 
process of news gathering is based on routine behavior.  Reporters under heavy pressure 
to continuously produce copy are forced to contact sources who can be relied upon to 
consistently provide information each day—something government officials are only too 
happy to do.  In addition, Sigal says reporters operate within a bureaucracy that has 
limited resources and a hierarchal structure that (1) constrains reporting activity to a set 
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of pre-established customs designed to collect information as cheaply as possible and (2) 
forces reporters to negotiate story topics and angles with editors and sources who each 
bring a different perspective on the news.  As Sigal (1973) put it: 
Like other large-scale organizations, newspapers have standard operating procedures that 
govern much of their employees’ activity.  Reporters, particularly when they are covering 
the U.S. government, rely on routine channels—handouts and press conferences—and 
informal channels—principally, background briefings—to obtain much of their 
information (115). 
 
 Although these observations were made more than three decades ago, scholarship 
in the ensuing years found similar tendencies and conditions.  Seven years after Sigal’s 
work, for example, Gans (1980) said that news organizations like CBS, NBC, and 
Newsweek were still heavily reliant on government officials mainly because 
congressman, senators, and other authorities were able to “supply the information that 
makes national news” (282).  Reese (1991) found that reporters faced the same 
organizational, cultural, and economic constraints in the 1990s as they had in the 1970s.  
And Berkowitz (1992) discovered that reporters tend to accept government officials’ 
view of the world because journalists operate in a similar environment as their sources 
and so over time see things from the same perspective—a problem some editors refer to 
as “going local.” 
 In addition to organizational limits and reporting routines, research indicates that 
the media agenda is also influenced and built under the constraints of journalistic 
objectivity.  Sigal (1986) says that objectivity places journalists at the mercy of sources 
because reporters are restrained from forming their own interpretations of events.  
Moreover, Berkowitz (1992) and others says that to be “objective,” reporters must get 
information from “legitimate” sources of information.  Policymakers, because of their 
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authoritative positions, automatically fit this bill (Berkowitz 1992; Brown et al. 1987; 
Sigal 1986). 
 Finally, competition is another factor that drives reporters to build the media 
agenda with the help of official sources of information (Sigal 1986).  Because reporters 
do not want to get scooped, they stay close to public officials to make sure that their 
competition does not get a story they miss.  “For network correspondents,” Sigal (1986, 
19) writes, “this often means trailing the president without filing a story, just to make 
sure he does not make news in their absence—and in the competitor’s presence.”  Such a 
mentality leads to pack journalism, in which reporters from different news outlets file the 
same stories based on information from the same elite sources (Crouse 1972; Sabato 
1993). 
 From an agenda-building perspective, which sources are quoted on the news 
pages is not without consequence.  Some scholars point out that the types of sources 
reporters use plays a big role in the types of stories that are written and how those stories 
are framed.  By relying so heavily on government authorities and other elites for 
information, they say, reporters are allowing those who hold the levers of power to at 
least partially control how public affairs is presented to the citizenry.  “The sources a 
newsman talks to largely shape what he reports,” Sigal (1973, 2) says.  “Not only does 
theory color his view of events but also men intervene to screen his line of sight.”  Brown 
et al. (1987) agree, saying: “By controlling the information available to these target 
audiences, sources are able to define decision-making options and, ultimately, to control 
the decision-making process” (46). 
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 One way that this occurs, Berkowitz (1992) says, is in how journalists use 
policymakers.  According to his analysis, reporters rely on government officials to not 
only express their opinion in an ongoing dispute with the public but to also establish the 
context in which the discussion occurs in the first place.  “Beyond the ability to become 
part of an existing policy debate, news sources can provide situation definitions of issues 
that establish the boundaries of future discussion,” Berkowitz (1992, 91) said.  Hallin 
(1984) discovered the same phenomenon in his examination of how the press covered the 
Vietnam War, arguing that government officials provided the so-called “neutral” facts 
and context through which the policymakers then debated opponents of the conflict. 
 Recent studies seem to bare this out.  Marchi (2005), for example, examined how 
the Boston Globe and Boston Herald covered the controversial proposal by the 
Massachusetts Port Authority in the late 1990s to expand Logan Airport in Boston, which 
was opposed by neighboring communities.  Marchi said that while opponents were 
permitted to voice their opinion on the pages of both newspapers, each publication 
ultimately accepted the perspective of government sources, who were allowed to frame 
the context of the debate.  Likewise, Kim (2003) demonstrated that the news sources used 
by Korean and American newspapers at least partially accounted for the different frames 
publications in each country adopted to describe the 1997 Korean Air Flight 801 crash in 
Guam.  While American reporters followed the lead of U.S. officials and focused on pilot 
error as the most likely cause of the crash, Korean newspapers framed the incident as one 
of bad weather, poor navigational equipment, and possible incompetence by Guam air 
traffic control agents—the context pushed by the government in Seoul. 
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 But journalists are not at the complete mercy of their sources either.  Callaghan 
and Schnell’s (2001) analysis of how the networks covered the gun control debate 
between 1988 and 1996 showed that while various interest groups and political actors all 
tried to incorporate their frames into the news coverage, journalists often “structured the 
debate by generating their own frames” (201).  The authors noted that “in contrast to 
previous researchers, network coverage of the gun control issue did not seem to follow 
official (i.e. congressional) opinion” (Callaghan and Schnell’s 2001, 201).  In addition, 
Weaver and Elliott (1985) reported that while prominent sources such as the City Council 
can have an important impact on the stories a local newspaper prints, reporters and 
editors also bring their own judgment to the table when deciding what is news.  Put 
another way, there are times when sources have the upper hand, such as during 
campaigns when reporters are herded around in packs and the candidate’s aides possess 
most of the information, and there are situations when reporters control the story, such as 
when a source is less prominent or when a scandal erupts (Reese 1991; Sabato 1993). 
 In summary, the agenda setting tradition suggests that the news media do more 
than just tell readers what to think about.  Through the process of framing and priming, 
the press emphasizes certain attributes about an issue or candidate and encourages 
citizens to consider those characteristics when making decisions on Election Day.  But 
the press does not act alone.  News is made—and agendas built—through a process in 
which reporters navigate a complex terrain influenced by news sources, the 
organizational structures of the news outlet itself, journalistic routines, the notion of 
objectivity, and competition. 
 88 
 All of this has serious ramifications for third-party candidates, who like any 
political aspirant must rely on the press to help create the context in which they will 
operate.  The research reviewed here thus leads to two important questions: How does the 
agenda-setting function translate into campaign coverage?  And what impact might this 
have on how reporters cover third-party candidates? 
How the press covers political campaigns: The horse race 
One area of political news coverage that has received a great deal of scholarly 
attention is the press’s propensity to cover campaigns as if they were horse races.  If the 
research has taught us anything, it is that reporters spend most of their time assessing 
each candidates’ campaign strategy, momentum, organizational and financial strength, 
expectations, support in public opinion polls, and political endorsements—all at the 
expense of public policy issues (Adams 1984; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994; Broh 
1980; Clarke and Evans 1983; Craig 2000; Crouse 1972; Harmon 2000; Johnson 1993; 
Patterson 1980 and 1994; Robinson and Sheehan 1983; Russonello and Wolf 1979). 
What’s more, the news media’s fascination with the contest is not unique to 
today’s journalists.  Sigelman and Bullock’s (1991) analysis of campaign coverage 
between 1888 and 1988 found that newspapers have always focused more on hoopla than 
substance, concluding that the contest has trumped issues well before radio and television 
came on the scene.  Littlewood (1998) points out that horse-race journalism can be traced 
back to at least 1824, when partisan newspapers in North Carolina and other states used 
rudimentary straw polls to keep tabs on the presidential election between Andrew 
Jackson and John Quincy Adams.  By the late 1800s, newspapers in Chicago were 
forecasting presidential elections based on postcard ballots mailed to registered voters 
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throughout the Midwest while the press in New York and other parts of the country 
tracked candidate support by monitoring gamblers who bet on elections, conducting man-
on-the-street interviews, and eventually teaming up with the newly syndicated Gallup 
Poll organization in the 1930s (Crespi 1980; Folkerts and Teeter 2002; Littlewood 1998). 
There were bumps along the way, such as when the Literary Digest wrongly 
predicted that Republican Alf Landon would defeat Democrat Franklin Roosevelt in the 
1936 presidential election (Squire 1988).  But generally speaking, the use of surveys 
grew significantly in the second half of the 20th century when large news organizations 
created in-house polling operations and adopted social science methodologies as part of 
the precision journalism movement popularized by Philip Meyers (2002) in the 1970s 
(Gollin 1980; Weaver and McCombs 1980). 
Today, scholars have attempted to document various aspects of horse race 
journalism in an attempt to better understand how the contest paradigm plays out in the 
news and the impact it may have on elections.  In his analysis of CBS over a 28-year 
period, for example, Craig (2000) illustrated that journalists present presidential 
campaigns as a series of daily successes and failures based on the candidates’ standing in 
the polls, leaving voters with the message that campaign skills are more important than 
governing skills.  His content analysis showed that the number of poll stories reported on 
the CBS Evening News not only increased from about 20 per year in 1968 to nearly 100 
in 1992, but that those stories were being aired earlier in the news broadcast.  Similar 
findings were reported by Broh (1983), whose analysis of all three networks showed that 
the number of national and statewide polls used on the evening news broadcasts jumped 
from 89 during the 1972 presidential election to 188 by 1980. 
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The same is true for print journalism.  King’s (1990) analysis of newspaper 
themes found that the horse race dominated the 1988 presidential primary coverage in 
USA Today and the New York Times, with each newspaper devoting 89 percent and 74 
percent, respectively, of their front page stories to the contest aspect of the campaign.  By 
contrast, only 11 percent of the Times’ coverage and 7.5 percent of USA Today’s 
reporting discussed issues, King said.  These findings were consistent with both Benoit, 
Stein, and Hansen (2005), who found that the horse race was the main news theme of all 
presidential campaigns covered by the New York Times between 1952 and 2000, and 
Rhee (1996), who reported that USA Today’s reliance on tracking polls encouraged the 
newspaper to focus mostly on who was winning and losing the 1992 presidential election. 
Horse-race journalism does not always dominate campaign coverage, though.  
Graber (1971) reported that the personality attributes of the 1968 presidential candidates 
were the main emphasis of the 20 newspapers she analyzed, with style and image ranking 
second and third.  Russonello and Wolf (1979) followed up on this analysis, concluding 
that horse race coverage actually decreased between the 1968 and 1976 presidential 
elections, although they said public opinion surveys still played a big role.  Stovall and 
Solomon (1984) found that while polls are an important part of campaign news coverage 
in the American media, they are sometimes overshadowed by other types of stories. 
Broh (1980) added a slight twist to the literature, reporting that journalists use 
polls to track who is winning and losing at particular moments during a campaign but 
rarely use them to predict winners or analyze public policy issues.  Likewise, Johnson 
(1993) said that horse race coverage is not always the same throughout a campaign.  
Analyzing the 1988 presidential primary season, Johnson found that reporters relied 
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heavily on both public opinion surveys and each candidates’ organizational strength in 
the early part of the campaign but began monitoring “momentum” in the later stages. 
One reason that reporters focus on polls could be because many journalists do not 
believe that a candidates’ stands on the issues will impact the election (Clarke and Evans, 
1983).  In addition, Patterson (1994) points out that while each day’s survey results 
represents fresh new information—and thus is newsworthy—a candidate’s issue position 
ceases to be news after a reporter writes one or two stories about it.  Skewes (2004) found 
that reporters are forced to write about polls and strategy because they have little or no 
access to the candidates and so have few opportunities to quiz them on important issues; 
and Atkin and Gaudino (1984) say polls are frequently used in press reports because they 
meet the journalist’s definition of news: they convey concrete information that is 
objective and well defined; they produce information that is important to a large segment 
of the population; and they are fairly timely because they measure public attitudes about 
events or candidates recently reported in the media. 
Another explanation for why the horse race dominates is that reporters tend to 
view campaigns “as a contest between two candidate organizations” rather than as a 
contest of ideas, a clash of political values, an expression of social conflict, or a ritual 
used to legitimize government (Joslyn 1984, 109).  Because news organizations tend to 
see campaigns through the contest paradigm, Joslyn says, they structure their coverage by 
assigning reporters to individual candidates rather than to individual issues, a practice 
that encourages them to write about winners and losers.  Patterson (1980) agrees with this 
assertion and writes: “Although journalists consider the campaign to have more than 
ritual significance, they tend not to view it primarily as a battle over the directions of 
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national policy and leadership.  It is seen mainly as a power struggle between the 
candidates” (22). 
The American press’s reliance on polls to tell most campaign stories has been 
fairly controversial over the years, with some scholars seeing it as a distortion of 
democracy and others arguing that public opinion measures can be used to hold elite 
power accountable.  Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1994), for instance, say that “horse race 
journalism squeezes out more relevant information, such as factual reporting of the 
candidates’ positions on the issues, their performance in office, and so forth” (427-428).  
Such reporting distorts the democratic process, Patterson (1980) says, because it 
diminishes the public’s concern with each candidate’s issue stands and leadership ability 
and leaves citizens with little substantive information in which to base their vote.  Joslyn 
(1984) concurs, saying that “of all the patterns in news coverage of the presidential 
nomination campaign, this focus on the horse race may well be the most consequential” 
(133).  With little substantive information about the candidates, he says, voters must form 
impressions of political contenders based on their public support. 
More than that, a candidate’s public standing may also affect the type of coverage 
he or she receives.  For example, Patterson’s (1994) analysis of presidential primaries 
showed that the news media tends to write negative stories about frontrunners and 
candidates who are behind in the polls or perceived to be losing ground.  The only type of 
candidate who can expect a high degree of positive coverage, Patterson said, are those 
who are gaining in the polls—the so-called bandwagon candidates.  This was supported 
by Stevens et al. (2006), whose study of local Minnesota television’s political coverage 
concluded that “when a candidate is leading or gaining [in the polls], he or she receives 
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more coverage, and more positive coverage, than if he or she is losing or slipping in the 
polls” (75). 
Evidence also suggests that reporters use survey results to determine which 
candidates will be covered and which ones will be ignored.  Adams (1984), for example, 
concluded that news organizations heap lots of attention on those who do well in public 
opinion surveys and significantly less on those who do not.  This observation was 
supported by at least three studies: Zaller’s (1999) analysis showing a correlation 
between poll support and media attention among presidential candidates between 1980 
and 1996; research by Harmon (2000), who found that perceived front runners and major 
challengers receive the greatest amount of coverage in presidential primary campaigns 
while other contenders—including those from minor parties—toil in obscurity; and a 
study by Atkin and Gaudino (1984), which concluded that “potential candidates with low 
poll standings tend to be ignored by journalists, at least until their ratings in the polls 
begin to rise” (124). 
This raises serious questions for the role of a supposedly “objective” news media, 
some scholars say.  Referring to presidential primaries, Ramsden (1996) put it this way: 
If the media start favoring one candidate or another before the process has indicated who 
is more “worthy” of coverage, then it becomes the media rather than the voters who 
determine who goes on to do well in the remainder of the race.  Conversely, the media 
could dismiss a candidate before the public even knows him well enough to render a 
judgment (81). 
 
Although the effects of horse-race journalism is still up to debate, scholarly 
research suggests that poll stories may influence how people vote—thus distorting the 
ideal concepts of democracy.  For example, a study of the early stages of the 1984 
Democratic presidential primary found that voters will throw their support behind 
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candidates who are leading in the polls, thus using survey data to make voting decisions 
rather than issue positions (Adams 1984).  According to this research:  
Journalists did more than just follow the lead of poll standings in 1983 by continuing to 
reinforce the preexisting pecking order.  They also independently contributed to poll 
shifts.  The overall pattern is interactive: Prior visibility begets high poll ratings which 
beget media coverage/legitimacy which begets improved poll standings which beget 
media coverage/legitimacy (Adams 1984, 10). 
 
These results were supported by Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1994), who 
conducted three experiments on the impact of polls on the electorate and concluded the 
following:  “Overall, the pattern proved consistent.  The more favorable the poll 
information, the more significant the surge in electoral support for the candidate leading 
in the polls” (425).  This undermines normative notions of democracy, the authors said, 
because it leads voters to “choose between the candidates on the basis of what other 
people think” (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994, 428).  This is particularly true of third-
party candidates, Lang and Lang (1984) said, because voters often practice “tactical 
voting” in which they decide not to cast a ballot for a minor-party contender simply 
because polls say the candidate cannot win.  As the authors put it: 
Anyone who ever considered voting for a third-party candidate in a two-party race knows 
the dilemma: should one waste a vote or try to influence the outcome by supporting the 
less undesirable of the other two candidates?  The focus on winning is a major obstacle to 
third-party challengers, up against the charge of being nothing but spoilers (Lang and 
Lang 1984, 136) 
 
Bartels (1988) added to this discussion in his analysis of political momentum in 
presidential primaries.  Although he was not addressing third-party candidates 
specifically, his observations carry relevance.  According to Bartels:  
The desire to avoid “wasting” a vote on a minor candidate in a multicandidate race is 
relevant in primary campaigns.  The logic of the notion is that a voter should attempt to 
maximize favorable impact on the outcome of the election, rather than to simply express 
support for a favorite candidate.  If the voter’s favorite candidate has no chance to win, it 
may make sense to vote for a second-best candidate who does have some chance, 
forestalling the election of a still less attractive alternative (Bartels 1988, 109).   
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Not all scholarship agrees that horse race coverage is as prevalent or as 
detrimental to democracy as some contend.  Pippa (2001), for example, acknowledges 
that news stories about poll results dominated the 2000 presidential election coverage, but 
he said that there was enough issue-based reporting available in print, television, and 
online journalism to allow the public to form a thorough understanding of where 
Republican George W. Bush and Democrat Al Gore stood on the issues.  Likewise, 
Palmgreen (1979) found that when the news media provides extensive coverage to 
political issues of national importance, “learning from the media is not only possible, but 
predominates” (31). 
Gollin (1980) believes that media-generated polls actually help the democratic 
process by generating interest in the election and encouraging citizens to vote.  In 
addition, Gollin maintains that polls conducted by news organizations “enable the press 
actively and independently to define or divine public opinion as a counterweight to polls 
taken by others for their own purposes,” adding that “press polls can also test the claims 
of public support made by spokesman for diverse interests, nationally or locally” (456).  
This contention was supported by journalist Rachel Smolkin’s (April/May 2004) report in 
the American Journalism Review, which said polls allowed political reporters to 
accurately assess which of the 2004 Democratic presidential candidates really had public 
traction and which ones would not last, such as one-time frontrunner Howard Dean. 
Other scholarship has raised questions about the so-called bandwagon effect.  For 
example, while Skalaban (1988) demonstrated that favorable poll results for Ronald 
Reagan help boost the Republican’s support at the ballot box during the 1980 presidential 
election, he found that the effect did little to persuade strong partisans and was only a 
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factor for voters with weak political opinions.  Similarly, Bartels (1985) says the 
bandwagon phenomenon is most likely to occur when a little-known candidate has 
unexpected success and upsets the stability of the presidential nomination process.  In his 
analysis of the 1980 Democratic and Republican primaries, Bartels (1985, 812) found 
that “supporters flock to the candidate with momentum mostly because he is new, 
exciting, and getting a lot of attention,” adding that “they bolster this diffuse support with 
more specific, reasoned political judgments only later (or, if the candidate fades, not at 
all).”  This was consistent with Beniger (2001), whose analysis of more than 200 Gallup 
opinion polls between 1936 and 1972 discovered that a presidential candidate’s success 
in statewide primaries had a bigger affect on his standing in national polls than the other 
way around.  In short, he said, there was little if any bandwagon effect associated with 
national surveys. 
In any case, the scholarship that examines horse-race journalism is relevant to this 
dissertation for at least two reasons.  First, most of the research here focuses on major-
party candidates running for president and does not address how the horse-race mentality 
plays out at the gubernatorial level when third-party candidates are involved.  This 
dissertation seeks to close that gap.  Second, the research strongly suggests that the 
contest paradigm through which reporters view campaigns may be an explanation for 
why third-party presidential candidates receive scant coverage in the news media.  Such 
evidence lays a foundation for the current study in that it helps establish some guidelines 
for both the content analysis and long interviews that are part of this research.  More 
specifically, this study seeks to determine whether reporters who cover statewide politics 
also adopt the contest paradigm used by the national press and, if so, how does that horse-
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race approach impact the decisions they make about politicians who come from outside 
the mainstream. 
This is no small point.  As Graber (1997) put it: 
How journalists cover stories often plays a crucial part in shaping the perceptions of 
reality of millions of people in all walks of life…  In the process of image creation, the 
media indicate which views and behaviors are acceptable and even praiseworthy in a 
given society and which are unacceptable or outside the mainstream…  The media thus 
help to integrate and homogenize American society (3). 
 
How, then, does this homogenization process play out in the coverage of dissent 
and third-party candidates? 
Press coverage of dissent and third-party candidates 
 Dissent has rarely had a friend in the news media.  For most of American history, 
groups that have challenged conventional norms have had trouble getting a sympathetic 
ear from the press (see Emery, Emery and Roberts 2000; Kessler 1984; Sloan 2002; 
Streitmatter 2001).  Even the Civil Rights demonstrations of the middle 20th century, 
which received favorable coverage in their early years, caught the ire of reporters after 
1965, when “the movement went from the South into other parts of the country” and 
more radical African-American leaders such as Malcolm X and Stokely Carmichael 
became the face of what was eventually called “the Black Power Movement” (Sumner 
1998). 
 While the press seems to recognize the right of the public to participate in 
government affairs, it often acts to delegitimize and marginalize groups that pose a 
serious challenge to the status quo and elite discourse (Entman and Rojecki 1993; Gitlin 
1980; Luther and Miller 2005).  Rather than discuss the substance behind the actions of 
dissident groups, journalists focus on the spectacle of public demonstrations, emphasizing 
violence, arrests, and the unconventional behavior of protesters—even if this behavior 
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comes from a small minority and does not represent the group as a whole (Baylor 1996; 
Gitlin 1980; McLeod and Hertog 1992; Small 1994; Smith, McCarthy, McPhail, and 
Augustyn 2001).  Such news coverage eventually hurts a movement’s ability to recruit 
new members, and it makes it impossible for such groups to amplify their message to the 
public at large (Baylor 1996; Entman and Rojecki 1993; Small 1994). 
 During the anti-war demonstrations of the 1960s, for example, the mass media 
eventually turned against protest groups like the Students for a Democratic Society—
marginalizing the movement by trivializing its goals, emphasizing internal dissension, 
framing it as a polarizing force in society, and highlighting “deviant” behavior (Gitlin 
1980. See also Small 1994).  Margolis and Burtt (1989) showed that one protest group in 
Pittsburgh failed to raise awareness about unemployment partially because it was 
portrayed as irresponsible by the local news media.  Shoemaker (1984) illustrated that the 
more abnormal a group is perceived to be by newspaper editors, the less favorable 
coverage that group receives in the press; and Luther and Miller (2005) found that 
demonstrations supporting the Bush administration’s Iraq war policy received more 
favorable coverage in national newspapers in 2003 than did anti-war protesters. 
 One form of dissent that goes beyond public protests is the third party.  Yet while 
the literature reflects widespread scholarly interest in how dissident groups generally are 
covered by the news media,4 there has been surprisingly little analysis of how reporters 
treat independent and third-party candidates for political office.  Most of the early studies 
of third parties and the press did little more than emphasize story counts, concluding that 
                                                 
4 In addition to the studies mentioned above, see the following for a discussion of how the press covers 
dissent: Cohen 1981; Gamson 1995; Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993; Hackett and Carroll 2004; Hocke 1999; 
Hwang, Schmierbach, Paek, Zuniga and Shah 2006; Kielbowicz and Scherer 1986; McCarthy, McPhail, 
and Smith 1996; Paletz and Dunn 1969; Powlick and Katz 1998; and Wells 1978.  
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independent presidential candidates generally receive less coverage than do Democrats 
and Republicans (Graber 1971; Stempel 1969; Stempel and Windhauser 1984).  
Likewise, while Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus (1996) found “a huge disparity between 
the amount of coverage the media give minor parties and the attention they devote to the 
Democrats and Republicans” (33), their analysis of the 1980 presidential election failed 
to explain why such a discrepancy exists. 
 Others have tried to fill that gap.  Stovall (1985) showed that coverage of John 
Anderson’s 1980 independent presidential campaign “fell considerably short of that given 
to Carter and Reagan” because journalists tend to “value third parties for what they 
contribute to the debate on the campaign itself, not the issues raised in the campaign” 
(271).  His analysis of 50 newspapers found that Carter and Reagan events were 50 
percent more likely to generate press coverage than were Anderson events.  In addition, 
Stovall reported that while Anderson tried to run an issue-based campaign, reporters were 
only interested in what he had to say about the campaign itself—the only category in 
which he actually received more coverage than Carter and Reagan. 
Robinson and Sheehan’s (1983) analysis of the 1980 election determined that 
third-party presidential candidates are unlikely to have any credibility with the press 
unless, like Anderson, they start their careers in one of the major parties.  Being the odd 
man out may help gain some attention in the short-term, they said, but candidates who 
run from outside the mainstream will soon learn that there are limits to the news media’s 
interest.  “As far as the media are concerned,” the authors wrote, “only Democrats and 
Republicans deserve national attention.  Running inside the party does more than confer 
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major party status; it also provides a platform, both literally and figuratively.  It was the 
GOP which gave Anderson his platform” (Robinson and Sheehan 1983, 244). 
Pirch (2004) took the analysis a step further, examining the presidential 
campaigns of George Wallace, John Anderson, H. Ross Perot, and Ralph Nader to 
determine why the press gave coverage to these third-party candidates while ignoring the 
dozens of other contenders who have run for president over the years from outside the 
Democratic and Republican parties.  He concluded that minor-party candidates will get 
on the news media’s radar only if they present a compelling story in one of four ways: the 
candidate is ideologically inconsistent so that he or she cannot be clearly labeled “liberal” 
or “conservative;” the candidate takes unique political positions that appeal to voters of 
both major parties but do not stray too far from what the press considers to be the 
mainstream; the candidate appeals to a broad demographic group; and/or the candidate is 
likely to effect the outcome of the election.  This last point, which goes to the strategic 
nature of most political coverage, is particularly dangerous, Pirch says, adding that  
if it is true that the media might focus on third party candidates whose presence can 
influence the outcome of the election, then the next question appears to be “what 
influence did the media have on these voters?”  … It appears that if and when the media 
focuses on third party candidates because of their strategic role in the election, then the 
media could be dangerously close to unwittingly influencing the election (Pirch 2004, 
162). 
 
 Along those lines, Joslyn (1984) maintains that “a candidate who is ignored will 
have a difficult time producing the voter awareness necessary for electoral success” (12).  
All of this raises what Zaller and Hunt (1994) call a  “chicken-and-egg problem,” saying 
that  
if reporters ignore a candidate because they think he is a loser and the candidate fails to 
take off in the polls, it may be because the candidate was weak to begin with, or it may be 
because the candidate has been ignored by the press (Zaller and Hunt 1994, 377). 
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McLeod and Hertog (1992) would likely agree, saying that reporters may affect 
election outcomes by assuming—and then telling readers—that minor-party candidates 
have little public support, thus decreasing the chances that anyone would vote for them.  
Although their study of three anarchist demonstrations in the 1980s did not deal with 
third-party contenders directly, the authors nevertheless said that their study was relevant 
for understanding why Democrats and Republicans have dominated political discourse.  
For example, McLeod and Hertog revealed that reporters rely on loaded terms or cue 
words like obscene, eccentric, and abusive to characterize dissident groups as a minority, 
even when news organizations have little quantitative data to support those 
characterizations.  To illustrate the point, the authors said that while “no public opinion 
polls were taken to present the spectrum of public reaction to the anarchist protesters [in 
Minnesota] … the Fargo Forum quoted a Minneapolis police officer who emphasized the 
minority status of anarchists by characterizing them as ‘a bunch of punk-rockers from the 
Hennepin-Lake area, led by a small number, and I mean a small number of people’” 
(McLeod and Hertog 1992, 264).  The authors concluded: 
Informal references to public opinion provides a way to examine discourse between the 
two major parties and subsequent political analyses by the media.  Indeed, these types of 
cues might have a powerful effect on shaping voting patterns.  They might also shed 
some light on the maintenance of the two-party dominance in the United States (McLeod 
and Hertog 1992, 273-274). 
 
 Pirch might also find backing in Zaller and Hunt (1994 and 1995), whose 
exhaustive two-part examination of Perot’s 1992 campaign found that support of the 
independent presidential candidate tended to rise when the Texas billionaire received 
positive news coverage and fell when the coverage turned negative.  The authors contend 
that the press (along with political parties) is a major force in presidential politics, 
pointing out that despite Perot’s best effort to circumvent the traditional news media by 
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attracting voters through unmediated communication via television talk shows like Larry 
King Live and Donahue, in the end, even a successful candidate like Perot could not build 
a winning national coalition without appealing to mainstream news outlets.  In fact, 
Zaller and Hunt conclude, Perot’s inability to handle the traditional press may have been 
one of the significant factors in his eventual fall from grace. 
Third-party candidates cannot always complain, though.  Zaller (1999) points out 
that when politicians from minor parties are successful at attracting media attention, they 
normally receive more than their fair share of coverage—even if that coverage still falls 
considerably short of that given to the Democrat and Republican.  For example, Zaller’s 
found that John Anderson received 10 percent of the coverage in Time and Newsweek 
during the 1980 election but only 6.6 percent of the popular vote.  Likewise, George 
Wallace got 28 percent of the coverage in the two magazines during the 1968 campaign, 
but only 13.5 percent support at the ballot box.  In addition, while Perot received 19 
percent of the vote during the 1992 presidential election, he received 23 percent of the 
coverage in the news magazines and 22 percent of the coverage on TV news. 
 The scholarship also reflects an interest in how journalists handle so-called 
“minor” candidates from within the two major parties.  Einsiedel and Bibbee (1979) 
analyzed how the three major news magazines covered the Democratic presidential 
candidacy of Eugene McCarthy in 1968 and discovered that he was rarely noticed.  
According to their analysis, McCarthy appeared in only three stories in the 27 issues that 
were examined.  Moreover, of the 14,000 square inches of space that the three magazines 
devoted to presidential politics that year, the authors reported, only 2 percent included 
any mention of third-party candidates—and of that, only 1 percent mentioned McCarthy. 
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Meyrowitz (1995) found similar results in his analysis of the 1992 Democratic 
presidential campaign of Larry Agran.  In that study, Meyrowitz illustrated how the 
former mayor of Irvine, California, was all but ignored by national news reporters during 
the New Hampshire primary, even when public opinion polls showed him either tied or 
leading several of the “major” candidates in the race, including Iowa Sen. Tom Harkin 
and former California Governor Jerry Brown.  At first, Meyrowitz said, reporters 
indicated that they ignored Agran because their news organizations simply did not have 
the resources to cover all the candidates, forcing them to choose between those who had 
the best chance of winning.  However, Meyrowitz said, when Agran continued to be 
ignored in March—after the field had been winnowed down to Bill Clinton and Jerry 
Brown—reporters still refused to write about Agran, explaining that they could not 
“change the narrative in midstream.”  Said one New York Times reporter:  “Once the ball 
got rolling, it was very hard to cover him [Agran].  The press would have to go back and 
explain who this guy was” (quoted in Meyrowitz 1995, 54). 
In any case, each of these studies focus exclusively on presidential politics and so 
leave a gap in our understanding of this phenomenon at the gubernatorial level.  In fact, 
the only study found that examines how the press covers third-party candidates for 
governor was an analysis by Frith (2005), who showed that Jesse Ventura was taken 
much more seriously by the Minnesota press during his 1998 governor’s race than was 
Arnold Schwarzenegger by the California media during the 2003 special recall election.  
However, this analysis focused on Ventura and Schwarzenegger as celebrity candidates 
and had very little to do with third-party politics.  This dissertation hopes to close that 
gap. 
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Why third parties may be ignored 
Embedded in the discussion above about the horse race and third-party candidates 
are several potential reasons for why the news media may ignore political aspirants who 
come from minor-party movements.  First, because reporters use a contest paradigm to 
interpret election campaigns, they see no reason to cover candidates who have little 
chance of winning the horse race.  Second, journalists value third-party candidates for 
what they bring to the campaign rather than the issues they raise.  And third, journalists 
do not have the resources to cover every nominee during an election contest and so are 
forced to make judgments that exclude weaker candidates.  Beyond that, scholarship 
reviewed in this chapter also suggests that third-party candidates have trouble getting on 
the news media’s radar screen because many of them are simply not qualified for the 
office they seek.  In other cases, minor-party nominees represent small constituencies that 
generate little interest among the general population, fail to build long-lasting coalitions 
that can seriously challenge the Democrats and Republicans, and run in a system that has 
traditionally and legally favored only two major parties. 
Each of these explanations has merit, but can they be expanded to create some 
theoretical framework that examines more broadly how third-party candidates are 
covered and why they are covered this way?  In the subsections that follow, three such 
theories will be discussed:  John Zaller’s (1999) Rule of Anticipated Importance, Joshua 
Meyrowitz’s (1995) observations of journalistic logic, and Antonio Gramsci’s (1971, 
1994a, 1994b) notion of political hegemony. 
Rule of Anticipated Importance.  Zaller (1999) has developed what he calls “The 
Rule of Anticipated Importance” to explain why certain candidates and issues are 
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thoroughly covered by the news media while others are virtually ignored.  According to 
his analysis, reporters will only expend limited journalistic resources—reporting talent, 
space in the newspaper, and air time in a broadcast—on stories that they believe will 
carry some importance for their readers and viewers in the future.  When it comes to 
election campaigns, Zaller says, this means that it is the reporter’s job to determine which 
candidates have a realistic chance of winning and then focusing most of the attention on 
them. 
Zaller provides three reasons for why reporters use the Rule of Anticipated 
Importance to make such judgments.  First, he says that reporters understand that most 
voters do not have the time or inclination to study every candidate who runs for president.  
Faced with busy schedules and obligations, most citizens only want to learn about the 
two or three candidates who could have an impact on their lives in the future.  Second, 
“journalists have a collective incentive to get the story right” (Zaller 1999, 90).  That is, 
reporters do not want to undermine their own credibility and embarrass the profession as 
a whole, Zaller says, by consistently promoting weak candidates who eventually fade 
from public importance.  Finally, Zaller says that political reporters operate in a highly 
competitive, cutthroat atmosphere in which each individual journalist’s status among his 
or her peers depends very much on the reporter’s ability to accurately assess which 
candidates have legs and which ones are simply the flavor of the week.  Like school 
children playing King of the Hill, reporters do not want to lose their place in the 
journalistic pecking order by writing too much about candidates who are unlikely to 
prevail at the ballot box.  As Zaller puts it: 
Although journalists, like stock market investors, often run in packs, each individual 
reporter, like each individual investor, has an incentive to find undervalued candidates 
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and invest in them.  Thus, poor choices by existing pack leaders create opportunities for 
would-be pack leaders, and journalism is full of such ambitious individuals (90-91). 
  
According to Zaller’s theory, reporters use several indicators to anticipate a 
candidate’s likely future importance.  Most importantly, journalists keep a close eye on a 
candidate’s public support through the polls, with greater amounts of coverage generally 
going to political contenders who are either leading or registering close behind the 
frontrunner.  Analyzing the so-called invisible primaries between 1980 and 1996, for 
example, Zaller found a correlation between the percentage of support a candidate 
received in public opinion surveys and the percentage of his or her coverage in the press.  
One illustration of this came from 1991, when then-President George Bush “was favored 
by 78 percent of Republicans in the last pre-December Gallup Poll and received 70 
percent of the campaign coverage allocated to Republican candidates in the New York 
Times” (91-92).  
But reporters are not slaves to the polls alone, Zaller says.  In addition to 
monitoring surveys, reporters also examine a candidate’s ability to give a good speech, 
win support from party leaders and activists, raise substantial funds, attract and organize 
a strong campaign staff, perform well before TV cameras, and display that most 
cherished among political skills: charisma.  These intangibles, as Zaller calls them, 
explain why certain candidates (such as Bill Clinton in 1992) may receive substantial 
coverage in the press even though they are not registering particularly high numbers in 
early opinion polls. 
Zaller’s theory, as he points out, has serious ramifications for third-party 
candidates.  At its most basic level, the Rule of Anticipated Importance suggests that 
most minor-party political aspirants will be ignored by reporters because these candidates 
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have little chance of winning national elections and so are expected to have little, if any, 
future consequence.  But the theory also predicts that third-party candidates can convince 
reporters to take their campaigns seriously when (1) they are a fresh face that generates 
interest within the electorate and (2) they demonstrate enough public support to either 
win the election or impact the race between the Democrat and the Republican.  Ross 
Perot was just such a candidate in 1992, Zaller says, adding that Perot’s public appeal and 
newsworthiness were fairly high the first time he ran for president but tapered off 
significantly in 1996 when his second campaign was viewed as stale and lackluster. 
Finally, the Rule of Anticipated Importance suggests that the media attention 
given to third-party candidates may not always be positive.  Under Zaller’s theory, there 
is a direct correlation between the anticipated importance of a minor-party contender and 
the amount of media scrutiny that the candidate will receive.  In most cases, Zaller says, 
the additional coverage will be negative—a situation Perot faced during his 1992 run for 
the White House when he was perceived as an important factor in the race. 
Journalistic logic.  A second explanation for why third-party candidates are 
ignored may rest with the mindset and routines of the journalists themselves.  In his 
analysis of Larry Agran’s campaign for the 1992  Democratic presidential nomination 
(mentioned earlier in this chapter), Meyrowitz (1995) identified what he described as 
three campaign logics to explain different coverage patterns vis-à-vis “minor” candidates:  
national journalistic logic, which restricts campaign coverage “to a narrow set of largely 
predetermined major candidates;” public logic, which is open to hearing about a variety 
of candidates and ideas; and local journalistic logic, which falls somewhere in-between 
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(44-45).  Since this dissertation is most interested in how reporters think, this section will 
discuss the differences and similarities of only the two journalistic worldviews.5 
Under Meyrowitz’s framework, national reporters look for reasons to exclude 
certain presidential candidates from their coverage.  The main reason for this, Meyrowitz 
said, is that news organizations simply do not have the resources to be on the road with 
dozens of contenders each day—particularly when most of these candidates have little 
chance of eventually winning.  As one reporter from the New York Times told Meyrowitz, 
“Even six candidates are a lot to cover if you give them equal time” (46).  Another 
journalist with the Los Angeles Times agreed, saying:  “Journalists don’t sit around in 
newsrooms asking, ‘Whom else should we cover?’ The big question is ‘Whom can we 
stop covering?’” (47). 
National reporters attempt to weed out candidates by assessing which ones have 
the best chance of winning the contest.  They do this, Meyrowitz said, by examining each 
candidate’s financial strength and standing in the polls, taking cues from other national 
media outlets to see what their colleagues are saying, and asking their sources to tell them 
which contenders party insiders consider to be the “major candidates.”  Moreover, 
national reporters told Meyrowitz that coverage often begets coverage—in other words, 
candidates who receive lots of attention early in a primary season are more likely to 
receive attention later. 
                                                 
5 Meyrowitz acknowledges that these three categories—which he developed through interviews with 
political reporters, surveys of the general public, and an analysis of story content, all from the New 
Hampshire primary—“are not as neatly bounded as their labels may suggest” (45-46).  Some national 
reporters, for example, expressed views that reflected local journalistic logic while local reporters had 
attitudes that vacillated between public and national journalistic logic (45-46).  Nevertheless, Meyrowitz 
argues that his observations of three distinct ways of interpreting a campaign is valuable in explaining the 
differences in how national and regional news organizations cover candidates who are perceived to be 
minor players in the political process. 
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This is different from local journalistic logic, which puts a higher premium on the 
value and freshness of a candidate’s ideas.  According to Meyrowitz, local editors and 
reporters determine who to cover by evaluating each candidate’s political experience and 
then assessing whether the candidate (1) is running a serious campaign, (2) has 
interesting ideas that address state and national problems, and (3) holds campaign events 
in the newspaper’s circulation area.  In addition, he said that local reporters also interview 
sources to determine which candidates were most viable.  But rather than talking to 
national party insiders for the scoop on who is a major player in the race, Meyrowitz 
says, local reporters talk to regional politicians, college professors, and regular voters to 
see which candidates are resonating with the public. 
In short, Meyrowitz summed up his findings this way:  Local journalistic logic 
dictates that a candidate should receive media coverage to determine whether his or her 
ideas catch on with the public; national journalistic logic maintains that a candidate 
should be excluded from coverage until he or she can first demonstrate public interest in 
his or her views. 
Meyrowitz provided two reasons to account for the differences between national 
and local journalists.  First, national reporters may have an incentive to winnow the field 
of candidates to reduce the cost of campaign coverage for their news organizations.  
Local newspapers and television stations also face financial considerations, Meyrowitz 
says, but while national reporters must travel with the candidates, thus accruing hotel and 
plane expenses, local reporters simply wait for the candidates to come to them.  Second, 
presidential campaigns have certain implications for a national reporter’s career that do 
not exist for journalists at the local level.  That is, while regional reporters will go back to 
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covering city council meetings, the school board, and local police after the campaign has 
ended, a national journalist could find him- or herself on the White House beat should the 
candidate he or she is covering win the election.  In the context of Agran’s 1992 
campaign, Meyrowitz wrote, “national journalists had much more to gain from covering 
high-status candidates, win or lose, than they had to forfeit from ignoring Larry Agran” 
(53). 
Meyrowitz’s journalistic logics and Zaller’s Rule of Anticipated Importance both 
provide explanations for why third-party candidates may or may not receive coverage by 
the news media.  However, both of these theories were formulated through observations 
of politics at the national level and do not deal directly with gubernatorial races.  Do the 
same dynamics come into play in state campaigns?  Do reporters at regional newspapers 
try to anticipate the importance of gubernatorial candidates in much the same way as 
national reporters do in presidential races?  Is there a difference, as Meyrowitz suggests, 
between regional and national news organizations in how they cover major- and minor-
party candidates seeking the office of governor? 
In addition to these questions, this dissertation seeks to examine how and why the 
coverage of third-party candidates is different when minor-party aspirants do receive 
coverage.  Zaller takes a slight step in that direction—showing, for example, that serious 
third-party presidential contenders can expect negative press scrutiny if they show signs 
of affecting the election outcome.  But can there be more to it?  Is it possible that the 
patterns of third-party coverage go beyond a simple calculation about a news 
organization’s financial resources or a candidate’s potential future consequence?  To help 
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examine such questions, it is important to turn to the third possible explanation for third-
party coverage: the concept of hegemony. 
 Hegemony.  The notion of hegemony is most closely associated with the work of 
the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, who fashioned his concepts of political and cultural 
domination in an attempt to explain why the socialist movements of Europe had failed to 
bring an end to capitalism in the early 20th century (Bocock 1986; Carragee 1993).  In his 
writings from prison, where he was held by Mussolini from 1926 until his death in 1937, 
Gramsci (1971, 1994a, 1994b) drew a connection between power and persuasion, arguing 
that a dominant group can best maintain control over the masses through the use of 
consent—or convincing the public to accept as its own a value system that best serves 
elite interests.  To Gramsci (1971), this socialization process occurs from within the 
superstructure of a society, including its education and communication systems.  
Intellectuals, he said, were the “deputies” of the privileged class, helping to persuade “the 
great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the 
dominant fundamental group…” (Gramsci 1971, 12). 
  Fontana (1993) explains it this way: 
Hegemony is defined by Gramsci as intellectual and moral leadership whose principal 
constituting elements are consent and persuasion.  A social group or class can be said to 
assume a hegemonic role to the extent that it articulates and proliferates throughout 
society cultural and ideological belief systems whose teachings are accepted as 
universally valid by the general population…  The social group or class that is capable of 
forming its own particular knowledge and value systems, and of transforming them into 
general and universally applicable conceptions of the world, is the group that exercises 
intellectual and moral leadership…  Hegemony is thus conceived as the vehicle whereby 
the dominant social groups establish a system of “permanent consent” that legitimates a 
prevailing social order by encompassing a complex network of mutually reinforcing and 
interwoven ideas affirmed and articulated by intellectuals (140-141). 
 
 Just what role the news media is ascribed in this concept of social control has 
been a subject of intense interest for many years, generating a wealth of studies both 
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exploring and refuting the so-called “media hegemony thesis” (see Carragee 1993 for a 
comprehensive review).  While scholars such as Altheide (1984), Robinson and Sheehan 
(1983), and Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner (1980) raise serious questions about the 
charge that journalists act as a hegemonic force in American society, others contend that 
through the sources and frames they employ in their stories, reporters and television 
broadcasters essentially protect the status quo and existing power centers. 
 Hall (1977), for example, made the link between hegemony and the mass media 
through the concept of “encoding”—the idea that media organizations construct social 
reality by giving meaning to events through the use of certain codes or news frames (see 
also Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, and Sasson 1992; Jansen 1994; Joslyn 1984; and 
Tuchman 1978).  Although the media do not intentionally choose to support a dominant 
ideology, Hall says, it nevertheless operates within boundaries established through a 
social discourse that eventually reaches a consensus reflective of elite opinion.  
“Precisely because they have become ‘universalized and naturalized,’” Hall writes, the 
value systems of the privileged class “appear to be the only forms of intelligibility 
available…   The premises and preconditions which sustain their rationalities have been 
rendered invisible by the process of ideological masking…” (Hall 1977, 343).  He adds: 
In the interplay of opinions, freely given and exchanged, to which the idea of consensus 
always makes its ritual bow, some voices and opinions exhibit greater weight [and] 
resonance, defining and limiting power—for the pure consensus of classical liberal-
democratic theory has long since given way to the reality of the more shaped and 
structured consensus, constructed in the unequal exchange between the unorganized 
masses and the great organizing centers of power and opinion… (Hall 1977, 342).  
 
 The result, some scholars and journalists say, is that most news reports about 
politics and public affairs are embedded with the hegemonic views of opinion leaders.  
Wicker (1978) maintains that “objective journalism almost always favors Establishment 
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positions and exists not least to avoid offense to them” (36-37); Hallin (1984) found that 
reporters often make value judgments about which viewpoints are legitimate and which 
ones are deviant based on the consensus of top policymakers; and Graber (1997) has 
shown that mainstream political institutions such as Congress and the presidency are 
routinely legitimized and celebrated by the news media while outside groups are 
marginalized.  It is true, Graber says, that the press occasionally does investigative pieces 
that disparage a public official or reveal corruption within public institutions, but these 
are usually portrayed as a deviation from the system rather than as a problem with the 
system itself.  For the most part, Graber (1997) writes, the press displays “a supportive 
attitude toward political leaders and the American political system in general,” adding 
that “news stories cast a negative light on antiestablishment behavior, such as protest 
demonstrations that disrupt normal activities, inflammatory speeches by militants, or 
looting during a riot” (123). 
 Soloski (1989) agrees, saying that journalists’ reliance on elite sources for most of 
the information that appears in the news firmly imbeds reporters “within the power 
structure of the community.”  He adds: 
For both journalists and news consumers, news reifies the socio-political system.  
Journalists perceive the existing socio-political system as the legitimate site for gathering 
news and perceive public officials as the legitimate sources of news.  By choosing to 
concentrate their coverage on the power structure of society, journalists present a very 
specific picture of society (Soloski 1989, 870). 
 
 One reason for this, Rachlin (1988) says, is that reporters have been socialized by 
the same cultural forces that shape the society in general and are subject to the same 
pressures to conform.  In addition, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, studies have 
shown that reporters rely heavily on official government sources for most of their 
information about politics and public affairs (Dunn 1969; Graber 1997; Sigal 1973).  
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These official spokespersons are not only used by reporters to counter the opinions of 
those who challenge the system, they are often considered the authoritative sources of the 
“objective” and “factual” information that establishes the context of the debate (Hallin 
1984).  What’s more, when government officials are quoted in most political news 
reports, they are rarely challenged by the reporter.  As Joslyn (1984) writes:  “The facts 
presented [in news reports] are often words spoken by so-called authoritative or informed 
sources.  Although these utterances may well be personal opinions or preferences and 
may be factually inaccurate, once they are spoken to the journalist, they become facts 
capable of being transmitted to the news” (104). 
 Others point to the economic structure of American journalism as the root of 
hegemonic values, arguing that the consolidation of media organizations over the past 
quarter century has given large corporations enormous incentives to confine debate 
within a political context that never threatens their bottom line (Bagdikian 2000; 
McChesney 1999).  Herman and Chomsky (2002), for example, have developed what 
they call the “propaganda model” for explaining the bias in the American news media.  
Under this conception of hegemony, the authors illustrated that all political discourse is 
filtered through a media system that is (1) dominated by large corporations, (2) relies on 
advertising for its primary source of revenue, (3) depends mostly on official sources for 
information (government and corporate experts), (4) subjected to intense pressure from 
sources and advertisers when it does challenge elite discourse, and (5) operates in a 
fiercely anticommunism political environment that, at least during the Cold War, acted as 
a “control mechanism” on the press (2).  Under this system, Herman and Chomsky say, 
elites use the mass media to manufacture consent, thus persuading the general public to 
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support value systems and institutions that ultimately favor the dominant group’s 
interests. 
 Lichtenberg (1987) concurs, saying that many views are excluded from 
newspaper and broadcast reports because of several factors: the media is owned by “large 
corporations whose interests influence what gets covered;” news companies are driven by 
an economic need to capture a large audience and so avoid controversial subjects that 
make readers and viewers uncomfortable; and journalists are easily manipulated by 
government authorities (330).  Such statements are supported by McManus (1992), who 
has said that the capitalist economic model used in the United States drives news 
organizations to use “market logic” rather than journalistic logic to determine what is 
news (see also Picard 1985).  Rather than seeking to inform people about their society, 
such as writing about all candidates in a campaign, “market logic” leads news 
organizations to report what will sell in the marketplace, such as news meant to entertain.  
Said McManus:  “The inherent conflict between the logic of business and the logic of 
journalism should be profoundly troubling for those who consider reliable information 
necessary for proper operation of a democracy” (205). 
 Lewis (1999) does not disagree with this assessment, but he leans toward a 
slightly different interpretation of hegemony.  According to his analysis, pro-corporate 
forces are able to get a generally left-leaning American public to accept a rightward tilt in 
government policy by sustaining a hegemonic system in two ways: (1) at the level of 
political economy through a campaign finance system that allows rich individuals and 
businesses to provide the public with their choice of candidates even before any votes are 
cast, and (2) ideological hegemony in which the schools and the mass media are used to 
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portray the American system as democratic, pluralistic, and representative of the public 
rather than what Lewis believes it really is: a center-right system designed to protect 
corporate and elite interests. 
 What’s more, some scholars believe that the hegemonic influences evident in 
traditional news media are now being extended into the Internet.  Singer (2000), for 
example, found evidence that Web-based news media are “normalizing” the Internet—in 
other words, journalists are doing on the Web what they do in traditional print.  This view 
is supported by Resnick (1998) and Margolis and Resnick (2000), who contend that the 
same restraints that place limits on public discourse in the real world have come into play 
in cyberspace.  Not only do the two major political parties dominate third parties on the 
Web, Margolis and Resnick point out, but mainstream news outlets dominate other 
potential news sources.  “Far from remaking American politics,” they write, “the 
development of cyberspace, and particularly of the WWW, seems more likely to 
reinforce the status quo” (Margolis and Resnick 2000, 54). 
 To be sure, most of the research that has examined hegemony on the Internet is 
already getting “old,” and no recent studies dealing with third parties and the Web could 
be found.  In addition, there is a body of scholarship that has refuted the media hegemony 
thesis as it pertains to traditional news outlets.  In their analysis of the 1980 presidential 
election involving independent John Anderson, for example, Robinson and Sheehan 
(1983) found no hegemonic forces at work in campaign coverage.  They said that while it 
is true the news media rarely have an antiestablishment tone, television news is often 
highly critical of politicians and rarely serves as a mouthpiece for the elite. 
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 Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner (1980) said that it is difficult to support the notion 
of hegemony in the media because elite opinion has rarely, if ever, been monolithic and 
all encompassing.  As the authors put it:  “What is the dominant ideology?  While it is 
often assumed that the dominant ideologies are clear, coherent and effective, we show 
that, on the contrary, they are fractured and even contradictory in most historical periods” 
(Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner 1980, 156).  In addition, the authors contend that while 
Marxists focus on “the ‘means of mental production’” when explaining how hegemonic 
forces are dispersed to the masses, they fail to recognize that media messages “do not 
have uniform consequences for all social classes” (157).  In fact, Abercrombie, Hill, and 
Turner say, dominant groups are often more exposed to hegemonic communications that 
are the supposed subordinate ones. 
 Altheide’s (1984) examination of hegemony within news reports found that 
reporters not only resist socialization into a dominant ideology, but that news 
organizations have frequently challenged the status quo and acted as “agents of change” 
(477).  This is supported by Streitmatter (1997), who highlights 14 case studies from 
American history to illustrate how journalism has frequently played an instrumental role 
in bringing change to society—both good and bad.  In addition, scholars such as Lichter, 
Rothman and Lichter (1986) have demonstrated that most Washington-based reporters 
have traditionally been liberal-leaning Democrats who are more apt to challenge 
conservative notions of society than succumb to establishment viewpoints. 
 Still, the media hegemony thesis, like the Rule of Anticipated Importance and 
Meyrowitz’s notions of journalistic logic, provides another framework in which to 
proceed with this dissertation.  It is another possible explanation for why third-party 
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gubernatorial candidates may receive different treatment by the press than Democrats and 
Republicans.  However, unlike the theories put forth by Zaller and Meyrowitz, notions of 
hegemony imply more ideological tendencies on the part of journalists.  These may not 
be intentional, of course, but they may nevertheless appear in the language used in news 
reports as well as the attitudes displayed by the reporters themselves. 
Summary and Research Questions 
 This chapter has made several points that will be recapped here.  First, the 
scholarly literature suggests that gubernatorial campaigns involving third-party 
candidates are worth studying because (a) third parties have played an instrumental role 
in American politics throughout history and (b) campaigns in general are important 
rituals that help foster debate, spark citizen learning, and legitimize public institutions.  
Second, the press plays an instrumental role in how the public understands campaigns, 
constructing a reality through agenda setting, framing, and priming.  The media-public 
agenda is built, the literature indicates, by the sources reporters turn to for information as 
well as journalistic routines and notions of objectivity.  Third, the press covers campaigns 
mostly as horse races in which it is mostly concerned with how the Democrat and 
Republican are fairing in public opinion surveys and other measures of the contest.  
Finally, dissent in general and third-party candidates in particular receive little coverage 
in the news media, possibly because of such factors as Zaller’s (1999) Rule of 
Anticipated Importance, Meyrowitz’s (1995) notions of journalistic logic, and Gramsci’s 
(1971) concept of hegemony. 
 Based on the discussion that has been outlined in this chapter, this dissertation 
seeks to answer the following research questions: 
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1. What is the nature of press coverage of third-party candidates who run for governor 
and how is that coverage similar to and different from the treatment of Republicans 
and Democrats? 
a. What are the characteristics of third-party coverage? 
b. How is the text about third-party candidates different from the texts about the 
major-party contenders? 
 
2. Meyrowitz says that national and regional journalists operate under different 
campaign logics, with national reporters focusing mostly on the horse race and 
regional reporters emphasizing issues and ideas. How do Meyrowitz’s observations 
translate into the way regional and national news organizations cover third-party 
candidates at the gubernatorial level?  In what ways is the coverage of third-party 
gubernatorial candidates in regional newspapers similar to and different from the 
coverage in national newspapers? 
 
3. Lippmann (1922) and others say that the public’s main way of learning about a 
campaign is through the news media because few members of the public will 
experience the campaign directly themselves.  What role do political reporters believe 
they play during a campaign? 
a. How do political reporters define the term campaign? 
b. How does the definition drive news coverage? 
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4. Zaller (1999) and Meyrowitz (1995) say that national journalists choose who to cover 
based not on the ideas of the candidates but on their public support as measured by 
polls, fund raising abilities, and support from party leaders.  Is this true at the state 
level? 
a. What criteria do reporters use when deciding which gubernatorial candidates to 
cover? 
b. How did these criteria develop? 
 
5. Zaller (1999) says journalists operate under a theory he calls the Rule of Anticipated 
Importance, meaning that news organizations faced with limited resources will only 
cover candidates who are perceived to have some importance in the future.  Other 
scholars, such as Gramsci (1971) and Hall (1977) maintain that certain voices are left 
out of public debate because of hegemonic forces at work that confine discourse 
within boundaries established by society’s elites.  Which of these explanations comes 
closest to explaining the coverage patterns of third-party gubernatorial candidates? 
a. Do reporters cover third-party candidates differently for the practical reasons 
outlined by Zaller? 
b. Or do reporters ignore minor-party contenders because they are predisposed to 
accept a Democrat-Republican paradigm? 
 
 This study is designed to broaden our understanding of what the scholarly 
literature suggests and what we intuitively know: that third-party candidates are not 
treated the same as major-party candidates by the news media.  By answering these 
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questions, this project hopes to explicate the practical and possibly the ideological 
reasons for why reporters cover third-party gubernatorial candidates differently from 
Democrats and Republicans.  It is not my intent to, in the words of the late Dr. Michael 
Gurevitch, “push at an open door.”6  Rather, my hope is to begin the process of 
documenting the underlying factors that contribute to how political discourse is practiced 
in the United States.  For if it is true, as Lippmann (1922) and others (see Lichtenberg 
1987) have suggested, that the news media is the main conduit through which Americans 
learn about politics, then it is imperative to understand how reporters facilitate that 
debate, particularly when they are dealing with voices from outside the mainstream.
                                                 
6 Dr. Michael Gurevitch of the University of Maryland-College Park made these comments to me 
personally during a private meeting in the Fall of 2002 when I was taking his Communications Theory 
course.  In doing so, he was urging me to design a study that did not seek out findings that were obvious, 





Chapter 3: Methodology 
 This study has two parts: a content analysis that examines four gubernatorial 
campaigns involving third-party candidates and a series of in-depth interviews with eight 
political reporters who covered two of those races.  The content analysis is designed to 
answer Research Questions 1 and 2 while the long interviews will address Research 
Questions 3 through 5.  The codebook that was used for the content analysis and the 
protocol for the in-depth interviews are included in Appendices A and C, respectively.  
This chapter will explain how the content analysis and interviews were conducted, and it 
will provide some rationale for why certain choices were made and procedures followed. 
 Designing a dissertation that mixes research methods is, in some ways, cutting 
against the grain of mass communication research.  Systematic examinations of recent 
trends in the field show that few scholars have utilized qualitative and quantitative 
techniques in a single study over the past 10 to 20 years (Cooper, Potter, and DuPagne 
1994; Kamhawi and Weaver 2003; and Trumbo 2004).  Nevertheless, combining 
methodologies—sometimes called “multiple operationism” (Campbell and Fiske 1959, 
101) but more generally known as  triangulation (Webb et. al. 1966, 1969)—will allow 
this study to take advantage of each technique’s strengths to draw a more complete 
picture of how regional and national newspapers cover third-party candidates at the state 
level.  This strategy has been used in several studies of the news media in the past (for 
example, see Clarke and Evans 1983; Clarke and Fredin 1978; Lavie and Lehman-Wilzig 
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2005; Wolfsfeld et al. 2002; Wolfsfeld et al. 2000) and is based on the “growing 
acknowledgment that complex social phenomena can usefully be understood by looking 
at them both quantitatively and qualitatively” (Rossman and Wilson 1994, 315).  More 
specifically, the quantitative content analysis shows how third-party gubernatorial 
candidates have actually been covered in newspapers by examining such variables as 
story length, media type (national vs. regional newspapers), news sources, candidate 
portrayals, issue frames, tone of news coverage, and candidate themes while the in-depth 
interviews delve more deeply into the attitudes of journalists to identify the pressures, 
biases, and motivations that drive the political reporters who produce the very content 
under analysis.  In short, the quantitative part of this study seeks to show what political 
reporters actually wrote during a campaign and the qualitative part tries to explain why 
they wrote it. 
 Although some scholars have argued that the détente between qualitative and 
quantitative techniques cannot be sustained because each is based on completely different 
assumptions of reality (Smith and Heshusius 1986), there is an abundance of literature 
that advocates the use of multiple methods in single studies (Campbell 1975; Campbell 
and Fiske 1959; Denzin 1978; Erzberger and Prein 1997; Jick 1979, 1983; Light and 
Pillemer 1982; Mathison 1988; Padilla 1992; Rossman and Wilson 1994; Smith 1975, 
1981; and Webb et al. 1966, 1969).  While much of this comes from the fields of 
psychology, sociology, and education, scholars have also backed the idea of combining 
qualitative and quantitative techniques in the study of mass communication (Dominick 
and Wimmer 2003; Jankowski and Wester 1991; Weaver 1988; and Weaver 1993). 
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Proponents of triangulation often argue that any single methodology has a number 
of weaknesses that can raise serious questions about the validity and reliability of results.  
By combining two or more methods in a single study, advocates say, the strengths of one 
technique can often neutralize the weaknesses of another, thus increasing the confidence 
one can have in a study’s findings (see Erzberger and Prein, 1997, for an explanation of 
this reasoning).  Webb et al. (1966, 1969), for example, maintained that “as long as the 
research strategy is based on a single measurement class, some flanks will be exposed” 
(173).  Denzen (1978) agreed, saying different methods reveal “different aspects of 
empirical reality,” adding that “in the present stage of social research single-method 
investigations are no longer appropriate” (28).  According to Denzen (1978): 
Because each method reveals different aspects of empirical reality, multiple methods of 
observation must be employed…  The combination of multiple methods in a single 
investigation will better enable the sociologist to forge valid propositions that carefully 
consider relevant rival causal factors (28-29). 
 
Campbell and Fiske (1959), who are sometimes credited with introducing the idea 
of triangulation (see Mathison 1988), argued that multiple methods should be used in the 
validation process to ensure that a study’s results reflect variances in the social 
phenomenon under study rather than variances in the methodology itself.  Rossman and 
Wilson (1994) gave four reasons for mixing methods in a single study: (1) corroboration, 
or using one method to confirm the results of another; (2) elaboration, using qualitative 
methods to expand on the findings of quantitative research; (3) development, using the 
results of one method to shape a second method; and (4) initiation, or applying a second 
methodology to a study after the results of the first method either sparked new lines of 
thinking or uncovered contradictions in findings.  Others have maintained that research 
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methods all have their inherent biases—a fact that investigators can compensate for by 
employing different techniques.  Said Smith (1981, 1975):  
Research methods are never atheoretical or neutral in representing the world “out there.”  
They act as filters through which the environment is selectively experienced.  By using 
one’s knowledge of how each method may selectively bias or distort the scientist’s 
picture of “reality,” combinations of methods may be selected that more accurately 
represent what is “out there” (357). 
 
Mathison (1988) tried to take the debate a step further, arguing that while some of 
the assumptions surrounding triangulation are flawed, the mixing of methods is 
nevertheless justified because “several levels of evidence are required for the researcher 
to construct plausible explanations” (16).  The use of multiple methods will often reveal 
inconsistent or contradictory results, Mathison (1988) said, something that forces 
researchers to make sense of findings by “embedding the empirical data at hand with a 
holistic understanding of the specific situation and general background knowledge about 
this class of social phenomena” (17).  Erzberger and Prein (1997) concur, arguing that 
mixing methods can lead to three possible outcomes: convergence of results, which 
would increase the validity of the study; a more comprehensive understanding of a social 
phenomenon; and contradictions in results that can undermine previous theories and 
assumptions about the phenomenon under study.  Finally, some scholars say that 
regardless of whether triangulation confirms findings, increases reliability, or uncovers 
contradictions, a major advantage of utilizing quantitative and qualitative methods in a 
single study is to allow for each technique’s assumptions about reality to uncover new 
truths or perspectives that would otherwise go unnoticed.  “In this sense, triangulation 
may be used not only to examine the same phenomenon from multiple perspectives but 
also to enrich our understanding by allowing for new and deeper dimensions to emerge” 
(Jick 1979, 1983, p. 138). 
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 It is this last point that is so central to the design of this dissertation.  The goal 
here is not necessarily to seek convergence or divergence of results, although such 
findings would be welcomed.  Nor does this study mix methods to limit the flanks that 
will undoubtedly be exposed.  No study is perfect—there will always be limits.  Rather, it 
is the hope that a qualitative method such as long interviews will allow this study to 
elaborate and expand on the numbers provided by the content analysis—in other words, 
to allow new dimensions to emerge.  By using triangulation, this study seeks out multiple 
levels of evidence that complement one another and lead to a better understanding of how 
and why certain voices are left out of political discourse.  It seeks a richer, thicker, more 
holistic description of the phenomena of third-party candidates and the press.  Put another 
way, while the content analysis can provide a precision that shows how minor parties are 
portrayed in the news media when they do receive coverage, the long interviews can 
provide the meaning behind such coverage. 
Content Analysis 
 The content analysis is designed to assess how regional and national newspapers 
covered the gubernatorial campaigns in California, Maine, Oregon, and Wisconsin in 
2002, the last major off-year election cycle available at the time this study was designed.  
These campaigns were chosen for three reasons: they all involved a credible third-party 
candidate who had strong professional or political credentials; they each featured a third-
party candidate who ran a serious campaign designed either to win the election or build a 
foundation for the future; and they all involved third-party candidates who demonstrated 
popular support by receiving more than 5 percent of the total vote, the threshold used by 
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the federal government and most states to determine major party status for the next 
election cycle.7 
 The analysis looks at how the Democratic, Republican, and third-party (Green or 
Libertarian) candidates were each covered in three statewide newspapers and three 
national newspapers.  The only exception to this rule is in California, where four regional 
dailies were included in the analysis. This was done to cover all three major cities, Los 
Angeles, San Francisco and San Diego, along with the state capital, Sacramento. Included 
in the study are the Los Angeles Times, San Diego Union-Tribune, San Francisco 
Chronicle, and Sacramento Bee in the California election; the Bangor Daily News, 
Portland Press Herald, and Kennebec Journal/Morning Sentinel in the Maine contest; 
The Oregonian, The Register-Guard and the Statesman Journal in the Oregon election; 
and the Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel, the Wisconsin State Journal, and The Capital Times 
in the Wisconsin campaign.  The three national newspapers included in the study are the 
New York Times, the Washington Post, and USA Today. (See Table 3.1) 
Each of these regional newspapers was chosen for one or more of the following 
reasons: the newspaper either had a large circulation in the state; the newspaper is 
considered an influential publications in the state; or the newspaper is located in the state 
capital.  In addition, the study tried to identify newspapers from different regions in each 
state to take into account any regional differences in perspective that might occur. For the 
purposes of this study, a national newspaper was defined as a newspaper that either has a 
national circulation, such as the New York Times and USA Today, or one that covers 
                                                 
7 In his book Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics (1970), Walter Dean Burnham 
defines successful third parties as those that have won at least 5 percent of the vote.  See also, Ronald B. 
Rapoport and Walter J. Stone, Three’s a Crowd: The Dynamics of Third Parties, Ross Perot, and 
Republican Resurgence, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005. 
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national politics from a national rather than a regional perspective, such as the 
Washington Post.  In addition, the three national papers were chosen for these reasons: 
the New York Times is still considered the premier newspaper in the United States and, 
until recently, had been called the nation’s paper of record; the Washington Post is 
considered one of the leading political journals in the country; and USA Today is the only 
truly national newspaper in America that focuses on general news.8 
 The unit of analysis for this study is the newspaper story.  A sample of articles 
was randomly selected from each regional newspaper using the “constructed week” 
approach described by Riffe, Lacy and Fico (1998) and Riffe, Aust and Lacy (1993).  
Under this methodology, seven articles per candidate, per newspaper were randomly 
selected, making sure that all seven days of the week were equally represented in the 
sample.  In the Wisconsin race, for instance, I randomly selected 21 articles from the 
regional press in which Libertarian Party candidate Ed Thompson was mentioned—seven 
that appeared in the Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel, seven from the Wisconsin State 
Journal, and seven from The Capital Times.  For each publication, the seven articles 
included one article for each day of the week, so that there is one article from a Monday, 
one from a Tuesday, and so on.  This was done to avoid any “cyclic variations of 
content” that occur for different days of the week (Riffe, Aust and Lacy 1993, 134).  The 
process was repeated for Democrat Jim Doyle and Republican Scott McCallum so that 
the final sample for the regional news media in Wisconsin totals 63 articles—seven for 
each candidate for each of the three statewide newspapers for a total of 21 stories per 
                                                 
8 In making this statement, I should point out that while the Wall Street Journal is also considered a 
national newspaper, it focuses on business news and so targets a more specific audience than does a general 
circulation paper like USA Today. 
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candidate.  Multiplied over four campaigns, I had a sample of 273 articles from regional 
newspapers to code. 
There was one exception to the constructed week approach: the sample collected 
from The Register-Guard of Eugene, Oregon.  Because this newspaper produced only 21 
staff written pieces about the entire campaign and several days of the week were 
unrepresented in the population, there was no way that a pure constructed week approach 
could be used.  In this case, the entire population of articles was taken; the sample was 
then split into three piles of seven articles; and each pile was randomly assigned to one of 
the three candidates. 
 The national media is a bit tricky because none of the national newspapers 
devoted consistent coverage to any one gubernatorial campaign.  This means that for 
most candidates (but particularly for the Green or Libertarian party candidates) the 
overall population of articles was too small for each individual newspaper to either 
construct a week of coverage or take a census that could lead to any meaningful 
conclusions about how the national news media handles third-party candidates.  For 
example, a preliminary LexisNexis search for articles about Green candidate Peter 
Camejo of California found only one article from the Washington Post and only three 
from the New York Times between Labor Day and Election Day.  Therefore, to help 
minimize this problem, the articles that appeared in the New York Times, the Washington 
Post and USA Today were combined into one population set for each gubernatorial 
candidate and defined generically as “national newspaper coverage.”  The entire 
population of national news stories for each individual candidate (a census) was then 
collected and used in the study (See Table 3.1).  The one exception to this was in 
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California, where the national news media devoted enough coverage so that a constructed 
week approach was used in the samples of the two major party candidates. The full 
population about the Green Party candidate was taken because the sample was so small. 
Table 3.1:  Content Analysis Methodology 





(Includes vote percentage received by candidate)
 
Regional Newspapers 
(7 articles per candidate per newspaper) 
California 
  Los Angeles Times 
  San Francisco Chronicle 
  Sacramento Bee 
  San Diego Union-Tribune 
Gray Davis (D)  47.3 percent 
Bill Simon (R)  42.4 percent 
Peter Camejo (G)  5.3 percent 
Maine 
  Kennebec Journal/Morning Sentinel (Augusta) 
  Bangor Daily News 
  Portland Press Herald 
John E. Baldacci (D)  47.1 percent 
Peter E. Cianchette (R)  41.5 percent 
Jonathan K. Carter (G)  9.3 percent 
Wisconsin   
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel 
Wisconsin State Journal (Madison) 
Capital Times (Madison) 
Jim Doyle (D)   45 percent 
Scott McCallum (R)  41 percent 
Ed Thompson  (L)  10 percent 
Oregon 
The Oregonian (Portland) 
The Register-Guard (Eugene) 
Statesman Journal (Salem) 
Ted Kulongoski (D) 48 percent 
Kevin Mannix (R)  47 percent 




New York Times All candidates 
Washington Post All candidates 
USA Today All candidates 
 
1 D = Democrat; R = Republican; G = Green Party; L = Libertarian 
 
 Admittedly, combining articles from the three national newspapers into one 
population eliminates my ability to assess how individual national newspapers may differ 
in their approach to third-party candidates who run for statewide office.  It also raises 
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questions as to whether variations in each organization’s work practices, resources, and 
newsroom cultures could alter the coverage in each publication just enough so that 
reaching conclusions about an entity called “the national news media” becomes 
problematic.  On the first point, since each individual national paper provided only 
minimal coverage to each of the gubernatorial campaigns under study, it would not be 
possible to make assessments about individual publications even if the articles from all 
three newspapers were coded separately.  Put another way, unless the stories from all 
three national papers are combined, there could be no national media component to this 
study.  As to whether it is problematic to combine articles from three individual 
newspapers into one generic data set called “national news coverage,” there is precedent 
for viewing the national news media as a kind of single entity.  Gans (1979), for example, 
has shown that national news organizations as diverse as television networks and national 
news magazines tend to follow similar routines and adhere to the same journalistic values 
when making judgments about what is news; Meyrowitz (1995) identified what he called 
a “national journalism logic” that drives the choices national reporters make when 
covering campaigns; and Reinemann (2004) showed that journalists routinely rely on 
other news media when making news decisions and deciding what stories to publish.  In 
addition, it has been illustrated that national news reporters often act in unison, or packs, 
when reporting major stories such as campaigns (Crouse 1972, 2003; Sabato 1991, 1993).  
Given these observations in the scholarship, I felt there would be minimal problems in 
combining the stories from the three national newspapers into one population for the 
purposes of this study. 
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   The articles from the regional and national news media were drawn from stories 
that were published between the traditional Labor Day campaign kickoff on September 2 
and November 12—one week after the November 5, 2002, election.  The decision to 
broaden the potential sample beyond the election was based on research that advises 
scholars to analyze postelection coverage when examining campaigns so as to capture 
what Hale (1993) calls the “emergence of a ‘conventional wisdom’” in the days after 
voters have cast their ballots.  Such contentions are supported by other studies, which 
point out that “immediately after an election, journalists have a real incentive to propose 
explanations for the election results” (Hershey 1992, 946).  For the purposes of this 
study, then, including articles that appeared in the week after the election may shed light 
on how reporters interpreted the third-party candidate’s impact on the campaign. 
 The sample of articles from regional newspapers was chosen by randomly 
selecting the order of each newspaper and then conducting a LexisNexis search of each 
newspaper separately using the following search terms: (candidate’s full name) AND 
gubernatorial OR governor.  (For the national media, the same search was conducted but 
for all three national newspapers combined.)  The same search was conducted in online 
newspaper archives for publications like the Los Angeles Times, The Register-Guard, and 
the Statesman Journal that were not available on LexisNexis.  From the population of 
articles about each candidate from each regional newspaper, I then constructed a week’s 
worth of coverage by randomly selecting a start date and then working forward in eight-
day intervals until seven articles about the candidate from the publication were identified, 
one for each day of the week.  For example, if the randomly selected order of the 
Wisconsin newspapers was the Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel, The Capital Times, and the 
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Wisconsin State Journal, and the randomly selected start date for Wisconsin Libertarian 
candidate Ed Thompson was Monday, September 16, then the first article that mentioned 
Thompson that was published in the Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel on September 16 was 
chosen for the sample.  The next date from the Journal-Sentinel to be chosen was 
Tuesday, September 24, followed by Wednesday, October 2.  If no article appeared in the 
Journal-Sentinel on the next designated day, then the next available article in the 
database from that publication was chosen, provided that it did not fall on a day of the 
week that was already represented in the sample.  The procedure was followed up until 
November 12.  If, after that time, there were still days of the week from the Journal-
Sentinel that were not represented in the candidate’s sample, I went back to the original 
start date and moved backward until September 2 to fill in the remaining days.  For 
example, if a Wednesday was still not represented for Thompson after following the 
eight-day interval procedure, I returned to the original start date of September 16 and 
moved backward to the next available Wednesday, which would have been September 
11, followed by September 4 if need be.  If no articles about Thompson appeared in the 
Journal-Sentinel on either of those Wednesdays, then a “Thompson story” that appeared 
in the newspaper on any Wednesday during the sample period (September 2 to November 
12) was randomly selected by picking a number out of a hat.  Once seven Thompson 
articles were chosen from the Journal-Sentinel, the same procedure was followed for the 
next two regional newspapers in Wisconsin.  The same process was followed for the 
Democratic and Republican party candidates. 
 To avoid duplication of articles, each candidate’s constructed week began on a 
different day, so that if the Green or Libertarian party candidate’s start date began on a 
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Monday, the Democrat’s might have begun on a Tuesday and the Republican’s on a 
Wednesday.  The order of the candidates was also randomly selected.  Despite these 
efforts, however, there is some duplication of articles in that the same article might 
appear in the sample of two different candidates in a campaign.  This problem was 
minimal, but it could not be avoided completely given that some of the publications in the 
study were small and devoted limited resources to covering the campaign. 
 In designing this study, I considered using the entire population of articles that 
appeared about each candidate in each regional publication.  However, this was quickly 
disregarded because of the sheer number of potential articles.  The California race alone 
produced a population of well over 1,000 news stories about the gubernatorial campaign.  
In addition, because many of these articles mention more than one candidate, they were 
likely to be listed in the population set of multiple candidates, making it more difficult to 
avoid article duplication in the analysis. 
The constructed week, or stratified, approach was deemed a methodologically 
sound way of developing a sample that would allow for generalizations to a broader 
population while also limiting the study to a manageable level.  The method is cited in 
several texts about content analysis (see Krippendorff 2004; Neuendorf 2002; and Riffe, 
Lacy and Fico 1998; Stempel and Westley 1989).  Moreover,  Riffe, Aust and Lacy 
(1993) found that the constructed week approach actually provides a better estimate of a 
population than does simple random and consecutive day sampling because it captures 
variations in coverage that occur from day to day and week to week.  They also found 
that one constructed week was an efficient and accurate way of estimating the daily 
newspaper coverage of an issue for up to a six-month period.  As the authors put it: 
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The basis for constructed week sampling – that news holes vary by day of week – is 
supported by [the research]…  The distribution of newspaper stories is simply not 
normal.  Constructed weeks produce better estimates than purely random samples of days 
because they avoid the possibility of oversampling Sundays or Saturdays.  Our 
comparison with consecutive day sampling, which may also avoid oversampling 
individual weekdays, demonstrate the further importance of sampling across weeks (as in 
constructed week sampling) if one seeks generalizability beyond the consecutive days 
period itself (Riffe, Aust and Lacy 1993, 136, 139). 
  
To ensure intercoder reliability, an assistant recoded 20 randomly selected articles 
from the sample.  This procedure netted 89 percent agreement between the two coders.  
This falls well within Neuendorf’s (2002) suggestion that a content analysis have 
anywhere from 70 to 90 percent agreement between coders.  As she puts it:  “It’s clear 
from a review of the work on reliability that reliability coefficients of .90 or greater 
would be acceptable to all, .80 or greater would be acceptable in most situations, and 
below that, there exists greater disagreement” (Neuendorf 2002, 143). 
In determining which races to include in the study, I looked at the ten independent 
and third-party gubernatorial candidates in 2002 who received at least 5 percent of the 
popular vote, the threshold used by the federal government to designate public campaign 
funding and automatic ballot access for the party in the next election.9  Of those, three 
were Greens, two were Libertarians, and five were independents.  Only Green and 
Libertarian candidates were considered for the study for five reasons: first, these 
candidates came from established political organizations with their own ideology and 
clearly outlined issue platforms; second, the Greens and Libertarians are the two largest 
minor parties in the United States with a consistent record of running candidates at the 
                                                 
9 The ten candidates were: Richard Mahoney of Arizona (Independent, 7 percent of the vote); Peter Camejo 
of California (Green, 5 percent); Jonathan Carter of Maine (Green, 9 percent); Timothy Penny of 
Minnesota (Independent, 16 percent); David Bacon of New Mexico (Green, 5 percent); B. Thomas 
Golisano of New York (Independent, 14 percent); Gary Richardson of Oklahoma (Independent, 14 
percent); Tom Cox of Oregon (Libertarian, 5 percent); Cornelius Hogan of Vermont (Independent, 10 
percent); and Ed Thompson of Wisconsin (Libertarian, 10 percent). 
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state and local level;10 third, both parties are committed voices of dissent that have been 
clearly defined as outside the established political order; fourth, each party represents a 
different point on the left-right political spectrum, giving the study a nice ideological 
balance; and fifth, both organizations represent long-term movements to challenge the 
two-party system, unlike many independent candidacies, which are often either fleeting 
efforts by one unknown man or woman or the short-term political aspirations of a well-
known politician who was originally a Democrat or Republican.  This last point is 
important because a major purpose of this study is to analyze how the news media 
portrays candidates who do not come from the major parties.  By including independents, 
the analysis ran the risk of contaminating the sample with candidates who were former 
Democrats and Republicans using the independent route for personal political reasons 
during one election cycle.11 
It was also important to actively select credible third-party candidates to examine 
as opposed to randomly selecting candidates from the entire population of 2002 minor-
party gubernatorial contenders.  Because one of the main research interests of this study 
is to determine what biases may exist in newspaper culture that would predispose 
reporters to ignore any candidate who is not a member of the Democratic or Republican 
                                                 
10 Furthermore, the Libertarians have a long history of running candidates for statewide office while the 
Green Party has been treated in the literature as a mainstream organization with the potential to influence 
national policy.  Described by some scholars as having a bright future, the Green Party has increased its 
membership since Ralph Nader’s 2000 presidential bid and has effectively built state-level party 
organizations that are helping Greens run candidates for local and statewide offices throughout the country 
(Collet and Hansen 2002; Francia and Herrnson 2002; and Sifry 2003). 
11 This was the case of independent Timothy Penny, who received 16 percent of the vote in his 
unsuccessful bid to become governor of Minnesota in 2002, and was a former congressman from the 
Democratic Party who started the gubernatorial campaign with strong name recognition and a long history 
in mainstream Democratic politics.  Including someone like Penny in the study would not give an accurate 
representation of how the news media cover third parties since reporters would likely know Penny from his 
days as a Democrat and so would naturally cover him the way they would any major party candidate. For 
the purposes of this study, then, such an independent candidacy was viewed more as a vehicle for one 
man’s immediate political ambitions than the organized effort of a committed and permanent third party. 
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parties (regardless of his or her credentials or public appeal), it was vital that the study 
look at serious candidates who were not far from the mainstream.  Using simple random 
sampling would likely lead to the selection of third-party candidates who ran 
unprofessional, underfinanced campaigns or those who were naturally marginalized by 
radical political positions and unconventional behavior—something that would defeat the 
purpose of this study.  Put another way, by purposely choosing serious third-party 
candidates to study, it is my hope that this analysis will help identify explanations other 
than the standard reasons journalists give for why they ignore minor-party candidates—
namely that third parties have no chance of winning because they are outside the 
mainstream. 
 In sum, then, this content analysis is designed to give a snapshot of how regional 
and national newspapers cover third-party candidates at the state level.  The study is not 
designed to measure quantity of stories—it has already been established that Democrats 
and Republicans receive more coverage than third-party candidates (see Rosenstone, 
Behr, and Lazarus 1996, 1984; Sifry 2003; Stempel 1969; Stempel and Windhauser 1984; 
and Zaller 1999).  The purpose here is to show how the coverage of third-party 
gubernatorial contenders differs from Democrats and Republicans when the press 
provides coverage to minor parties.  The key questions here are, how does the newspaper 
text of major and minor parties differ and what biases inherent in the news media might 
be gleaned from the coverage?  It is my hope that this study documents specifically how 
third-party gubernatorial candidates are covered at the state level so as to gain a better 
appreciation for how certain points of view are sidelined in American political discourse 
and what might be done to bring those voices back into the debate. 
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In-depth interviews 
 While the content analysis provides a general snapshot of how third-party 
gubernatorial candidates are covered by regional and national news media, the in-depth 
interviews were designed to, in the words of McCracken (1988), “take us into the mental 
world of the [journalist] … to glimpse the categories and logic by which he or she sees 
the world” (9).  The interviews provide this study with a richer understanding of how 
political reporters view campaigns, their role in election contests, and the values and 
criteria journalists use to make news judgments about which candidates to cover and 
which ones to ignore.  The long interviews are considered a critical part of this study 
because they flesh out the numbers provided by the content analysis by giving us a more 
in-depth view of why certain news decisions are made during campaigns.  
 Because this study examines the criteria used by political reporters when 
deciding which candidates to cover in a gubernatorial campaign, subjects were 
purposefully selected based on their job responsibilities at regional and national 
newspapers (i.e. political reporters who cover gubernatorial campaigns).  In this sense, 
then, the sample was a cross between what Patton (2002) calls a “homogeneous” and 
“intensity” group—homogeneous because it focuses on a particular subgroup of 
journalist, the political reporter; and intensity because as a group, political reporters tend 
to observe and experience campaigns at an intimate and intense level. 
 The interviews were conducted with eight reporters at regional newspapers who 
covered the 2002 gubernatorial campaigns in California and Wisconsin.12  It was difficult 
                                                 
12 These two campaigns were chosen out of the four campaigns under study in the content analysis for 
three simple reasons: they are the two biggest of the four states under study; they each have a diverse, large 
and sophisticated media environment that should provide a rich choice of journalists to interview; and they 
each represent vastly different regions of the country.  
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to arrive at a number of subjects to interview because many texts on qualitative methods 
are fairly vague on the matter of sample size.  McCracken (1988), for example, 
recommends that investigators interview about eight subjects while Patton (2002) says 
“there are no rules for sample size in qualitative inquiry,” adding that “sample size 
depends on what you want to know, the purpose of the inquiry, what’s at stake, what will 
be useful, what will have credibility, and what can be done with available time and 
resources” (244).  In addition, a perfunctory scan of the literature found that studies using 
in-depth interviews vary widely in the number of subjects questioned.  For example, 
Holohan (2003) interviewed 16 journalists for her study on coverage of Haiti, Deuze 
(2005) interviewed 14 editors for his analysis of tabloid newspapers, and Lee (2004) 
conducted 20 interviews in a study of journalistic deception.  Other studies came up with 
such numbers as 21, 28, 47, 133, and 162 interviews (see Jensen 2005; Berger and Reber 
2005; Lachover 2003; Wolfsfeld, Khouri and Peri 2002; and Sreberny-Mohammadi and 
Ross 1996). 
 Given such uncertainty in qualitative analysis, this study sought to interview a 
sufficient number of journalists so as to gain as wide a perspective as possible “so that 
others outside the sample might have a chance to connect to the experiences of those in 
it” (Seidman 2006, 55).  One way to gauge whether enough subjects had been 
interviewed was to watch for the saturation effect—that is, the point at which the 
researcher begins to hear the same information over and over again (Seidman 2006; 
Rubin and Rubin 2005).  The eight interviews I conducted met that standard.  The 
journalists came from a variety of regional newspapers from two distinct regions of the 
country so that some variety of perspective was built into the study.  However, since all 
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the subjects came from one subgroup of the profession (the political reporter), I 
anticipated that they would have similar pressures and attitudes about campaigns so that 
eight interviews would be sufficient to gain an in-depth understanding of how journalists 
operate when covering gubernatorial campaigns involving third-party candidates.    
 The list of potential subjects was drawn by looking at bylines from each 
newspaper. The articles were drawn from the Lexis-Nexis database or a newspaper’s 
online archive.  Once political reporters had been identified, they were ranked based on 
the number of stories they had written about the 2002 gubernatorial campaign in their 
state, so that the reporter at each publication with the most bylines was ranked one, the 
reporter with the second most was ranked two and so on.  E-mails were then sent to the 
two reporters at each regional publication who had the most bylines about their respective 
gubernatorial campaign (see Appendix F for the text of the letter).  The e-mails, which 
were followed up with a telephone call about a week later, explained the scope of the 
project, asked each reporter if he or she would be willing to participate in the study, 
explained what participation would entail for them, and outlined how their contribution 
would further the goals of the research and hopefully help the profession.  If one or both 
of the reporters at any one publication declined to participate, then the next one or two 
reporters on the list would have been contacted.  However, this was not a problem.  Each 
reporter who was contacted agreed to participate in the study. 
   Those who agreed to take part were asked to sit for a 60- to 90-minute interview 
in which they were asked a series of questions about how they covered political 
campaigns.  The questions were built around three preliminary themes: campaigns, third-
party candidates, and things that influence coverage.  The interviews followed a 
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somewhat structured approach, with major questions and probes written in advance.  
However, because one of the strengths of the in-depth interview is its flexibility, I also 
followed the lead of the subject and asked new questions that arose during each 
individual interview (see McCracken 1988; Patton 2002; Rubin and Rubin 2005; and 
Seidman 2006).  Some of the questions were broad and others focused on specific actions 
taken by the reporter during the 2002 gubernatorial campaign.  The latter types of 
questions were gleaned at least partially from the results of the content analysis of these 
races. 
The eight reporters from California and Wisconsin were interviewed between 
June 24 and July 11, 2007.  All but one were conducted in person, with the eighth 
interview done via e-mail.  Subjects were given a copy of the Informed Consent Form 
(see Appendix E) prior to the interview, which they were asked to read, sign and date 
before the interview began.  All of the reporters agreed to be digitally recorded, and all 
agreed to let the investigator use their names in the study.  While the gubernatorial 
campaigns under study occurred five years ago, none of the reporters had any problem 
remembering the events of the past.  In fact, all of the reporters spoke of the 2002 
campaign as if it was fresh in their minds.13 
                                                 
13 The study considered the fact that some reporters might have trouble remembering their coverage of 
campaigns that occurred five years ago, especially given that some of them either moved on to new jobs or 
were involved in the coverage of the 2006 gubernatorial elections.  However, because campaigns are fairly 
intense experiences, especially high-profile races such as those for governor, the study assumed that most 
reporters would be capable of recalling certain decisions they made only four years earlier.  This was not an 
unreasonable assumption.  Other studies that have relied on the in-depth interview as a method of inquiry 
have also asked reporters, with success, to recall how they covered events that occurred several years in the 
past.  Wolfsfeld, Khouri and Peri (2002), for instance, interviewed Israeli and Jordanian journalists who 
covered the peace process between those two countries in the 1990s.  Many of the interviews were 
conducted in 1997 and asked reporters to discuss events that had occurred as far back as 1994.  Likewise, 
Holohan (2003) interviewed 16 American journalists in the late 1990s about events they had covered in 
Haiti in the early 1990s.  In both cases, the authors reported insightful results.  
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 Written transcripts of the interview were produced by an outside service provider 
hired by the investigator.  The digital recordings, which have been saved on the 
investigator’s computer hard drive, were uploaded to the Web site of the transcription 
service provider, who produced and e-mailed written transcripts of each interview, 
usually within one week.  The transcription service provider was asked to destroy both 
the digital recordings and the written transcripts in its files after the investigator had 
received electronic copies of the written documents, which were each printed out for 
analysis.14 
 The analysis of the data followed a fairly flexible format that allowed me to 
approach the material with an open mind so that important insights could emerge 
naturally from the text.  In the initial stage of the analysis, I read all eight answers to the 
same question, making note of language use and themes discussed by the reporter.  I was 
able to develop broad categories for each of the themes to capture the differences and 
similarities in how reporters addressed the same issue.  I then bracketed key quotations 
that effectively summarized the dominant viewpoints expressed in the text.  In addition, 
                                                 
14 Although it was not needed, several measures were established in the event that a subject wished to 
remain anonymous. To ensure that information could not be directly tied to a subject, each participant was 
assigned a code number and given a pseudonym that would have been used in the text of the dissertation.  
All material from that subject would then have been associated with the subject’s number and pseudonym 
only.  I began each interview by collecting personal information about the subject (Name, Position, Job 
Responsibilities, and Institution).  This information was entered on a Subject Form, which was filed at the 
investigator’s home office in a separate and secure file.  Each subject was assigned a code number, which 
was entered on the Subject Form. The code number was the only identifying information placed on the tape 
cassette used to backup the digitally recorded conversation.  It would also have been the only identifying 
information placed on the written transcript of the interview had the subject wished to remain anonymous. 
The cassette tapes were stored at the investigator’s home office separate from the Subject Form.  The 
digital recording was stored on the investigator’s hard drive. The hard copy of the written transcript was 
also filed separately from the Subject Form. The electronic copy of the written transcript was stored on the 
investigator’s computer hard drive as well as a flash disk.  For any subject who wished to remain 
anonymous, the transcript would have been filed only under the subject’s code number. Code numbers 
were set up so that the investigator could identify only the state where the subject works—but not the 
institution. For example, California reporters were labeled CA1, CA2 while Wisconsin reporters were 
labeled W1, W2.  This process should have been sufficient to ensure confidentiality if any reporters had 
wished to remain anonymous. 
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minority viewpoints were also bracketed to capture insights that may have been provided 
by only one or two reporters.  When this was completed, my observations and key 
quotations were entered into a Word document so that the responses of each reporter to 
the same question could be compared side by side.  I then moved on to the next question 
in the transcripts and followed the same procedures again.  This process was helpful in 
identifying common patterns and attitudes that surfaced from the interviews. 
 In conducting the data analysis of the interview transcripts, I tried to keep several 
questions in mind:  What did I learn from the interviews?  What surprised me?  In what 
ways were the interviews consistent with the literature and in what ways were they 
inconsistent?  How have the interviews gone beyond the literature?  In what ways did the 
data support contentions that the news media ignore third-party candidates?  In what 
ways did the data contradict those arguments? (See Seidman 2003 for a more complete 
list of potential questions to ask in qualitative analysis.) 
Discussion 
 There was a time when Paul F. Lazarsfeld felt compelled to offer a compromise 
between the warring factions in the field of public opinion who vehemently disagreed 
over the usefulness of the in-depth interview as a research tool.  Lazarsfeld’s proposal, if 
one can call it that, was meant to bridge the gap that existed between those who believed 
the public’s opinion could best be gleaned from highly structured survey questions and 
those who argued that a different technique was needed to gain a more in-depth 
understanding of why the public feels the way it feels.  Lazarsfeld singled out six 
functions of the long interview, saying the method works best when researchers are trying 
to (1) clarify the meaning of a respondent’s answer, (2) single out the decisive aspects of 
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an opinion, (3) determine what has influenced an opinion, (4) identify the patterns that 
exist in the complex attitudes of the public, (5) understand an individual’s interpretation 
of what motivates their actions, and (6) clarify and refine statistical results that were 
developed using other methodologies (Lazarsfeld 1944, 40-47). 
 The qualitative-quantitative controversy that Lazarsfeld experienced in the 1940s 
continues today.  Yet as a tool for the collection of data, the long interview has been 
called “one of the most powerful methods in the qualitative armory” (McCracken 1988, 
9).  It is a technique designed to tap into the why of human experience as it strives to 
explain the intricacies behind an individual’s beliefs and behavior.  It seeks to question 
fundamental assumptions of society by inspecting the cultural lenses through which 
individuals view their world (Rubin and Rubin 2005; Seidman 2006).  It has been used in 
a wide-range of fields, including education and government studies to sociology and 
communications, making what Iorio (2004) calls a “far reaching” contribution to our 
understanding of human behavior (112). 
 It is in this light, then, that this project proceeded.  The long interviews may not 
be generalizable to a broader population of political reporters, but what they lack in 
precision they make up for in depth.  For it is through this method that this dissertation 
attempts to reach a greater understanding of how journalists make the decisions they face 






Chapter 4: Content Analysis Results 
  
The content analysis showed significant differences between how the news media 
covered the gubernatorial campaigns of Democrats and Republicans and how it covered 
those of third parties, specifically the Greens and Libertarians.  In general, the analysis 
showed that third-party candidates for governor are featured less prominently than their 
major-party rivals, even in cases in which voters seem to be receptive to a minor-party 
alternative; sources from within the major parties are quoted in newspaper stories 
considerably more often than are sources from minor parties; third-party hopefuls are 
typically defined as being separate from the main Democratic-Republican contest; and 
third-party candidates are more likely to be portrayed as spoilers or long-shots while 
Democrats and Republicans are typically viewed as serious contenders.  In addition, the 
analysis revealed that third-party nominees are more likely than major-party aspirants to 
be portrayed as either offbeat or extreme in their political views, although newspapers 
more often than not painted all candidates—regardless of party—as mainstream.  Finally, 
the data suggest that third-party gubernatorial candidates do fairly well in having their 
message delivered to the public through the news media, although they still fall slightly 
behind Republicans and Democrats. 
 The analysis also indicates some differences between regional dailies and national 
newspapers.  Small- and medium-size regional publications are more likely to devote a 
higher percentage of their overall coverage to third-party candidates than are larger 
national dailies; smaller newspapers feature third-party contenders more prominently 
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than do larger publications; regional newspapers focus less attention on a candidate’s 
ideology than do larger newspapers; and regional publications are far more likely to 
allow third-party candidates to speak for themselves than are larger newspapers, where 
reporters tend to use their own voice to explain the positions of candidates. 
The content analysis also revealed differences in how newspapers in different 
states covered their respective gubernatorial candidates.  While newspapers in California, 
Oregon, and Wisconsin all followed a similar pattern of either excluding or sidelining 
third-party candidates for governor, newspapers in Maine treated Green gubernatorial 
candidate Jonathan Carter as a major contender who was equal to the Democrat and 
Republican.  This exception manifested itself in several ways.  For example, Maine 
newspapers gave the third-party candidate the same prominence as the Democrat and 
Republican; they turned to Green Party sources for comment significantly more often 
than their counterparts in the three other states; they quoted Carter directly and indirectly 
throughout the campaign; and they often portrayed Carter as a serious contender rather 
than a spoiler.  In short, Maine newspapers generally treated the Green Party candidate as 
a significant part of the race for governor in 2002 whereas the newspapers in California, 
Oregon, and Wisconsin treated their respective third-party candidates as mostly 
insignificant side notes. 
The remainder of this chapter will explain the results of the data analysis in more 
detail and explore possible implications for this and future studies.  In addition to 
outlining the quantitative statistical results generated by the content analysis, the chapter 
will provide qualitative support through examples from the texts of news stories 
themselves.  These qualitative examples were collected during the coding process and 
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will serve as a snapshot on press coverage of third-party candidates, thus fleshing out the 
quantitative insights provided by the numbers. 
Prominence of Coverage 
 The most obvious way in which third-party gubernatorial candidates are treated 
differently is in the prominence of coverage given to each candidate.  In terms of raw 
numbers, candidates who ran for governor on the Green or Libertarian ticket in these four 
states in 2002 simply appeared in fewer stories than did Democrats and Republicans.  As 
Table 4.1 illustrates, 2002 third-party gubernatorial candidates in California, Wisconsin, 
Oregon, and Maine appeared in 26 percent of the 2,241 stories that were published in the 
regional and national newspapers included in this study.15  By contrast, Democrats 
appeared in 86 percent and Republicans appeared in 73 percent. 
The minimal coverage afforded to third parties was particularly pronounced in the 
national press, where Greens and Libertarians were virtually invisible.  Of the 132 stories 
that appeared in the New York Times, the Washington Post, and USA Today that 
discussed the gubernatorial races in California, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Maine, only 4.5 
percent mentioned the third-party candidates in those races.  By contrast, Green and 
Libertarian gubernatorial hopefuls appeared in 27 percent of all stories appearing in the 
regional press. 
                                                 
15 This number was derived from a search of the Lexis-Nexis database as well as the individual archive 
systems of three of the newspaper’s in the study. (These three newspapers were not available through 
Lexis-Nexis and include the Los Angeles Times, the Statesman Journal, and the Register-Guard. Stories 
that appeared in a fourth newspaper, the Kennebec Journal, are not included in this aspect of the analysis 
because it is not available on Lexis-Nexis and its archive system made it difficult to get a full counting of 
all staff written articles that it published. ) For example, to determine the total number of stories about the 
2002 California gubernatorial campaign that appeared in the four California newspapers that are part of this 
study, the following search terms were used for each publication: “governor” OR “gubernatorial” AND 
Gray Davis OR Bill Simon OR Peter Camejo AND NOT Opinion, Letter, Editorial. The same process was 
used for the other races.  
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A qualitative reading of the news stories revealed two different ways in which 
third-party candidates were ignored.  In the most typical case, stories simply neglected to 
mention the Green or Libertarian party contender at all, with the report written as if the 
only candidates on the ballot were the Democrat and Republican.  However, a second  
Table 4.1:  Candidate Appearances 
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way that third-party contenders were excluded from coverage included instances in which 
reporters chose not to mention the Green or Libertarian candidate’s name even when that 
candidate was part of a story.  For example, the Sacramento Bee published a campaign 
piece on September 27 that examined the Republican Party’s struggle to remain a 
relevant force in California politics.  While the story cited Republican candidate Bill 
Simon in the lead and Democratic Gov. Gray Davis in the second paragraph, it never 
once mentioned Green candidate Peter Camejo by name—even though the opening two 
paragraphs clearly referenced him indirectly to make a broader point about the GOP.  To 
the Bee, Camejo was simply “the Green Party candidate.”  Below are the first four 
paragraphs of the story, which ran under the headline: “GOP tries to dispel its gloom.” 
When Republican candidate for governor Bill Simon faced off this month in a 
solo debate with the Green Party candidate, Democrats declared California’s 
Republican Party a nonentity. 
 
To spend precious time debating a candidate whose party draws 1 percent of 
registered voters showed just how small-time the GOP had become, said Roger 
Salazar, campaign spokesman for Gov. Gray Davis. 
 




Salazar was being facetious. But he’d tapped a dark fear among Republican 
activists: that a wipeout in this year’s elections could drive the already-battered 
state party closer to irrelevance (Talev, 2002). 
 
In addition to mentioning third parties less often, there were several other ways in 
which Democrats and Republicans were more prominently featured in the news media in 
2002.  For example, Table 4.2 shows that of the 334 newspaper articles that were 
analyzed as part of this study, the Democratic nominee was the first candidate to be 
mentioned in 166 stories, or 49.7 percent of the sample, while the Republican candidate 
appeared first in 102 stories, or 30.5 percent of the sample.  The Green candidate was 
emphasized first in 28 of the stories, or 8.4 percent of the time, and the Libertarian was 
mentioned first in 14 stories, or 4.2 percent of the sample. 
Table 4.2: Candidate appearing first in the story 
Party Frequency Percentage 
Democrat 166 49.7 
Republican 102 30.5 
Green 28 8.4 
Libertarian 14 4.2 
Other 24 7.2 
 
Where a candidate first appeared in a story also proved to be significant.  As 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate, Democrats and Republicans were almost twice as likely to 
have their names appear in headlines or the lead paragraph of a story than were third-
party candidates.  According to this analysis, when daily newspapers wrote stories about 
Democrats or Republicans, they mentioned the major-party candidate by name in the 
headline or lead 48.5 percent of the time.  Minor-party candidates who were featured in 
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newspaper stories had their names appear in headlines or the lead graph in 24.5 percent of 
the cases studied. 
Third-party candidates were more likely to be introduced by name in the second 
to ninth paragraphs of a story, and they were more than twice as likely to appear first in 
the tenth graph or later than were major-party contenders.  Put another way, when a third-
party candidate was featured in a story, his name did not appear until at least the tenth 
paragraph in 31.4 percent of the cases studied compared to just 12.6 percent for major-
party candidates. 
Table 4.3:  When does the candidate’s name first appear in the story: By individual party 






































Table 4.4:  When does the candidate’s name first appear in the story: By party status 






















Democrats and Republicans were also more likely to dominate the stories in 
which they appeared.  As shown in Figure 4.1, in 62 percent of the 334 stories analyzed, 
one or both of the major-party candidates were the main emphasis of the story.  Third-
party candidates were the primary focus of a story in 6.9 percent of the cases studied, and 
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they were equally emphasized with Democrats and Republicans in almost 16 percent of 
the stories.  Figure 4.1 breaks these numbers down by individual party. 
 Major-party candidates were also featured on the front pages of the 16 
newspapers more regularly than were third-party candidates.  Table 4.5 shows that when 
regional and national dailies published stories in which the Democrats and/or Republican 
was the main focus, the newspapers placed these stories on the front page in 30.6 percent 
of the cases and on the front page of the local section in 15.8 percent of the sample.  By 
contrast, stories that focused mainly on a third-party candidate appeared on the front page 
in 10.5 percent of the cases and on the front page of the local section in 21.1 percent.  
Generally speaking, stories that emphasized third-party candidates were placed on the 
inside pages of newspapers in almost 70 percent of the cases studied. 
Figure 4.1 






























































































The regional and national newspapers also wrote longer stories about Democrats 
and Republicans than they did about Greens or Libertarians.  For example, when one or 
both of the major-party candidates was the main focus of a story, the article was typically 
500 words or more while stories that emphasized third-party candidates tended to be less 
than 500 words.  Stories that emphasized third-party candidates were usually more than 
500 words only when the story also focused significant attention on a major-party 
contender as well (see Table 4.6). 
Table 4.5: Where stories are placed – by party 
   
Candidate who is the main 
focus of the story 
Front 
Page 




















































Table 4.6: Story lengths – by party 
Candidate who is 
the main focus of 
story 
1 to 499 Words 500 to 999 Words 






























Likewise, third-party candidates almost never appeared in stories alone, without 
their major-party rivals.  However, Democrats and Republicans often appeared in stories 
that never mentioned their Green or Libertarian challengers.  Table 4.7 shows that when a 
Democrat was mentioned in a story, his Republican opponent also appeared in the same 
story in more than 95 percent of the cases studied while the third-party candidate 
appeared in 34.7 percent of those stories.  The same numbers hold when a Republican is 
mentioned in a story.  By contrast, when a Green Party candidate appeared in a story, that 
same story also mentioned the Democrat and Republican in 100 percent of the cases.  
Both major-party candidates appeared in 95.6 percent of all stories in which a Libertarian 
candidate was mentioned.  Put more simply, a third-party candidate is almost never 
mentioned alone in a story, whereas major-party contenders often appear either alone or 
only with their other major-party rival. 
Table 4.7: Other candidates mentioned in the story 
Candidate who 
is the main 






































































This tendency to de-emphasize third-party gubernatorial candidates was 
particularly interesting in California, where newspapers constantly sidelined Green 
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candidate Peter Camejo despite the fact that voters consistently said they were unhappy 
with the two major-party contenders, Democrat Gov. Gray Davis and Republican Bill 
Simon, and would welcome an alternative.  For example, in an October 6 report in the 
San Francisco Chronicle, the newspaper reported that “the degree of dissatisfaction this 
year with the major candidates seems unprecedented” (Curiel, 2002), adding in a story 
one day later that voters felt “frustrated with the choices they face” (Gledhill, 2002). 
Likewise, the San Diego Union-Tribune reported on October 7 that “polls have 
consistently shown the majority of California voters to be unhappy with the choice 
between Democrat Davis and Republican Simon” (Marelius 2002a); and the Los Angeles 
Times quoted one 70-year-old voter on October 29 saying that while “Gov. Davis can’t 
make up his mind whether to put his right shoe on his right foot,” she will nevertheless 
vote for him because Simon “is an idiot”16 (Barabak, 2002).   
Yet even in the frustrated atmosphere of 2002, Camejo remained virtually 
invisible to the news media.  He appeared in only 10 percent of the stories published in 
the Sacramento Bee, 6 percent of the stories published in the San Diego Union-Tribune, 
17 percent in the San Francisco Chronicle, and 5 percent in the Los Angeles Times.  In 
the national press, Camejo appeared in only three stories, or 4 percent of the total. 
A typical way that Camejo was handled occurred on October 14, when the 
Chronicle outlined the gubernatorial candidates’ positions on the environment.  Despite 
the fact that the environment is an issue close to the heart of the Green Party, Camejo was 
mentioned only once and was described simply as “a strong supporter of environmental 
protection plans” (Wildermuth, 2002a).  He was never quoted in his own words in the 
                                                 
16 The evidence of voter discontent was made more apparent a year after the 2002 election, when 
Californians recalled Davis before electing Republican Arnold Schwarzenegger in a special election. 
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story, which gave Simon four graphs to outline his environmental proposals and Davis 
two paragraphs.  Moreover, the story was dominated by the environmental debate 
between Davis and Simon. 
In addition, Camejo remained invisible even when voters were quoted expressing 
a desire for a candidate other than Davis and Simon.  For example, the Washington Post 
reported on October 9 that “polls show most Californians wish someone else were 
running” (Kurtz, 2002), while the Chronicle quoted a 71-year-old focus group participant 
as saying he “kept thinking how nice it would be to have a third candidate” in the race 
(Gledhill, 2002).  The fact is, there was a third candidate in the race, but neither the Post 
nor the Chronicle mentioned Camejo in their respective stories. 
Not surprisingly, the analysis indicates that Democrats and Republicans have a 
clear media advantage over Greens and Libertarians, who must first struggle to get 
mentioned in a story and then struggle again to be named in headlines, lead paragraphs, 
and in stories that do not also cover the Democrats and Republicans.  Such coverage 
gives Democratic and Republican contenders many more opportunities to get their name 
into the public domain than is afforded third parties. 
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It is difficult to determine through a content analysis what impact, if any, this kind 
of coverage has on such factors as voter intentions or election results.  However, a 
Pearson’s test indicates that a strong correlation exists between the number of stories 
written about a candidate and that candidates eventual vote total.  As Figure 4.2 shows, 
candidates who appeared in a higher percentage of stories also received a higher 
percentage of the vote, with a correlation coefficient of .896.  This raises an interesting 
chicken-and-egg question: Did candidates receive more votes because the press wrote 
more stories about them, or were political reporters adept at taking the public’s pulse and 
so were able to concentrate their coverage on the candidates who would eventually 
succeed at the ballot box?  The answer would require additional research.  In any event, 
the analysis suggests that political reporters accept the hegemony of the two-party system 
with little question. 
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Sources used by reporters 
One major difference in the coverage between major-party and third-party 
gubernatorial campaigns rests with the sources that reporters typically use in their news 
stories.  According to the content analysis, the news media turned to Democratic and 
Republican party officials for comment significantly more often than it quoted leaders 
from within the Libertarian and Green parties.  These sources included campaign 
spokesmen, state party chairmen, political consultants, pollsters, and party leaders other 
than the candidates themselves.  As Figure 4.3 illustrates, national publications and 
regional newspapers in California, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Maine quoted Democratic 
Party officials in 38.3 percent of the stories published and Republican Party officials in 
37.1 percent.  By contrast, Green officials were quoted in 4.8 percent and Libertarians in 
3 percent. 
These results by themselves are not surprising.  It is no secret that highly 
organized Democratic and Republican party operatives are better equipped to make 
themselves available to reporters than are smaller, less structured minor parties.  In 
addition, as the literature review showed, journalists gravitate toward elite sources when 
gathering news (Gieber and Johnson 1961; Sigel 1973; Tuchman 1978; Gans 1979; 
Weaver and Elliott 1985; Brown, Bybee, Wearden and Straughan 1987).  What makes the 
discrepancy between major-party and minor-party sources interesting in this study, 
however, is the notion that the people who are quoted in news stories often play a vital 
role in establishing the frames through which those stories are told (Gans 1979; Kim and 
Lee 2003; Marchi 2005; Reese 1991; Tuchman 1978).  To reiterate a point made in 
Chapter Two, local reporters essentially imbed themselves into the power structure of a 
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community when they rely so heavily on government officials for information.  This in 
turn legitimizes that power structure and passes along elite interpretations of events as 
objective fact, effectively “eliminating sources of news who would radically challenge 
the status quo” (Soloski 1989, 868). 
Figure 4.3 
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One question for this study, then, is this: How did the news sources used by 
reporters covering the 2002 elections in California, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Maine help 
frame the stories about the gubernatorial campaigns in those states?  The question is more 
or less a qualitative one, because the content analysis did not code for news frames.  
Nevertheless, in-depth reading of the 334 stories about these four campaigns suggests 
that in most cases, the major-party sources who dominated the news coverage in the 
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national and regional press interpreted the 2002 gubernatorial contests from the 
perspective of the two-party system, even when an individual story prominently featured 
a serious third-party challenger. 
For example, on September 7, the Wisconsin State Journal of Madison analyzed 
the growing number of people throughout the state who were placing Ed-Thompson-For-
Governor signs along highways to show their support for the Libertarian gubernatorial 
candidate.  The 476-word article prominently featured Thompson in both the headline 
and the lead paragraph, but it relied heavily on major-party sources to interpret what 
those signs meant for the gubernatorial campaign.  Here are the opening eight paragraphs: 
If signs could vote, Libertarian Ed Thompson would be the odds-on favorite in the race 
for governor. 
 
More than 850, 4-by-8-foot, black-and-gold signs carrying Thompson’s name have 
sprouted along Wisconsin highways in recent months.  That’s on top of 9,000 smaller 
lawn signs. 
 
Even U.S. Sen. Russ Feingold, D-Wis., has noticed. 
 
“We’ve always said signs don’t vote. And they don’t,” Feingold said. “But the presence 
of Ed Thompson signs is a warning to Democrats.” 
 
“Yes, we should win this time,” Feingold continued. “We’ve got the best candidates. But 
be on alert. Don’t take things like that for granted. It’s pretty significant, and it’s pretty 
amazing…” 
 
Thompson is an important factor in the governor’s race, Feingold said, and he could “cut 
either way” into Republican or Democratic support. 
 
Republican strategist Brandon Scholz agreed Thompson is “a wild card.” State voters 
have an independent streak, and Thompson has made some strides since announcing his 
long-shot candidacy, he said. 
 
But Scholz isn’t convinced that the Thompson “sign burst” indicates a growing, 
grassroots movement  (Milfred, 2002a). 
  
There are two issues to take note of in this story.  First, even though this story is 
ostensibly about Thompson’s growing presence on the campaign trail, the newspaper 
chose to quote Democrats and Republicans first, rather than someone from the 
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Libertarian Party, at the beginning of the story about the significance of Thompson’s 
lawn signs.  Second, the major-party officials quoted in this story clearly cast 
Thompson’s campaign in the context of how it affected the contest between the 
Democrats and Republicans.  In the story, for instance, Feingold saw Thompson’s signs 
not as a grassroots effort in support of a political outsider, but rather as “a warning to 
Democrats,” while Scholz portrayed Thompson’s role solely as a “wild card” that might 
impact the race between Democrat Jim Doyle and Republican Gov. Scott McCallum. 
It seems logical that Democrats and Republicans would frame the debate this 
way—after all, that is how they saw the campaign.  But is that the only interpretation of 
Thompson’s campaign signs?  What about the Libertarian Party’s perspective?  Did 
Libertarian officials see the growing presence of Thompson campaign signs as a warning 
to Democrats, or did they view this development as an indication that voters might be 
willing to take a new path?  And what about the people who placed the signs on their 
lawns in the first place?  What made them support Thompson, and could that support be 
used by Libertarians to grow their party?  Most of these questions went unanswered 
because neither Libertarian officials nor ordinary Thompson supporters were quoted in 
the story.  It is true that Thompson was paraphrased saying that “his signs show he’s 
catching on.”  But these comments did not come until after the major-party sources had 
already framed the issue within the two-party system. 
In another example of how major-party sources framed the debate, the San 
Francisco Chronicle published a story in September in which it quoted a spokesman for 
Democratic Gov. Gray Davis belittling the Green Party as a small political organization 
that contributed little to the California gubernatorial campaign.  In the story, the Davis 
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spokesman criticized the governor’s Republican opponent, Bill Simon, for “resorting” to 
a formal debate with Green candidate Peter Camejo.  Said the spokesman: “When you 
debate a third-party candidate, you are a third-party candidate” (Wildermuth, 2002b).  
The quote was obviously meant as an insult to Simon and the Republicans, but it also 
denigrated the Green Party.  However, while the Simon camp was quoted in the story 
defending its decision to debate Camejo, there were no sources from the Green Party to 
either respond to Davis’s attack, give their perspective on the role of minor parties in 
political campaigns, or discuss the debate between Camejo and Simon.  The insinuation 
that third parties are completely insignificant—an interpretation fostered by a highly 
placed Democratic Party operative—was allowed to stand as fact because third-party 
officials were not afforded the opportunity to challenge it. 
The two-party news frame that was evident in most of the press reports from 2002 
did not come from major-party sources alone.  Independent analysts such as political 
science professors and unaffiliated pollsters, who appeared in almost 23 percent of the 
stories analyzed, also interpreted these campaigns as contests solely between the 
Democrat and Republican.  For example, the San Diego Union Tribune quoted Mark 
DiCamillo, the associate director of the Field Poll, saying that voters “have a negative 
view of both candidates.”  The use of the word “both” suggests here that Davis and 
Simon were the only candidates on the ballot.  The paper went on to quote DiCamillo 
saying: “This is first and foremost an election about Davis.  The main reason voters are 
voting for Simon has nothing really to do with Simon.  It has everything to do with 
Davis, and the rejection of Davis is very strong” (Marelius, 2002b).  Such analysis casts 
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the campaign in the two-party system and ignores the fact that other candidates were 
involved in the election. 
In a similar example of a two-party news frame, the Chronicle quoted a political 
science professor analyzing the California campaign by saying that “the public keeps 
saying, ‘We hate all the candidates’” (Gledhill, 2002).  In fact, the voters said they 
disliked only two candidates: Simon and Davis.  Previously reported polls said nothing 
about voters “hating” Camejo, and, in fact, the Chronicle had reported that Camejo was 
“personable, knowledgeable, funny and effusive … the sort of candidate who would 
benefit from more exposure” (Curiel, 2002).  Yet by quoting an independent analyst 
referring to Simon and Davis as “all” the candidates, the paper was reinforcing the notion 
that only Democrats and Republicans are legitimate.  Reporters essentially passed along 
quotes like this without challenging their underlying assumptions that Democrats and 
Republicans are either all or both of the candidates. 
Another way to explore the impact that sources have in framing news stories is to 
look at the rare article in which third-party officials are actually quoted at length.  One 
such example came from the San Francisco Chronicle, which published a 1,797-word 
story on October 6 that analyzed the frustration voters felt toward Davis and Simon and 
examined the “other options” California voters had in the election.  The story is unique in 
that it quoted Green Party officials and other third-party advocates extensively, thus 
giving them an unusual forum to challenge the two-party paradigm through which most 
political campaigns are viewed.  Ralph Nader, for instance, was quoted disputing the 
perception that the only role a third-party candidate can play in an election is that of a 
spoiler—a perception that is frequently reported as objective fact.  While Nader 
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acknowledged that third-party candidates have little chance of winning, he said they are 
nevertheless worth listening to because “they change the agenda” and “push the (major) 
parties to address issues they’d prefer to ignore” (Curiel, 2002).   
In addition, the story quoted former presidential candidate John Anderson 
challenging the criteria used by the Los Angeles Times to exclude Green candidate Peter 
Camejo from a debate it was sponsoring between Davis and Simon.  That criteria, which 
said Camejo could not participate in the debate because he was not polling at least 15 
percent in public opinion surveys, went unchallenged in the press until Anderson called 
for a new standard, saying that “an independent or third-party candidate should be invited 
(to a debate) if he gets 50 percent of the respondents saying he should be included.”  At 
the time, polls were showing that 69 percent of Californians believed Camejo should be 
included in the debate.  That point was buttressed by Nader, who reminded readers that 
Minnesota gubernatorial nominee Jesse Ventura of the Reform Party was considered a 
long shot in 1998 until he participated in the debates that boosted his public exposure and 
ostensibly won over converts (Curiel, 2002). 
 The journalistic use of sources is important to examine because (1) prominent 
sources can add a level of credibility to a story and (2) sources help reporters frame a 
story within a certain context.  As this analysis indicates, reporters relied heavily on 
sources from the two major parties as well as independent analysts who thought in terms 
of the two-party system.  In many cases, these sources were allowed to interpret the race 
from their Democrat-Republican paradigm, which was then passed along as objective 
fact.  In this sense, the content analysis strongly suggests that stories are imbedded with 
the hegemony of the two-party system, which is subtly reported as the natural way of 
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things.  Subsequent qualitative study of individual stories, as noted here, support the 
finding in the content analysis that a two-party paradigm is powerful and dominant. 
Separate but not equal 
 The content analysis found that third-party gubernatorial candidates are often 
defined as being separate from—or outside of—the main contest between the Democrat 
and the Republican.  While major-party candidates were often defined in terms of their 
opponent—that is, the first time they were mentioned by name in a story they were 
usually paired with their major-party rival in the same sentence—third-party candidates 
were typically defined in terms of themselves.  This propensity by reporters to couple 
major-party aspirants together while introducing third-party contenders alone acted to 
physically separate Greens and Libertarians from the text about their major-party 
opponents, thus removing them from the main contest for elective office. 
In terms of numbers, Table 4.8 illustrates that Green and Libertarian gubernatorial 
candidates were introduced by name alone in separate sentences in nearly 60 percent of 
the cases and were paired with one of their opponents in 40 percent.  By contrast, 
Democrats and Republicans were introduced by name together with their major- or 
minor-party opponents in 64.2 percent of the cases.  A major-party candidate was 
introduced alone in a story in only 35.8 percent of the articles studied. 
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 One qualitative illustration of this occurred on October 25, when The Register-
Guard of Eugene, Oregon, published a story reporting on the campaign finance reports 
filed by the three gubernatorial hopefuls in the race.  As the example below shows, 
Democrat Ted Kulongoski and Republican Kevin Mannix were paired together in the 
lead paragraph, and the main thrust of the story was a comparison between how much 
money Mannix and Kulongoski had raised and spent in relation to each other.  
Libertarian candidate Tom Cox, on the other hand, was introduced by himself, and his 
campaign finances were reported solely in terms of Cox as an individual candidate and 
were not directly compared to what his rivals had raised or spent. 
SALEM – Both major-party candidates for governor have exceeded the $2 
million mark in contributions as they enter the home stretch of their campaigns, 
according to financial disclosures made public Thursday. 
 
Republican Kevin Mannix pulled in a pair of contributions totaling $450,000, 
along with loans totaling $150,000 from two Salem businessmen to help draw 
ahead of the fund-raising totals of his Democratic opponent, Ted Kulongoski. 
 
Thanks to his $1.18 million in contributions for the 30-day period that ended 
Sunday, the Salem attorney’s fund-raising totals reached $2.25 million. 
 
Kulongoski, a Portland resident who stepped down last year as a Supreme Court 
justice, took in $836,651 in the latest 30-day reporting period, giving him a new 
contribution total of $2.12 million for the entire campaign, which ends with the 
Nov. 5 Election Day… 
 
The third candidate, Libertarian Tom Cox of Hillsboro, reported a new fund-
raising total of $38,378, thanks to contributions of $8,228 in the latest fund-
raising cycle. The management consultant has been his own biggest contributor 
with $9,600 overall. 
 
Despite the loan and outstanding bills, Mannix so far has been able to surpass 
Kulongoski in spending, most of which has gone to TV and other means of 
marketing their messages to voters. 
 
Mannix reported spending $2.15 million through last Sunday while Kulongoski 
reported expenditures totaled $1.77 million… (Steves, 2002a). 
  
In addition to the physical textual separation the example above illustrates, third-
party candidates were also separated from the main issue debates that dominated the 
campaign.  In most cases, for instance, Democrats and Republicans were portrayed as in 
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conflict with each other over such issues as taxes, budget deficits, education, and the 
environment.  Their comments appeared either in the same paragraph or adjoining 
paragraphs, and their arguments were framed in opposition to one another.  Third-party 
candidates, on the other hand, typically appeared alone in their respective paragraphs and 
were simply quoted stating their opinions about a particular issue.  Although there were 
times when a Green or Libertarian was framed in opposition to one of his opponents, in 
most cases, this was the exception more than the rule. 
For example, the Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel published a story on October 17 
reporting on a four-way debate between Democrat Jim Doyle, Republican Scott 
McCallum, Libertarian Ed Thompson, and Green Jim Young.17  The two third-party 
candidates were physically removed from the issue debate right from the beginning of the 
story with a headline that read: “Doyle, McCallum tangle over ads: 3rd-party candidates 
join front-runners in Eau Claire forum.”  Here, the two major-party candidates were 
mentioned by name together in the main headline and were portrayed as competing with 
each other.  The unnamed third-party contenders were relegated to the subhead and were 
portrayed simply as joining the front-runners.  The trend continued throughout the rest of 
the 995-word story, the first eleven paragraphs of which are below.  Take note that 
neither Thompson nor Young are included in the disagreements over taxes and negative 
advertisements in the first half of this story. 
EAU CLAIRE – Republican Gov. Scott McCallum and Democratic Attorney General 
Jim Doyle clashed Wednesday over the same issues that dominate their television ads – 
selling off health care payments from the tobacco companies, taxes, funding for schools 
and pay raises for teachers. 
 
And both candidates disowned a report released Tuesday from a bipartisan panel that 
recommends big tax increases and cuts in state funding in a variety of areas to balance 
Wisconsin's books. 
                                                 
17 Young is not part of the content analysis, but will be included briefly in the discussion here. 
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McCallum had a direct answer – “No” – when asked whether a tax increase was 
inevitable to balance the state budget and help deal with the expected $2.8 billion deficit 
over the next two years. And the governor said repeatedly that Doyle’s campaign 
promises, which he claims total $2.7 billion, make a tax increase unavoidable if Doyle is 
elected.  
 
In turn, Doyle said McCallum was wrong – “I’m against raising taxes” – and accused 
McCallum of killing $8 million in spending for the elderly while spending $9 million to 
buy three new state airplanes since becoming governor in February 2001. 
 
And there also was a new wrinkle to what has become a highly negative, and personal, 
tone to the campaigns: When asked about their negative ads, both McCallum and Doyle 
offered to change the ads – but only if the other did so. 
 
And those promises seemed empty as the Eau Claire session ended. 
 
“I make this offer right now: Let’s stop the negative ads. Let’s change the tone,” Doyle 
told more than 2,500 University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire students and curious western 
Wisconsin residents. “For the next three weeks, let’s talk about the positive things about 
our campaign.” 
 
But Doyle’s campaign this week began running ads that criticize the governor’s flights in 
state planes, including the timing of the governor’s reimbursement for a controversial 
flight to Rhode Island with his family and a family friend. Those are the type of ads 
McCallum said he must answer with his own ads that “document a clear difference” 
between them. 
 
“If he takes his negative ads off, I'll do the same thing,” said McCallum, whose campaign 
this week began running an ad critical of Doyle’s own flights in state-owned planes. 
 
“I've got to respond, if he continues” to run negative ads, the governor explained. 
 
It was the first debate that included the two third-party candidates – Libertarian Party 
candidate Ed Thompson and Green Party hopeful Jim Young (Walters, 2002). 
 
There were sections of this story in which third-party candidates were reported 
interacting and disagreeing with their major-party rivals.  In paragraph twelve, for 
instance, the Journal-Sentinel wrote: “Thompson thanked McCallum and Doyle for the 
non-stop negative ads, saying they are so angering voters that he is becoming more 
popular” (Walters, 2002).  However, exchanges like this one were rare and did not 
represent the typical way in which campaign stories were cast.  Table 4.9 provides a side-
by-side comparison of the typical Democrat-Republican exchange and the typical third-
party exchange.  As the table indicates, the Democrat and Republican are portrayed in 
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conflict with each other.  The third-party candidates simply state their opinions and are 
not in conflict with anyone. 
Table 4.9 
Typical Democrat and Republican exchange Typical third-party 
exchange 
 
       
     Using the tobacco settlement 
money to balance the budget: 
Doyle again denounced 
McCallum for signing the budget-
repair bill that sold off – like 
private bonds – future health care 
payments from cigarette 
manufacturers to avoid raising 
taxes or cutting services. 
     Doyle called that a “one-year 
payoff just to get (McCallum) 
through the election.” 
     But McCallum said Doyle, as 
attorney general, could have 
stopped the sale, but instead sent 
Wall Street bonding attorneys a 
letter supporting the sell-off. 
     “Be honest. Be honest with the 
people,” McCallum chided Doyle. 
     Responding, Doyle said he was pushed 
into issuing a legal opinion that said only 
that the Legislature and governor had the 
legal authority to package and sell to 
investors decades of future tobacco 
payments. “I told them, yes, you can pass a 
stupid law,” Doyle said (Walters, 2002). 
 
 
     Thompson again proposed 
cutting state spending, including 
half of the $1 billion budget a 
year that runs state prisons, and 
said state government should raise 
new money by legalizing video 
poker and other forms of 
gambling. 
     And, any community that 
passes a referendum asking for an 
Indian casino should get one, 
Thompson added. 
     Young proposed raising sales taxes to 
help the elderly pay property taxes on their 
homes and said corporate income taxes 
should be tied to whether companies pay 
workers “living wages” (Walters, 2002). 
 
 
Finally, third-party candidates were defined as outside the system through the 
language used to describe them generally.  The press often portrayed Greens and 
Libertarians as “others”—or extras to the real contest between the major-party 
candidates.  In the California campaign, for example, Democrat Gray Davis and 
Republican Bill Simon were sometimes called “the major-party candidates,” “both 
candidates,” or simply “the candidates,” while the four third-party hopefuls who were on 
the ballot for governor were called “the four minor-party candidates,” “the four other 
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candidates,” or, in one story citing poll results, simply as “other” (see Bazar, 2002; 
Finnegan and Gold, 2002; Marelius, 2002a and 2002c). 
The same language was used in Oregon, where Democrat Ted Kulongoski and 
Republican Kevin Mannix were frequently called “the two major candidates,” “both 
candidates,” or “the two major-party candidates,” while Libertarian Tom Cox was 
frequently introduced as “a third candidate for governor,” “the third candidate in the 
race,” or as “an alternative” to the two frontrunners, terms that highlight his outsider 
status (see Law, 2002a; Mapes, 2002a; Mapes, 2002b; Mayer, 2002; Steves, 2002b; 
Steves, 2002c).  For example, in a political profile about Cox that appeared in the 
Statesman Journal of Salem, Oregon, on October 27, the newspaper reported that “the 
Libertarian offers alternatives to the traditional parties’ candidates” (Law, 2002b).  In 
other words, Cox was an “alternative” rather one of three candidates competing for the 
state’s top job. 
In Maine and Wisconsin the language was more neutral, with each candidate 
typically introduced by their party name (for example, Democrat Jim Doyle, Republican 
Scott McCallum, or Libertarian Ed Thompson).  However, there were a few rare 
instances in which the Wisconsin press used language that sidelined Thompson.  For 
example, the Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel once referred to the 2002 gubernatorial contest 
as “the campaign for governor between (Republican Scott) McCallum and Democratic 
Attorney General Jim Doyle” (see Walters and Toosi, 2002).  Generally speaking, 




Spoilers and long shots 
 Third-party candidates were also defined differently in terms of the role they were 
said to play in a gubernatorial election.  In almost half of the stories in which they 
appeared, Greens and Libertarians were defined as either long-shot candidates with little 
chance of winning or potential “spoilers” whose only role would be to siphon enough 
votes from one major-party candidate so as to effect the outcome of the election.  By 
contrast, Democrats and Republicans were defined as “serious contenders” in almost 86 
percent of the stories in which they appeared.  Democrats and Republicans were 
portrayed as long shots in less than 1 percent of the stories studied, and they were rarely 
if ever portrayed as spoilers or protest votes (see Table 4.10). 
Table 4.10: How is the candidate’s campaign role portrayed? 
Party Status Serious contender 























The reporter’s decision to use the term “spoiler” in the context of Green and 
Libertarian candidates is of particular interest here because it suggests that the only 
important role a third-party aspirant can play is as one who effects the election between 
the Democrat and Republican.  What this implies is that certain votes naturally belong to 
certain candidates—in other words, there are Democratic votes and Republican votes, but 
no in between.  Under this logic, a third-party candidate has no natural constituency and 
therefore must steal votes that would normally go to another candidate.  This is not 
always the case, though.  As the literature review indicated, while it is true that third-
party candidates are occasionally spoilers who steal votes away from major-party 
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candidates (Magee 2003), it has also been shown that minor parties generate their own 
votes by attracting people who would not otherwise go to the polls (Allen and Brox 2005; 
Michelson and Susin 2004; Southwell 2004); who want to send a message to the 
Democrats and Republicans (Chressanthis 1990); and who are simply loyal to alternative 
parties (Donovan, Bowler, and Terrio 2000; Gillespie 1993; Rosenstone et al. 1996).  Not 
only does such language strongly suggest that reporters have accepted the hegemony of 
the Democrats and Republicans, but it ignores the other roles a minor-party can play, 
such as broadening the political debate to issues that might not otherwise get aired and 
bringing out voters who may otherwise stay home. 
Nevertheless, such language was used frequently by regional and national 
newspapers.  In Oregon, for example, the Statesman Journal reported on October 1 that 
Libertarian Tom Cox “figures to draw a significant number of votes that otherwise might 
go to (Republican) Mannix” (Law, 2002c), a contention that Mannix had been making 
throughout the campaign.  When Democrat Kulongoski appeared to have won the 
election, the newspaper reported this angle again, saying that Cox had been “a thorn in 
Mannix’s side”—a candidate who the GOP worried would “siphon Republican votes …” 
(Law, 2002d). 
Other newspapers also characterized Cox as a spoiler.  In a story that reported on 
a previous election match-up between Mannix and Cox, The Oregonian wrote that “Cox 
demonstrated an ability to pull votes from Mannix in the 2000 attorney general’s race” 
(Nokes, 2002); and the Register-Guard quoted Mannix in its Election Day coverage 
saying, “The threat of future Libertarian candidates drawing votes away from 
Republicans will have to be confronted” (Steves, 2002d).  The same story did quote Cox 
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saying that it was Mannix and the Republicans who were responsible for the Democrat’s 
victory—not him.  Nevertheless, like most third-party contenders, Cox was forced to 
address the spoiler question. 
Newspaper reporters were also quick to label third-party contenders as long-shot 
candidates.  Although the Statesman Journal reported that Cox was a smart candidate—
“a math whiz and National Merit Scholar in high school” (Law, 2002b) who at least one 
voter considered to be “a legitimate candidate” (Law, 2002e)—the newspaper also 
pointed out twice that Cox had “no chance of winning” (Law, 2002e) or “the least chance 
of winning” (Law, 2002b).  Newspapers in California, Wisconsin, and even Maine used 
similar language at times to describe their respective third-party candidates—although 
Maine usually did not handicap the race by placing labels like “long shot,” “underdog,” 
or “frontrunner” on any of the candidates in that race. 
Democrats and Republicans who lagged in the polls were not described in the 
same way.  For example, California’s Republican gubernatorial hopeful, Bill Simon, was 
far behind Democratic incumbent Gray Davis throughout most of the 2002 election.  Yet, 
the press treated him as a serious contender, often referring to him simply as “the 
challenger” or Davis’s “Republican opponent.”  Likewise, the Washington Post referred 
to Wisconsin’s incumbent Republican governor, Scott McCallum, as “an early underdog” 
in the race against Democrat Jim Doyle (Broder, 2002a), but it called Libertarian Ed 
Thompson a “long-shot” (Broder, 2002b).  Such language represents two different ways 
of describing a candidate who is behind in the polls, although the former connotes 
potential seriousness and the latter suggests hopelessness.  It should be pointed out that 
no poll numbers were given in either case to support the Post’s claim.  The labels were 
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simply applied as if they were the objective truth.  Such coverage seems to support 
McLeod and Hertog’s (1992) observation that casual references to public opinion 
marginalize outside groups. 
When third-party candidates did well in the polls, reporters usually chalked this 
up as a protest vote against the two major parties rather than as natural support for the 
candidates themselves.  For example, when Libertarian Ed Thompson received more than 
10 percent of the vote in the Wisconsin election, the New York Times sought to explain 
how this could occur, writing: “Perhaps because voters were unhappy with the nasty tone 
of the race … Ed Thompson, running on a Libertarian ticket, made a strong showing as a 
third-party candidate” (Christian et al, 2002).  No polling data was used to support the 
contention that Thompson’s support came mainly from voters disgruntled over the 
negative campaigning of the two major parties.  Likewise, the Los Angeles Times saw 
Camejo’s 5 percent vote total as a clear signal of the “voters’ discontent with California’s 
two major-party candidates,” quoting one political consultant saying that the Green 
candidate’s support was “a true protest vote” (Daunt and Reiterman, 2002).  Again, the 
newspaper used no polling data in making this assessment—it was simply stated as fact. 
Offbeat or Extreme 
 The news media rarely described any of the candidates’ physical or personal 
characteristics, regardless of party.  Reporters also refrained, for the most part, in 
defining each candidates’ ideology.  For example, the news media avoided giving any 
physical description of both major- and minor-party candidates in nearly three-quarters of 
the 334 stories analyzed in this study.  Likewise, in roughly 8 out of 10 stories, the press 
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did not characterize where a major- or minor-party candidate sat on the ideological scale.  
This is a testament to the press’s attempt to remain objective when covering campaigns. 
However, when a candidate’s physical appearance or personal characteristics 
were described or their ideology defined, a minor-party candidate was more likely than 
was a major-party contender to be cast as outside the mainstream.  Table 4.11 shows that 
in only 1.7 percent of the stories analyzed was a Democrat or Republican described as 
either sometimes or often extreme, while third-party candidates were described as 
sometimes or often extreme in 7.8 percent of the stories.  Table 4.12 shows that a minor-
party candidate’s political ideology was described as radical or extreme in 5.9 percent of 
the cases studied, while a major-party candidate’s ideology was described this way in less 
than 1 percent of the stories analyzed. 
Table 4.11: How the candidate is physically and personally described – by party status 
Party status Mainstream 
Sometimes or always 


















Table 4.12: How the candidate’s ideology is portrayed. 

















Green gubernatorial candidate Peter Camejo, in particular, was cast as 
ideologically extreme in several stories that appeared in the California press.  The Los 
Angeles Times, for instance, characterized Camejo as “an activist” who “like many 
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radicals during the 1960s … found his way to UC Berkeley, where his role in campus 
activism convinced then-Gov. Ronald Reagan to brand him ‘one of the most dangerous 
men in America.’”  Later, the Times pointed out that in 1976 Camejo “ran for president 
on the Socialist ticket” (Daunt and Reiterman, 2002).  The San Francisco Chronicle 
added to this portrait, calling Camejo a former “Socialist Workers Party” member 
(Wildermuth, 2002b) and an “activist” who used to “mail away for radical pamphlets” 
(Herel, 2002). 
Camejo wasn’t the only one, though.  The Wisconsin press occasionally 
highlighted Libertarian candidate Ed Thompson’s colorful background.  He was called “a 
third-party maverick” (Milfred, 2002b) by the Wisconsin State Journal, a “professional 
poker player” who was running a “populist-tinged campaign” (Broder, 2002b) by the 
Washington Post, and an “anti-government political hero,” (Borowski and Walters, 2002) 
by the Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel.  This contrasts with adjectives used to describe 
Democrat Jim Doyle—who was referred to as “the state attorney general” and “the front-
runner” (see Doyle, McCallum agree to 3 debates but are clashing over others; Dresang, 
2002; Toosi and Borowski, 2002; and Walers and Schultze, 2002)—or Republican Scott 
McCallum—who was called “Governor,” the “underdog,” and a “leading candidate” (see 
Borowski and Walters, 2002; Broder, 2002a; Doyle, McCallum agree to 3 debates but are 
clashing over others; Milfred, 2002c; Pommer, 2002; Toosi and Borowski, 2002; and 
Walers and Schultze, 2002). 
Still, third-party candidates were usually cast as mainstream when they were cast 
at all.  For example, as Tables 4.11 and 4.12 show, Greens and Libertarians were 
physically and personally described as mainstream in 17.6 percent of the stories and 
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ideologically mainstream in 9.8 percent of the stories in which they appeared (compared 
to 26 percent and 8 percent for major-party candidates, respectively). 
 The preceding three sections of this chapter have been, for the most part, an 
analysis of language—in short, an examination of the words reporters use to represent 
what they see as “the reality” of a political campaign.  In all probability, reporters choose 
certain labels—whether it be “long-shot,” “spoiler,” or “radical”—not because of some 
outward political bias in favor of one candidate and against another, but because they are 
looking for short cuts that will allow them to quickly convey the essence of a campaign in 
the limited time and space with which they have to work.  In addition, many of these 
labels can be easily justified.  California’s Green Party candidate Peter Camejo, for 
instance, rarely registered more than 5 percent support in public opinion surveys 
throughout the gubernatorial campaign.  If that doesn’t represent a long shot, what does? 
Yet as Hodge and Kress (1979), Fairclough (1995), and others (Merrill, 1965; 
Cole and Shaw, 1974; Donohew, 1982; Fry and Sigman, 1984; and Fry and Fry, 1986) 
have shown, language is not neutral.  It is wrought with meanings and ideological 
perceptions of reality that color how we view and act upon the world around us.  Which 
words are used and how they are structured in a sentence may not only affect how readers 
perceive news events (Fry and Sigman, 1984), they may also shed light on the 
predisposition of the writer (Merrill, 1965).  In some cases, the reporter’s impartiality 
may be intentional, as Merrill showed with his study of the attributive verbs used by Time 
magazine to quote presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy.  But in many other 
instances, the biases conveyed by language may be hidden, even from the journalists 
themselves.  As Hodge and Kress wrote in 1979:  “There are basic assumptions about 
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reality which are built into the language at so deep a level that they act largely 
unconsciously” (p. 63). 
In this light, then, the present study assumes that the words reporters used to 
describe major- and minor-party candidates during the 2002 gubernatorial campaigns 
provide clues into the mindset of the journalists who covered those elections.  It is true, as 
the results above indicate, that reporters normally guarded against their biases by 
avoiding labels that described the physical, personal, and ideological characteristics of 
the candidates they were covering.  But at times, these biases slipped through, such as 
when losing third-party candidates were said to be “long shots” while losing major-party 
contenders were simply “underdogs.”  Such language use represents another way in 
which third-party candidates are sidelined, and it points to reporters’ (perhaps 
unconscious?) acceptance of the hegemony of the Democrats and Republicans. 
Message delivered? 
 When third-party candidates are featured in the news media, they do fairly well in 
having their messages delivered to the public—although major-party candidates still have 
a slight advantage.  For example, when third-party candidates were featured in a news 
story, the candidate’s message was reported in the story in 63.7 percent of the cases, 
compared to 73.3 percent of the time for major-party candidates (see Figure 4.4).  
Likewise, news reporters allowed the candidates themselves to deliver the message, 
rather than the reporter delivering it for them.  Figure 4.5 shows that in nearly 54 percent 
of the cases in which a third-party candidate’s message was delivered, it came in the form 
of a direct or indirect quote from the candidate himself while the press synthesized the 
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message in the reporter’s voice in only 24.5 percent of the cases.18  This was similar to 
major-party candidates, who were permitted to deliver their own message through direct 
and indirect quotes in 61.6 percent of the stories while reporters used their own voice to 
deliver the major-party candidate’s message in 25 percent of the stories. 
Newspaper reporters also gave equal coverage to the issues of both major- and 
minor-party candidates—and, in fact, third parties had a slight advantage in this category.  
For example, when a newspaper included a Green or Libertarian in a story, the third-party 
candidate’s issues were discussed in 49 percent of the cases while a major-party 
candidate’s issue positions were outlined in 41.4 percent of the stories in the analysis (see 
Figure 4.6).19 
Figure 4.4   































                                                 
18 In other cases, supporters outside the campaign helped delivered a candidate’s message. 
19 It should be noted that most of the 334 stories included in this analysis (54.5 percent) did not discuss 
issues at all. 
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Figure 4.5 

















There was also a fairly wide spread of issues that were associated with both major- and 
minor-party candidates.  Table 4.14 shows the rank order of issues associated with 
Democrats and Republicans versus Greens and Libertarians.  As the table illustrates, tax-
and-budget issues were closely associated with both major- and minor-party candidates, 
followed by education.  One noticeable difference is that the third-party candidates were 
more closely associated with complaints about the American political system than were 
major-party contenders, for obvious reasons.  However, it should be noted that most of 
the stories that highlighted a candidate’s complaint about the American political system 
were published in the California press and were associated with Green Peter Camejo, 
who made changing the electoral system a major issue of his 2002 gubernatorial 
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campaign.20  Other than this, no discernable differences in the issues associated with each 
candidate could be gleaned from the data analysis. 
Figure 4.6 

































1. Tax and budget 14.2 1. American political system 12.7 
2. Education 6 1. Tax and budget 12.7 
3. Economy 5.2 2. Education 3.9 
4. Corruption 3.4 2. Healthcare 3.9 
5. Abortion 3 2. Immigration 3.9 
6. Environment 2.6 3. Crime 2 
7. Healthcare 2.2 3. Abortion 2 
8. Crime 1.3 3. Civil Rights 2 
8. Immigration 1.3 3. Economy 2 
9. Civil Rights .4 4. Corruption 1 
  4. Environment 1 
 
                                                 
20 Peter Camejo’s 2002 gubernatorial campaign Web site listed “Free and Fair Elections” as the third issue 
on his 10-issue platform. The other three third-party candidates who were included in this study did not 
make the American political system a big issue in their campaigns. 
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Regional vs. National publications 
 The content analysis also picked up differences in the way regional and national 
newspapers cover third-party gubernatorial candidates.  Although most regional papers 
followed similar patterns of excluding or sidelining Greens and Libertarians, they 
nevertheless devoted slightly more coverage to third parties than did national newspapers.  
In citing this finding, however, it must be noted that the three national newspapers 
included in this study published only six stories that included any mention of a Green or 
Libertarian gubernatorial candidate in these four states.  This sample is so small that it 
may be problematic to draw too many conclusions about the nature of national newspaper 
coverage of minor parties at the gubernatorial level. 
 The main area of difference between regional and national newspapers in the 
study rests with which candidates are the main focus of news stories.  In the three 
national newspapers, a Democrat and/or a Republican was the main focus of the story in 
55.9 percent of the cases studied.21  A Green or Libertarian from California, Oregon, 
Maine, or Wisconsin was never the main focus of any story that appeared in the three 
national newspapers included in this study for the 2002 campaign (see Table 4.15). 
 Democrats and Republicans dominated coverage in regional newspapers as well, 
but not to the same extent that existed in national publications.  Table 4.15 illustrates that 
in regional newspapers, a Democrat and/or Republican was the main focus of the story in 
63.3 percent of the cases studied while a Green or Libertarian was the main focus in only 
8.4 percent of the stories published. 
                                                 
21 In 44.1 percent of the cases, some other major-party candidate was the main focus of the story. This 
category picked up cases in which national newspaper published “wrap-up” stories that highlighted major 
events in several gubernatorial or legislative races around the country. In such stories, one of the 
gubernatorial candidates from either California, Oregon, Maine or Wisconsin was mentioned in the story, 
but he was not the main focus. 
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 National newspapers were also more likely to characterize a third-party candidate 
as outside the mainstream than was a regional newspaper.  As is noted in Table 4.16, 
minor-party candidates were described as offbeat or extreme in 16.7 percent of the stories 
published in the three national newspapers, which never described third parties as 
mainstream.  By contrast, regional newspapers described third-party gubernatorial 
candidates as mainstream in 18.8 percent of cases, and offbeat or extreme in 7.3 
percent.22 
 Finally, national publications were more likely to handicap the race by describing 
third-party candidates as spoilers or long shots.  As Table 4.17 shows, major-party 
candidates were portrayed as serious contenders in almost every story published in  
national newspapers, which almost always portrayed third-party candidates as spoilers, 
long shots, or protest votes.  Regional newspapers were kinder in this sense, describing 
third-party candidates as mainstream in 15.6 percent of the stories, spoilers or long shots 
in 41.7 percent, and protest votes in 4.2 percent.  Again, regional papers followed similar 
patterns as national dailies, but to a lesser extent. 






























                                                 
22 It should be noted that in the great majority of cases, both regional and national newspaper avoided 
descriptions all together. 
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Table 4.16: How is the candidate described – by publication status 































































In many ways, these differences should not be surprising.  One might expect 
regional papers to devote more coverage to a third-party candidate given that they are 
writing for an audience that will be voting in the election.  National newspapers may 
refrain from covering third-party candidates because they are writing for a national 
audience, many of whom have no say in a particular state’s election and so may have 
little motivation to know every candidate who is on the ballot in that state.  In addition, 
political reporters at regional newspapers may actually know the candidates on a much 
more personal basis and therefore view them as much more than simple labels.  Finally, 
smaller newspapers may feel less secure in handicapping a race because they have fewer 
resources and may not have the same access to polling data as larger publications, some 
of which conduct their own surveys. 
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Table 4.17: What role does the candidate play – by publication status 
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 One exception to almost all generalizations about third-party coverage is the 
reporting that occurred at the three newspapers in Maine, which treated the Green Party’s 
gubernatorial candidate like he was a serious contender worthy of consideration by 
voters.  When Maine newspapers handicapped the race, they pointed out that Green 
candidate Jonathan Carter was far behind in the polls, but they reported survey results 
without then labeling Carter as a long shot.  Instead, they let the numbers speak for 
themselves.  Maine newspapers also wrote extensively about Carter’s position on the 
issues, usually intertwined his messages along with those from the Democrat and 
Republican, and they frequently allowed Green Party officials to give their perspective on 
the race. 
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This was not unique to Carter.  Independent John Michael, a state representative, 
also ran for governor in 2002.  Although this analysis did not code for Michael, a 
qualitative reading of the coverage indicates that Maine newspapers also treated him as 
an equal participant in the race, despite the fact that he had little campaign funding and 
received only 1 percent of the popular vote on Election Day.  He was almost always 
included in reporter-generated stories about issues, and he was quoted extensively in 
formal debate stories.  That said, Maine newspapers did seem to label Michael a long 
shot much more often than they did Carter, although, again, the data analysis did not code 
for Michael and so there are no numbers to quantify this. 
 In terms of raw numbers, newspapers in Maine devoted a significantly higher 
percentage of their coverage to Carter than newspapers in California, Oregon, and 
Wisconsin devoted to the third-party candidates in their elections.  Tables 4.18a through 
4.18d give a state-by-state comparison.  In Maine, the two largest newspapers in the state, 
the Portland Press Herald and the Bangor Daily News,23 published 101 and 98 stories, 
respectively, about the 2002 gubernatorial campaign during the time period used in this 
analysis.  Of that, the Portland Press Herald devoted 87 articles to the Democrat, or 86 
percent, 71 articles to the Republican, or 70 percent, and 62 articles to the Green 
candidate, or 61 percent.  The Daily News actually gave Carter a higher percentage of 
stories than it published about the Republican, with 50 percent of its stories mentioning 
Carter and only 46 percent mentioning Republican Peter Cianchette. 
 
 
                                                 
23 The third Maine newspaper in this study, the Kennebec Journal, is not included in this part of the 
analysis because its articles were not available on Lexis-Nexis and its online archive made it difficult to 
calculate total articles per candidate. 
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Tables 4.18a – 4.18d: State-by-State Differences 
Table A: California 
Newspaper Total Articles Davis (D) Simon (R) Camejo (G) 









































Table B: Wisconsin 


































Table C: Maine 





























Table D: Oregon 
Newspaper Total Articles Kulongoski (D) Mannix (R) Cox (L) 
































As Tables 4.18a through 4.18d indicate, the state to come closest to these 
percentages was Wisconsin, where Libertarian Ed Thompson was mentioned in 31  
percent of all campaign stories published in the Capital Times of Madison, 46 percent of 
the coverage in the Wisconsin State Journal, and 37 percent of the coverage in the 
Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel—although these numbers are small compared to the 
coverage each newspaper gave to the Democrat and Republican in that campaign. 
Figure 4.7 

































Democrat 94 77 85 84
Republican 61 86 59 83
Third Party 9 36 53 30
California Wisconsin Maine Oregon
 
The table also shows that Tom Cox, the Libertarian who ran for governor in 
Oregon, also received a fair amount of coverage while Green Peter Camejo of California 
fell far behind the coverage given to Democrat Gray Davis and Republican Bill Simon.  
Take note, though, that the coverage in Maine is much more even between the Green, the 
Democrat, and the Republican than coverage in the other three states, where the third-
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party candidate typically received about half the coverage given to major-party 
candidates—or less, as in the case of California.  This difference in coverage is illustrated 
in Figure 4.7, which measures the percentage of stories in which each candidate 
appeared. 
 Table 4.19 also suggests that Maine newspapers viewed the campaign as a multi-
party race, as opposed to a two-man race.  As the table shows, the Democrat, Republican 
and Green candidate were equally represented in nearly half of all stories that the three 
Maine newspapers published about the 2002 gubernatorial campaign.  Put another way, 
in 44 percent of the stories that appeared in the Bangor Daily News, the Portland Press 
Herald, and the Augusta-based Kennebec Journal, the Democrat, Republican and Green 
candidate were each mentioned equally and treated like serious contenders.  This is far 
different from the coverage in the other three states, where all three candidates were 
equally represented in only 5.8 percent of the stories appearing in the California press, 
9.6 percent of the stories in the Oregon press, and 8.3 percent of the stories that appeared 
in Wisconsin newspapers.  By contrast, most of the stories that appeared in the 
California, Oregon, and Wisconsin press focused on either the Democrat, the Republican 
or both major-party candidates together, an indication that these newspapers viewed these 
campaigns through the two-party paradigms while Maine newspapers seemed to break 
that mold. 
 Maine newspapers also gave the third-party candidate equal prominence in 
headlines and leads.  An analysis of Table 4.20 shows that Green candidate Jonathan 
Carter’s name appeared in a headline or lead paragraph in 37.5 percent of the cases 
analyzed, compared with 27.3 percent of the time for the Republican and 53 percent of 
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the time for the Democrat.  In other words, Carter’s name was highlighted in headlines 
and lead paragraphs more often than was the Republican candidate’s.  This is in stark 
contrast to newspapers in California and Oregon, where the third-party candidates 
appeared in headlines or leads in only 18 and 13 percent of the cases studied, 
respectively.  Wisconsin came close to Maine’s coverage, placing Libertarian Ed 
Thompson’s name in a headline or lead in 30.4 percent of the sample, slightly more than 
the Republican, Kevin Mannix. 
Table 4.19: Candidate who is the main focus of story 
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 The three newspapers in Maine were also more likely than newspapers in the 
other three states to treat the third-party candidate as a serious contender, although 
Democrats and Republicans still dominated in this category.  Table 4.21 gives a state-by-
state comparison on how newspapers defined the roles of Democrats, Republicans, and 
third-party candidates in their respective gubernatorial elections.  The table measures the 
percentage of stories in which a candidate was defined as either a serious contender, 
spoiler/long shot, or protest vote.  Take note that Maine newspapers portrayed Green 
candidate Jonathan Carter as a serious contender in almost half of the stories in which he 
appeared.  This far outpaced the newspapers in California, Oregon, and Wisconsin, which 
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almost never portrayed the third-party candidates in those campaigns as anything other 
than a spoiler, long shot, or protest vote. 
 Maine dailies also turned to third-party sources (other than the candidate) 
significantly more often than did newspapers in the other three states.  It should be noted, 
however, that the Bangor Daily News, the Portland Press Herald, and the Kennebec 
Journal still quoted Democratic and Republican party operatives much more often than it 
Table 4.20: When does candidates name first appear – state by state analysis 
State Party Headline or lead Second to ninth 
graph 
















































































Table 4.21: How is the candidate’s campaign role defined – state by state analysis 




Protest vote Role not 
mentioned 
Major Party 60 
85.7% 
0 0 10 
14.3% 
California 



















Major Party 48 
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0 0 3 
5.9% 
Oregon 






Major Party 51 
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Wisconsin 




























Democrat 55.3 35.7 29.7 26
Republican 42.7 32.1 36.5 35.6
Third Party 1.9 8.3 17.6 2.7
California Wisconsin Maine Oregon
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quoted Green officials.  Nevertheless, Maine newspapers quoted third-party officials 
almost twice as often as third-party officials were quoted in Wisconsin newspapers, the 
state that comes closest to the Maine totals.  Figure 4.8 illustrates these differences by 
measuring the percentage of stories in which noncandidate sources from the Democratic, 
Republican, Green, and Libertarian parties were quoted in newspaper stories in their 
respective states during the 2002 gubernatorial election.  For example, the bar chart 
shows that Green Party officials were quoted in 17.6 percent of the stories appearing in 
Maine newspapers and less than 2 percent of the stories appearing in California 
publications. 
Several examples from the Maine press coverage is warranted here to illustrate 
the points made above.  First, newspapers in the Pine Tree State treated all four 
gubernatorial candidates equally rather than referring to Democrats and Republicans as 
major-party contenders and Greens and Libertarians as “the other” candidates.  In 
describing the candidates in the election, the Bangor Daily News, Portland Press Herald, 
and Kennebec Journal frequently used such language as “Maine’s four gubernatorial 
candidates,” “all four gubernatorial candidates” and “the four-man race for governor” 
(see Baldacci seen leading in gubernatorial race, 2002; Carrier, 2002a; Higgins, 2002). 
 Second, when writing about the major issues that dominated the campaign, the 
three Maine newspapers almost always included substantial comments from Green 
candidate Jonathan Carter.  For example, on October 31, the Bangor Daily News 
published a reporter-generated story that analyzed how each of the gubernatorial 
candidates felt about various environment issues, such as hunting, river pollution, and 
land conservation.  The 1,704-word story mentioned Democrat John Baldacci 13 times, 
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Republican Peter Cianchette 15 times, and Carter 14 times (Edgecomb, 2002).  In another 
reporter-generated issue story about everything from abortion and gay marriage to term 
limits and gun control, the Portland Press Herald quoted Carter 17 times compared with 
11 times for Baldacci and 12 times for Cianchette (Carrier, 2002b).  And in a formal 
debate story in October, the Kennebec Journal gave Baldacci nine mentions, Cianchette 
10, and Carter seven (Weinstein, 2002). 
A third example of the differences between Maine and the other three states rests 
with how Maine newspapers frequently defined Carter as a serious contender rather than 
a spoiler or long shot, even when these newspapers reported poll results showing the 
Green candidate trailing the Democrat and Republican with only 4 to 7 percent support.  
In one case, the Kennebec Journal even reported that despite Carter’s poor showing in 
opinion surveys, he should nevertheless be taken seriously because he had enough money 
to be “competitive financially” (Baldacci spending mounts up, 2002). 
 Finally, Maine newspapers were much more likely to integrate third-party 
candidates into their coverage than were newspapers in the other three states.  In other 
words, while newspapers in California, Oregon, and Wisconsin physically separated 
third-party candidates from their major-party rivals, Maine newspapers intertwined 
coverage of Green Jonathan Carter with the coverage of Democrat John Balducci and 
Republican Peter Cianchette so that all three were portrayed as (1) part of the campaign 
for governor and (2) competing with each other over issues of public importance.  This 
conclusion that Maine coverage was distinctive from the coverage in California, Oregon, 
and Wisconsin, however, was reached more from an in-depth reading of the Maine 
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newspaper stories than from the numbers generated by the quantitative content analysis, 
which did not clearly pick up on these differences. 
For example, Table 4.22 outlines how major- and minor-party candidates were 
defined in terms of one another.  A candidate was defined in terms of himself if he 
appeared alone in a sentence the first time his name was mentioned in a story.  A 
candidate was defined in terms of his opponent when his name appeared with one of his 
rivals the first time his name was mentioned.  As noted earlier in this chapter, third-party  
candidates were more often than not defined in terms of themselves rather than as one of 
three legitimate candidates for governor. 
Table 4.22: How are candidates defined – state by state analysis 
State Party Defined in 
terms of himself 
Defined in terms of 
his opponent 





































In the case of the California, Oregon, and Wisconsin, a third-party candidate who 
was introduced alone in a story usually remained physically detached from the two 
major-party aspirants throughout the rest of the story.  Although Table 4.22 indicates that 
newspapers in Maine may have done the same thing, this result is misleading and fails to 
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capture the extent to which newspapers in Maine defined the Green candidate as an 
instrumental part of the gubernatorial campaign. 
To fully appreciate how the Maine press covered Carter, one must take a 
qualitative look at that coverage and compare it to another state.  Table 4.23 below 
provides just such a side-by-side comparison.  On the right side is a story from the 
Kennebec Journal reporting on a formal gubernatorial debate held in late October.  On 
the left side is a story that appeared in the October 12 edition of The Oregonian of 
Portland, Oregon, reporting on a formal debate held in that state.  While the Maine 
newspaper integrated Carter’s comments throughout the story, the Oregon press 
physically separated Libertarian Tom Cox from the main action between the Democrat 
and Republican.  Although Cox is quoted criticizing Republican Kevin Mannix, his role 
is limited to a few paragraphs.  The Maine story, on the other hand, casts the debate as a 
four-way contest between all the gubernatorial candidates on the ballot. 
Part of the reason Maine newspapers may be more open to third parties is that the 
state has a history of electing independents, including James Longley in 1974 and Angus 
King in 1994 and 1998.  Ross Perot also received more votes in Maine in 1992 than did 
Republican President George H.W. Bush, with Perot finishing second to Democrat Bill 
Clinton (see Baldacci seen leading in gubernatorial race, 2002).  In addition, Maine has 
what many consider to be a fairly strong public financing law, which provides substantial 
funding to candidates who can reach a certain fund raising threshold on their own.  Green 
candidate Jonathan Carter, for instance, had almost $1 million in public financing on 
hand for the campaign—one reason he may have been taken seriously by the press there.  
Finally, Maine newspapers may have had fewer resources to conduct polls on a consistent  
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Table 4.23: Story comparison 
Report from The Oregonian Report from the Kennebec Journal 
Kulongoski rips Mannix on taxes, budget at debate 
     Democrat Ted Kulongoski took the aggressor’s role 
Friday at a gubernatorial debate in Portland, continually 
prodding rival Republican Kevin Mannix on taxes, 
budgets and social issues. 
     Mannix, who polls show has chipped away at 
Kulongoski’s lead in recent weeks, got in some of his 
own licks but spent much of the debate before the City 
Club of Portland defending his legislative record as well 
as his tax and budget plans. 
     Libertarian Tom Cox also spent much of his 
firepower on Mannix, although he chided both 
candidates for not matching the detail of his draft 
spending blueprint for state government. 
     Kulongoski’s tougher tone was evident in the one 
new issue he injected into the race: the sexual abuse 
scandal facing the Catholic Church. Kulongoski, a 
former Supreme Court justice, blasted Mannix for 
voting for a 1999 bill that would have overturned a court 
decision opening the door for victims of long-ago cases 
of sex abuse to sue the church and other organizations 
for the actions of priest, teachers and others. 
     The Democratic candidate said it was 
“unconscionable” that Mannix voted for a bill that 
would keep organizations from being held “responsible 
for pedophilia and … offenses committed against 
children.” 
     Mannix charged that Kulongoski mischaracterized 
the bill, and after the debate, he called it “cheap-shot 
sensationalism by a desperate politician…” 
     Cox, who stood at a podium between the two major-
party candidates, offered his own conclusion of Mannix, 
saying, “In his heart, he is still a Democrat,” a reference 
to Mannix’s move to the Republican Party in 1997. 
     Mannix, who this summer laid plans for nearly $800 
million in the next budget, repeated his contention he 
can do that without new taxes because there will be an 
extra $1.6 billion in the general fund for the 2003-05 
budget… 
     Kulongoski and Cox said Mannix is using budget 
sleight-of-hand to claim there will be $1.6 billion more 
in actual spending. 
     “We need, above all, fiscal conservatism,” Cox 
chided… 
     Mannix and Kulongoski also exchanged shots on the 
state’s Public Employees Retirement System, with 
Mannix criticizing the Democrat for being unwilling to 
remove all PERS beneficiaries from the board that 
governs the financially troubled system.  And 
Kulongoski once again criticized Mannix for voting 
against major reforms in the system when he was a 
legislator in 1999… (Mapes, 2002a). 
 
(No other Cox mentions after this point) 
Governor candidates face off 
     Guns, gay rights and gambling were among the issues up for 
discussion Wednesday night as Maine’s four gubernatorial 
candidates held their final televised debate before next week’s 
election.  Each of the four stressed his particular message. 
     Democrat John Baldacci and Republican Peter Cianchette 
focused on their economic plans, Green Independent Jonathan 
Carter emphasized his single-payer health care proposal and 
Independent John Michael highlighted his distaste for 
government. 
     The closest thing to drama in the 90-minute televised debate 
at the Portland Club was when, during a portion in which each 
candidate was allowed to pose a question to the other candidate, 
Cianchette asked Baldacci in particular whether he would 
pledge to not raise taxes. 
     “I would really like to hear from John Baldacci,” said 
Cianchette, who has made reducing taxes a key component of 
his campaign. 
     In fact, Cianchette posed the question twice – during the 
question session and at the beginning of the debate, during his 
opening statement. 
     Baldacci answered by saying that during his tenure in the 
U.S. House of Representatives, Congress balanced the budget 
and provided tax relief. He also said, “I’m committed to not 
raising taxes.” 
     Carter, by contrast, said that taxes likely will have to go up 
in order to make up for the state budget deficit, although he said 
his plan would decrease property taxes. Michael said he would 
never allow taxes to increase, even if “all the state employees 
have to show up to work in their underwear…” 
     Baldacci and Carter said they would support a state gay 
rights law, and Cianchette said that while he supported gay 
rights while he was in the Legislature, any new proposal should 
go to the voters. 
     Michael said he does not support a gay rights law or gay 
marriages. 
     Carter called for mentoring, after school programs and for 
people to learn parenting skills. Cianchette talked about 
working with schools and community based programs, and, 
stressing his message, said that with a stronger economy, there 
will be less drug abuse… 
     Carter asked the others about a national park in northern 
Maine, specifically about a feasibility study whether one is 
needed. 
     Cianchette said he opposes a national park and prefers 
Maine’s solution of providing conservation easements. 
Baldacci, too, said he likes conservation easements. Michael 
said he doesn’t like the idea of a national park and would 
consider taking back Acadia National Park. 
     Cianchette asked about taxes. 
     Michael asked whether it would be appropriate for an Indian 
tribe … to open a casino in Maine.  All three other candidates 
said they oppose any casino … 
     On other issues, Baldacci and Carter said they’d like the 
state to have a community college system.  Because of Maine’s 
budget deficit, Cianchette said he would prefer to link the 
university and technical college system to create more 
educational opportunities… (Weinstein, 2002). 
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basis, thus leaving them with little choice but to devote more space to the policy debate 
between the candidates because they lacked horse-race data to work with.  
Discussion 
As the content analysis shows, Greens and Libertarians receive significantly 
different coverage in the press than do the major-party contenders.  They appear less 
frequently in headlines, lead paragraphs, and stories; minor-party sources are quoted 
much less frequently than are officials from the major parties; the news frames adopted 
by the news media often take on a two-party worldview; and third-party candidates are 
often separated from their major-party rivals in that they appear in separate sentences and 
paragraphs.  Moreover, while Democrats and Republicans who are behind in the polls are 
called “underdogs,” third-party candidates are called “spoilers” or “long shots;” and when 
minor-party aspirants show strong support at the ballot box, reporters explain this from a 
two-party perspective rather than considering other potential explanations, such as the 
possibility that some so-called alternative candidates may have a natural constituency of 
their own. 
Regional dailies tended to be more sympathetic to third-party gubernatorial 
candidates than was the national news media, which virtually ignored anyone who was 
not running as a Democrat and Republican.  One reason for this could be that regional 
news organizations are writing for a local audience that may have a greater interest in 
knowing about all—or at least most—of the candidates on the ballot while national news 
organizations are simply trying to provide a broad overview for readers who will have no 
say in a particular state’s election.  However, the sample of stories from the national press 
was so small that it is difficult to draw any broad conclusions here. 
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As noted, the coverage in Maine was different.  There, reporters tended to treat 
minor-party candidates as serious politicians who were an important part of the campaign 
dynamics.  What impact this had on the electorate is beyond the scope of this study, but it 
is clear that the news media can leave different impressions based on what it chooses to 
emphasize.  Although this is purely a qualitative observation, the sense one gets from 
reading the coverage in the California, Oregon, and Wisconsin press is that the campaign 
is mostly about the contest between competing candidates to see who will win on 
Election Day.  This is in stark contrast to the coverage in Maine, where the overall 
impression is that the campaign was primarily about the policy debate among the 
contenders for public office.  There was clearly a greater effort by Maine journalists to 
make sure that a diversity of voices were consistently heard throughout the election 
season.  If the Maine coverage suggests anything, it is that a campaign can be covered in 
a variety of ways and that news organizations, if they are committed to fostering a 
healthy debate, can use their resources wisely to make sure voters are exposed to many 





Chapter 5: Long Interviews 
 Eight in-depth interviews conducted with California and Wisconsin political 
reporters using the protocol in Appendix C identified five possible explanations for why 
even the most serious third-party candidates receive scant coverage in the press.  Each of 
these reasons has multiple facets and suggests both ideological and practical reasons why 
reporters choose to emphasize some viewpoints and sideline others. 
First, the interviews suggest that while campaign journalists see their role as 
helping inform the public so that citizens can make educated decisions at the ballot box, 
reporters ultimately define those responsibilities within the parameters established by the 
two major parties.  More specifically, it is clear from the ways that political journalists 
describe their jobs that they rely on institutions dominated by the Democrats and 
Republicans to tell them which issues and candidates are important and worthy of 
coverage. 
Second, the interviews indicate that regional reporters define the term “campaign” 
almost exclusively as a contest between people or political camps, thus supporting the 
literature cited in Chapter Two.  Such a definition not only excludes other, more idealistic 
notions of what a campaign can be in a democratic society, but it also establishes a 
journalistic mindset that immediately favors candidates from the two major parties at the 
expense of dissent, which is seen as less newsworthy because it is unlikely to prevail on 
Election Day. 
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 Third, in their language and their political outlook, reporters accept the 
hegemony of the two-party system.  While reporters sometimes ruminate over whether 
they should “challenge the system,” the interviews suggest that journalists often 
knowingly operate within the existing political structure.  When they talk about 
objectivity, what they are really talking about is fair coverage for Democrats and 
Republicans—and not necessarily for third-party contenders. 
Fourth, according to the interviews, news organizations may have an economic 
incentive to narrow the field of candidates to make campaign coverage more manageable.  
In several cases, political journalists said that they were forced to make certain editorial 
decisions because they were either the only ones covering a particular campaign or 
because limited budgets and news holes did not allow them to spend time with candidates 
who they perceived to be likely losers. 
Finally, the interviews suggest that third-party candidates have trouble getting 
news media attention because they cannot meet the criteria reporters have informally 
developed to determine which candidates are serious enough to cover.  To the journalists, 
these criteria are practical ways in which they can make news judgments quickly and 
efficiently, but these journalistic standards are also a window into how political reporters 
think, providing concrete reasons for why certain candidates and agendas have difficulty 
getting into the public sphere. 
The remainder of this chapter will discuss the interviews in greater detail.  It is 
divided into the following sections:  First, the chapter will establish some context by 
briefly describing how the interviews were conducted, who participated, and the general 
outlook of reporters who cover gubernatorial campaigns, including their perspective on 
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third parties.  Second, the chapter will provide in-depth accounts of the five explanations 
for why reporters cover third-party candidates differently.  These five sections will 
discuss the rationale journalists use when talking about these issues, and they will quote 
reporters in their own words so the reader can understand the nuances of their viewpoints.  
Finally, the chapter will end with a brief discussion and summary that pulls together the 
various themes identified through the interviews. 
It is not my intent here to be critical of the reporters who were gracious enough to 
participate in this study and allow me to use their names in this dissertation.  They spoke 
freely of their experiences on the campaign trail and obviously had given many of the 
questions substantial thought as part of their professional careers.  They offered 
compelling and practical reasons for why they make certain coverage decisions, and they 
indicated that they operate under tight constraints that make it difficult for any one 
journalist to give every candidate a fair shake.  As a former newspaper reporter and 
magazine editor myself, I could relate strongly to and see the practical wisdom in the 
tools they have developed to meet the challenges they face. 
It is also my impression that each of the journalists was honest, forthright, and 
happy to help in the research project.  Although it was evident that sometimes reporters 
were unaware of their own biases, they did not seem to intentionally bolster one group of 
candidates over another.  On the contrary, all the reporters who were interviewed 
appeared genuinely concerned with being fair and objective on the campaign trail.  They 
believe in the job they are doing, they are trying to do the right thing for their readers, and 
they take their role in a democratic society seriously. 
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Their comments provide a glimpse into the reporter’s world and show how the 
dominance of the two major parties permeates the thinking of journalists and can, at 
times, blind them to their inherent biases in favor of “the system.”  Nothing that was said 
during the interviews contradicted the findings of the content analysis reported in Chapter 
Four.  In fact, the data presented here offers a compelling complement.  While the content 
analysis showed that the news coverage of third-party gubernatorial candidates is weak, 
the data reported here will explain why.  It will get behind the coverage to show the 
process reporters go through when writing about gubernatorial campaigns that involve 
more than the two traditional parties.  It is only through such an analysis of the attitudes 
expressed here that one can hope to contribute to the discussion of how news 
organizations approach political campaigns and the role journalists play in either 
fostering or stifling political debate. 
The interviews 
 The eight 60- to 90-minute interviews were conducted between June 24 and July 
11 in 2007 with political journalists who have extensive experience covering 
gubernatorial campaigns, including those with third-party candidates.  Seven reporters 
were interviewed in person, and one—John Marelius of the San Diego Union-Tribune—
was interviewed by e-mail because his schedule did not permit a face-to-face meeting.  
Three of the California reporters were interviewed in San Francisco and Sacramento 
while one, Margaret Talev, a former reporter with the Los Angeles Times and Sacramento 
Bee who is now a Washington correspondent for the McClatchy Group, was interviewed 
in Bethesda, MD.  The three Wisconsin reporters were interviewed in Madison, WI.  Four 
interviews were conducted at local coffee shops recommended by the reporters and three 
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were completed in the news offices of the journalists.  Six of the reporters were men; two 
were women.  (See Table 5.1 for a full list of the reporters interviewed.) 
Table 5.1:  Reporters interviewed 
Reporter Years of Experience News Organization 
Mark Z. Barabak 29 Los Angeles Times 
David W. Callender 24 The Capital Times 
John Marelius 30 San Diego Union-Tribune 
Carla Marinucci 30 San Francisco Chronicle 
Scott Milfred 15 Wisconsin State Journal 
Margaret Talev 13 McClatchy Group 
Steven Walters 37 Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel 
Kevin Yamamura 8 Sacramento Bee 
 
 It was clear from the interviews that the reporters enjoy covering gubernatorial 
campaigns.  Although they occasionally lamented the long hours and repetitive nature of 
watching a candidate over the course of several months, they nevertheless expressed deep 
satisfaction with getting out of the office, meeting with “real people,” dissecting the 
statements of the candidates, and presenting useful information to their readers.  Having a 
front-row seat to history, as more than one reporter put it, is another factor that seems to 
motivate political journalists when covering campaigns.  For example, John Marelius of 
the San Diego Union-Tribune said, “As corny as it might sound, covering political 
campaigns … can be becoming a part of history in the making.”  That opinion was shared 
by the San Francisco Chronicle’s Carla Marinucci, who said: “We write the first draft of 
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history and it’s part of … the excitement.  You are getting a front row seat to history.  
You’re traveling—I’ve traveled with presidents from Clinton to Bush and all the 
candidates and witnessed first hand some of the major events in American history.” 
Reporters were both cynical and idealistic about the nature of campaigns.  On the 
one hand, reporters are savvy to the various tactics politicians use to manipulate the press 
on the campaign trail—such as making an announcement in a conference room that is 
obviously too small for the anticipated crowd so as to give the impression that there is 
strong interest in what they have to say.  On the other hand, most of the journalists who 
were interviewed still displayed an idealistic view of the campaign as an institution—and 
it is this idealism that seems to be the source of their professional enjoyment in covering 
them. 
 This attitude was summed up by Scott Milfred, who worked as a political reporter 
for the Wisconsin State Journal before recently becoming the newspaper’s editorial page 
editor.  In describing why he enjoyed covering gubernatorial campaigns, Milfred said: 
You sort of felt like it was a big decision for the state, and that people needed information 
to make the right decision.  And when I was running it … I just wanted the coverage to 
be good and to really try to let voters know who these people—who these candidates 
were and what they really—what their records really were in terms of experience and 
accomplishments and screw ups. [I wanted to tell people] what were their positions now 
and really try to drill down on what is the difference between the candidates… 
 
 Most of the reporters who were interviewed expressed a positive attitude toward 
the idea of third parties in the abstract, saying in some cases that they actually hope 
candidates from outside the system will catch fire with the electorate.  While some 
reporters were understandably hesitant to express their opinion about particular parties 
for fear of compromising objectivity, others characterized minor-party candidates as 
more honest or authentic than Democrats and Republicans.  They said third-party 
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candidates are often more accessible to the press and more willing to answer questions on 
a wide-range of topics.  In contrast, they said, major-party contenders are usually more 
guarded, shielding themselves from direct contact with journalists and trying to “stay on 
message” rather than giving straightforward answers to questions about public policy. 
 Following is a sample of some of the more positive comments reporters made 
when asked for their general impressions of third-party gubernatorial candidates. 
Steven Walters of the Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel:  
[I’m always] very interested to see if their campaigns catch on.  [I’m] intrigued by the 
possibility that their campaigns are going to catch on and begin resonating.  Maybe 
privately wanting them to do better than one, two, three percent, you know.  ‘Cause I 
think—I know from covering the 2002 race, that [Democrat] Jim Doyle had to be a better 
candidate knowing that [Libertarian] Ed Thompson was going to get somewhere between 
eight and 16 percent of the vote. 
 
Scott Milfred of the Wisconsin State Journal: 
I think they’re great.  I voted for [Libertarian] Ed Thompson [for governor in 2002].  I 
didn’t even like Ralph Nader’s politics, but I interviewed him a handful of times and I 
almost voted for Ralph Nader, even though I didn’t like his politics, because I just like 
him.  I wish there was a third party.  I wish third parties could be more credible.  I’m, you 
know, like I said, I’m a centrist…  I think the Democrats and Republicans are so stale and 
they’re boring and they’re in their containers, and they won’t come out of them even 
when they know they’re wrong.  And they play to the same tired dinosaur 
constituencies… 
 
John Marelius of the San Diego Union-Tribune: 
There is a prevalent attitude in the major parties that voters are throwing away their votes 
if they vote for a third-party candidate. I don’t agree. If a voter believes in the philosophy 
of the Green Party, Libertarian Party or whatever, it is perfectly appropriate for them to 
vote for that party’s candidates. The same applies to voters who are attracted to a 
particular third-party candidate even if they don’t totally share that party’s philosophy. 
Sometimes voters use third parties as a vehicle for “none-of-the-above” votes. If voters 
want to send a message to the major parties that says, “You’re going to have to do better 
than these candidates if you want my vote,” that too is appropriate. 
 
Carla Marinucci of the San Francisco Chronicle: 
I think third party candidates do contribute to the discussion…  There are some reporters 
who have no desire or no interest in covering third-party candidates because it’s a waste 
of time, you know, or it’s a bad choice of resources.  I’m not one of those.  I think that 
they elevate the discussion and I’m sorry we don’t have more time or resources to cover 
them because anything that helps voters to understand and readers to understand, you 
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know, what are the issues and what are the varying spectrum of ideas out there on issues 
that affect our lives—I think that’s a good thing. 
 
At other times, though, reporters indicated that they see third-party candidates as 
outside the mainstream and somehow different from major-party aspirants.  In one case, 
for instance, a reporter described third-party contenders as “niche candidates” who have 
“a desire to spread the word about their belief system” to the public—a curious 
distinction from major-party nominees given that all political organizations play to 
certain constituencies (or niche audiences) in an attempt to inject their worldview into the 
electorate.  In other cases, reporters described minor-party candidates as idealistic 
politicians who—perhaps naïvely—challenge a system that is unlikely to bend.  The 
reporters did not see this as necessarily bad, but they also felt no obligation to indulge 
those aspirations with news coverage. 
 The following three quotations represent this more cautious perspective on third-
party candidates. 
 Margaret Talev of the McClatchy Group: 
I think many third party candidates run for office on a specific issue platform [and] … 
their desire to run is a desire to spread the word about their belief system and to get other 
people to consider living in a way that they want them to live…  I think some people run 
for office for the experience of running for office.  I think, I mean, how cool is that, right, 
to go around the state and meet different people, to shake hands, to make the human 
connection.  So, I think there are those [third-party] candidates too and they’re like 
maybe on more of a personal journey, you know.  Which is great, but, I’m not – I’m not 
gonna cover it necessarily. 
 
Mark Barabak of the Los Angeles Times: 
 
Third party?  Well, it connotes to mean outside the system, obviously.  It connotes to 
mean quixotic, and I don’t mean in a pejorative way.  But the fact is, it means someone 
for good or ill, who is willing to go up against a system that is very stacked against them.  
And that can be a good thing in terms of someone who is principled and believes strongly 
in what they’re doing and is willing to make the sacrifice and face long odds because they 




John Marelius of the San Diego Union-Tribune: 
Because it’s theoretically possible for an independent or minor-party candidate to be 
elected governor of California by simply receiving a plurality of the votes cast, it’s 
conceivable there could be a circumstance where such a candidate warranted comparable 
coverage to the major-party nominees. But it hasn’t come close to happening.  Most of 
the time, I don’t believe the voters would be well served by “equal coverage” of minor-
party candidates. Two percent of California voters are registered with the American 
Independent Party, which grew out of the George Wallace candidacy in 1968. It is widely 
believed that is greatly inflated…  The other party registrations: Green, .89 percent; 
Libertarian, .53 percent; Peace and Freedom, .37 percent. The Reform Party and Natural 
Law Party have been dropped from the ballot in recent years because of declining 
registration.  In other words, while more than 4 in 10 California voters are Democrats, 
barely one in 200 are Libertarians. I don’t believe that giving “equal” coverage to 
Libertarian candidates most of the time would be fair to the voters… 
 
 It would be easy to conclude that these attitudes would have a direct influence on 
how political journalists write about minor-party gubernatorial candidates—and perhaps, 
to a certain extent, they do.  But how a reporter’s feelings play out in his or her news 
coverage is a process that is much more complex and goes beyond a simple correlation 
between a journalist’s opinions about third parties and how many column inches he or 
she decides to give a specific candidate in a specific news story.  If the interviews are any 
indication, how third-party candidates are covered has more to do with the five factors 
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, namely that (1) reporters see their campaign 
role as informing the public about candidates and issues but rely on Democrats and 
Republicans to tell them which candidates and issues are important; (2) journalists define 
the term campaign as a contest, which makes minor-party aspirants inherently less 
newsworthy; (3) reporters accept the hegemony of the two-party system; (4) news 
organizations have an economic incentive to limit campaign coverage; and (5) reporters 
have developed a set of criteria for deciding who gets covered that is difficult for third-




How reporters perceive their role 
 All eight reporters articulated some notion that their role is to cut through the 
white noise of the candidates’ messages and provide readers with objective, substantive 
information that voters can use when making a decision at the ballot box.  In fact, this 
concept of “journalist as informer” was a powerful theme in each of the interviews.  
Reporters said their role is to seek “essential truths” about the candidates; to help readers 
properly interpret the wide array of competing political messages that are transmitted in 
the months before an election; to act as the readers’ advocate by trying to force 
candidates to discuss issues they might try to avoid; and to keep the candidates honest 
through the journalistic watchdog role. 
 For example, Kevin Yamamura of the Sacramento Bee said his responsibility is to 
know “more than most people about what’s going on in the campaign and be able to … 
cut through the messaging or the strategy to provide readers and voters with clear 
information.” Marelius said: “The entire responsibility of a political reporter is to the 
broader society—that is, the voters.  Simply put, we try to give them the information they 
need to vote intelligently.”  Barabak said his role was “to inform people—to make sure 
people are fully informed when they step into the ballot box;” and Walters said his job is 
to “connect the dots” for a busy electorate by explaining the candidates’ positions on the 
major issues of the day.  As Walters put it:  “I like the model of [the] reporter being the 
provider of information for people who aren’t at the realm and who … are tuning in very 
late to the campaign.” 
 This job is difficult, the reporters said, because most candidates try to control the 
daily message by steering clear of news professionals and hiding the specifics of their 
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likely programs so as not to alienate needed constituencies.  It is up to journalists, the 
interviews suggest, to go beyond sound bites and uncover a candidate’s true intentions.  
Talev put it this way: 
What any journalist is trying to do for their audience is describe essential truths about 
something to their readers.  And a candidate goes out of his or her way really to mask 
those essential truths about themselves. They want you to see what they want you to 
see…  And so, if you look at what issues they’re peddling, where their money is coming 
from, what they’ve done before and what they say they want to do, I think that helps you 
get to the essence of … if you vote for that person, what you’re getting.  
 
 The Wisconsin State Journal’s Milfred touched on a similar theme when he 
explained how he knows whether he is playing his role effectively. 
I think my main rule is to ignore what is the “campaign” and to really try to give people 
information about the issues that are really affecting them … If you’re frustrating the 
candidates, you’re probably doing something right…  If you’re getting the candidates to 
talk about things that they’re not talking about anywhere else, officially anyway, I think 
then you know you’re doing something… 
 
 However, it appears from the interviews that reporters unconsciously define their 
role as informer within boundaries established by the Democrats and Republicans.  They 
did not say this explicitly, of course, but their bias came through in subtle ways when 
journalists explained which sources they turn to for political information and how they 
develop story ideas about campaigns.  Most of what journalists know about politics 
comes from observing and talking to people and institutions that are typically dominated 
by the two major political parties.  In short, the two-party system provides the menu of 
story ideas from which reporters choose. 
For example, at least two of the reporters who were interviewed indicated that 
they know which subjects are important to cover in a gubernatorial campaign simply by 
being around the Capitol building and observing which issues are being tackled by state 
government.  The Bee’s Yamamura, for instance, said that when he is covering a 
campaign he tries to focus on issues “that are problematic with the state, issues that the 
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state is grappling with in the legislature currently;” and Walters of the Milwaukee 
Journal-Sentinel said his ideas for political stories usually develop by “listening to 
people” and from “covering the Capitol and its issues for 17, 18 years.” 
Although it would seem natural for a state Capitol reporter to get information 
from sources at the state Capitol, it is also true that every state legislature in the country 
save one (Nebraska’s nonpartisan body) is dominated by either the Democrats or 
Republicans—and sometimes both.  Relying on these institutions for information, 
therefore, means that political journalists are continuously exposed to a Democrat-
Republican worldview on what is important.  Issues that the major parties deem 
significant enough to tackle and talk about during legislative sessions will likely be the 
same issues that dominate campaign discourse—an observation that is supported by the 
agenda-building studies cited in Chapter Two (see Berkowitz 1987; Brown et al. 1987; 
Gans 1980; Sigal 1973, 1986; Weaver and Elliott 1985). 
This is not to suggest, of course, that issues such as budget deficits and gun 
control are not major stories that a reporter should cover during an election campaign.  
They most certainly are.  However, one might argue that other issues are equally as 
pressing, such as a third-party candidate’s contention that the electoral system—the very 
system that makes American democracy possible—is rigged against anyone running for 
public office from outside the Democratic and Republican parties.  But because reporters 
are not talking to these unconventional sources on a regular basis, these types of issues 
rarely get on the media’s agenda—and when they do, they are rarely if ever considered 
the major issue of the day (see Baron 1967; Lichtenberg 1987; Tuchman 1978). 
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The interviews showed a second way that two-party institutions influence articles 
that appear in newspapers: reporters said they receive many (but not all) of their 
campaign story ideas from the campaigns they cover.  Although it is true that some of 
those ideas can and do come from the campaigns of third-party candidates—for example, 
Scott Milfred of the Wisconsin State Journal said that he typically called Libertarian 
gubernatorial candidate Ed Thompson during the 2002 Wisconsin campaign to get his 
opinion on various issues—in most cases reporters indicated that when they were 
referring to “the campaigns” they usually meant the Democrats and Republicans. 
For example, when Carla Marinucci of the San Francisco Chronicle gave 
examples of the various sources she usually contacts during an election, she said they 
normally include “the chairman of the state Democratic Party” as well as “Democratic 
Party fundraisers, the precinct workers, [and] major labor people on the Democratic 
side…”  Walters made similar references to the major parties when providing examples 
of sources with whom he is in regular contact, saying at one point that in addition to 
analyzing candidate advertising and schedules, he would call “the local Democratic and 
Republican chairmen and chairwomen” to see what they “think about the campaign.”  
Other reporters made similar references. 
Finally, when reporters discussed the independent sources or noncampaign 
officials they seek out for “neutral” information about the election, they again indicated 
that many of these people come from within the two-party structure.  For instance, 
Walters of the Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel said that he sometimes tries to get the opinion 
of special interest groups, citing the Wisconsin Realtors as an example—a group, he said, 
that “generally back(s) Republicans.”  Barabak of the Los Angeles Times cited the 
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Service Employees International Union as an example of a noncampaign source that he 
has tapped to test his own observations about politics—an organization that has donated 
millions to the Democrats and Republicans over the past 16 years (The Center for 
Responsive Politics).  And while the Wisconsin State Journal’s Milfred indicated that 
university professors and other unaffiliated sources are vital to a reporter’s work because 
they can provide information without spin, the examples of such neutral sources that he 
chose to cite included a former Wisconsin Supreme Court justice, a retired superintendent 
of schools who is a Democrat, and a former moderate Republican governor—sources that 
all come from the established order. 
On the surface, this all makes perfect sense.  Given that the United States 
currently has a two-party system, it is only logical that reporters would turn to sources 
from or connected to the Democratic and Republican parties for information, perspective, 
and analysis about politics.  But it is equally important to recognize that by using such 
sources and institutions to gauge which problems and solutions are the priorities, 
reporters are by extension adopting the values and priorities of the two major parties.  
They absorb what these institutions tell them and then reflect this back to the electorate, 
thus embedding their campaign reporting with a Democrat-Republican worldview.  
Scholar Leon Sigal noted this trend almost four decades ago in his academic analysis of 
journalistic sources when he said: 
What the news is depends very much on who its sources are…  Who gets to appear in the 
news and who provides the information that readers get are the basic questions of a 
democratic polity.  If these questions are addressed in the future as they have been in the 
past, journalistic practices will continue to foreclose access to the many and grant it to the 




What are the implications of this journalistic mindset for candidates who seek to 
challenge this system from outside the two major parties?  One possible outcome is that it 
adds yet another obstacle in the path of third-party aspirants who hope to raise issues not 
being discussed at the state Capitol or other mainstream institutions.  These candidates 
are forced to debate within a context established by their opponents—and they cannot 
look to the press for help in either broadening that debate or consistently reporting their 
message to the electorate.  In fact, they can expect the opposite.  In almost every case, the 
reporters who were interviewed indicated that one of their responsibilities is to explain to 
voters what the established candidates are saying.  Not one of the journalists said that his 
or her role was to broaden the debate beyond what the system defines as appropriate.  In 
other words, reporters appear uncomfortable with setting the agenda of a campaign and 
prefer to follow the lead of the candidates. 
The inclination of reporters to rely mostly on two-party sources and institutions 
for political information is consistent with the content analysis reported in Chapter Four, 
which found that third-party candidates receive less prominent coverage than Democrats 
and Republicans and are often physically separated from the text about their major-party 
rivals.  One reason for these differences in coverage could be, as the interviews suggest, 
because third-party gubernatorial contenders must always operate within a media context 
established by the traditional parties.  As long as Democrats and Republicans continue to 
view Greens and Libertarians as detached from “the system,” it is likely that journalists 




Campaign as contest 
The interviews suggest that reporters view campaigns mostly as the process by 
which one candidate tries to defeat his or her opponent(s).  In fact, the notion that a 
campaign is a “contest” was emphasized by seven of the eight political journalists who 
were interviewed.  In only one case did a reporter describe campaigns as something other 
than a game—and even in that instance there were still aspects of the definition that 
referred back to the competition. 
This contest paradigm was articulated in both the overt definitions reporters gave 
for the term “campaign” as well as the manner in which reporters talked about such 
things as how they cover elections, the sources they turn to for political information, and 
the role that voters and issues play in the fight for elected office.  This tendency to see 
campaigns mostly as a competition makes third-party candidates less newsworthy than 
their Democratic and Republican rivals because minor-party hopefuls usually are far 
behind in the contest.  This win-lose model used by reporters also de-emphasizes the 
more normative aspects of a campaign, such as a campaign’s role in encouraging public 
participation in a wider political discussion.  The rest of this section will examine the 
overt and subtle ways in which reporters expressed the contest paradigm, and it will 
analyze the ramifications of this worldview on third-party gubernatorial candidates. 
 Defining campaign.  The first way that reporters stressed the competition was in 
the definitions they provided for the term “campaign.”  Talev, for instance, said a 
campaign is “the organization that a candidate puts together to win a race,” adding later 
that the primary function of a campaign is “to win.”  Marelius of the San Diego Union-
Tribune put it this way: “A campaign is the process … of candidates making their cases 
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to the voters.”  David Callender of Madison, WI’s Capital Times defined the term as 
“actively seeking election to a political office” as well as “the organization … and the 
techniques you use to run for that office;” and the Los Angeles Times’s Barabak said that 
a campaign is “the attempt by individuals to elect themselves to a particular political 
office, or to establish a certain public policy through the ballot box.” 
 One of the most comprehensive definitions, though, was given by Milfred of the 
Wisconsin State Journal, who said: 
I guess it’s the process of attempting to become elected…  There’s the public campaign 
and then there’s the very private and secret campaign and the money campaign.  And so 
there’s lots of aspects to the campaign…  It’s much thicker and broader and just all the 
constant scheming by both sides on what to do on a daily basis and the changes in course 
and the constant trying to use the public’s attention—what there is of it—and the news to 
call attention to your campaign and your positions. 
 
The one exception to the contest paradigm was provided by Walters of the 
Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel—the most experienced of the eight reporters interviewed—
who described campaigns as a public “dialogue.”  However, even here Walters made 
passing reference to the contest element.  As Walters put it: 
I really think campaigns are a dialogue between the people who want to get elected and 
embrace and hold the levers of power, and those that they want to govern.  And it’s a 
tremendously interesting dialogue…  You have the supporting fundraisers and you have 
the great machine enablers and you have the creators of the sound bites and the advisors 
and then you have this great restless body politic who either engages these candidates or 
says, you know, I think you’re, I think you’re all a bunch of horse feed.  So that’s what I 
mean by the dialogue. 
 
Campaign coverage.  The contest paradigm through which reporters view 
campaigns also was evident in how reporters said they cover various candidates.  In 
answering a wide range of questions about their daily routines during the election season, 
the reporters tended to focus on elements of a campaign that directly pertain to the 
competition, such as fundraising, political strategy, polls, and political advertisements.  
For instance, when Barabak was trying to recall some of the political stories he had 
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written over the years, the first two he mentioned dealt with campaign financing and 
advertising.  Talev followed a similar line of thought, saying that in the final weeks of a 
campaign she will “check with TV stations about ad buys,” read blogs “to get a sense of 
what activists are talking about,” and access “campaign finance [forms] online” to see 
how much money the campaign organizations have and who is funding those operations. 
In Wisconsin, Walters said that, among other things, he watches which regions of 
the state—or markets—that the candidates visit as an indication of where the parties 
believe they need a big turnout on Election Day to prevail.  For example, he said that in 
2006, the Republican gubernatorial candidate chose not to waste time campaigning in 
Democratic-leaning Milwaukee, instead going to GOP strongholds to try to generate a 
large Republican turnout at the polls.  Said Walters: “When you track what markets the 
Republican candidate was in [during] the final days, it tells you what they need to win.”  
Sources used.  A strong indication of how important the contest model is to 
political journalists rests with the sources reporters typically turn to when researching 
campaign stories.  In all eight interviews, reporters mentioned “campaign officials” first 
when asked who they are most likely to contact during a typical day on the campaign 
trail.  Put another way, the first type of source the reporters thought to talk about were 
those whose main function is to help win the contest.  For example, Talev said that while 
the sources she contacts may change from day to day depending on the story she is 
writing, she usually develops a list of ten to 20 people over the course of a campaign who 
she tries to call regularly.  In describing who these sources are, Talev said: “You would 
talk to the campaign’s press guy.  You might talk to the campaign’s pollster, the 
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campaign’s media’s guy—on both sides…  So you check with the candidate’s campaign 
folks every day to find out what they’re doing.” 
Other reporters emphasized official sources as well.  Yamamura of the 
Sacramento Bee said he checks the Internet and his e-mail “to see what the campaigns are 
putting out.”  He said he also places “phone calls to each of the campaigns” and talks to 
“campaign staff” and “consultants” each day.  Marinucci of the Chronicle said she is in 
touch with the campaigns’ “communications director [and] press secretaries,” adding that 
“you could be talking to major fundraisers and certain major strategists or … the behind 
the scenes folks that are shaping the campaign.”  Callender of The Capital Times said:  
“Basically, it involves … in some way or another, finding out from each of the 
candidate’s organizations what they’re up to, what’s going on, or what other kinds of 
external factors are sort of affecting whatever they’re doing that day, and then just 
following that.”  And Barabak of the Los Angeles Times said he usually talks to “senior 
people on campaigns” because “to really, sort of, get the nitty gritty of what’s going on in 
the campaign, I would want to talk to … people at the highest level I possibly could.” 
This tendency on the part of reporters to turn to official sources for information 
about the campaign should not be surprising.  For one thing, the findings here are 
consistent with prior research indicating the importance of official sources to American 
journalists (Gans 1980; Sigal 1973; Stocking 1989; Tuchman 1978).  In addition, it 
should seem inherently natural that reporters would talk regularly with sources who are 
associated with a particular “beat,” whether that be the White House staff if the beat is 
the presidency, medical experts if the reporter covers health care, or campaign officials if 
the reporter writes about politics. 
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But let’s be clear:  The main reason any campaign official speaks to a reporter is 
to better the chances of his or her candidate on Election Day—something that is not lost 
on most political journalists. (For a discussion on how sources attempt to manipulate 
reporters for their own purposes, see Sigal 1973.)  Scott Milfred said as much, pointing 
out that campaign officials “only raise ideas that they think will benefit their candidate.”  
Nevertheless, the fact that most of the reporters who were interviewed thought about 
campaign officials first when talking about who they interview when covering a 
campaign is an indication of how political journalists think.  Such revelations go to the 
reporter’s mindset and strongly suggests that the contest paradigm is paramount. 
That said, reporters also indicated that they interview college professors, issues 
experts, and voters when covering campaigns.  In fact, these types of sources were 
considered highly important to all the reporters who were interviewed in that people who 
are not associated with a campaign come with a higher degree of credibility because they 
are viewed as objective or neutral.  However, it should be noted that these other sources 
were always mentioned after reporters first discussed campaign officials.  They also 
tended to talk at greater length about campaign officials, an indication that they may be in 
much greater contact with these sources than they are with others.  The priority that 
reporters place in official sources can be summed up with a statement made by Walters of 
the Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel.  In the final five days of a political campaign, he said, he 
is typically in contact with “handlers, editors, [the] candidate and finally, real people.” 
The role of voters.  Another way in which the contest aspect of a campaign is 
expressed by journalists is in how reporters tend to view the role of voters, who are seen 
mostly as the final measure of how well a candidate is performing in the game.  This is 
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not to suggest that reporters do not value voters for other things as well, such as their 
views on the issues.  In fact, the Bee’s Yamamura echoed other reporters when he said 
that part of his job is to find out “what we think voters think is important and sort of 
exploring those issues.”  In addition, Milfred described a series of stories the Wisconsin 
State Journal published in 2002 in which each gubernatorial candidate agreed to be 
escorted by newspaper reporters to previously undisclosed public venues, where they 
would have to meet with voters and respond to a variety of questions.24  However, when 
talking about voters, the interviews suggest that reporters place the greatest emphasis on 
citizens as a gauge for the competition. 
This was best expressed by Barabak of the Los Angeles Times, who said he 
frequently travels away from the power centers of Sacramento to see how the campaign is 
playing with regular citizens so he can better determine which candidate may be winning.  
As one example, Barabak said he went to San Benito County, CA, during the 2006 
governor’s campaign to interview voters there about which candidates they were 
supporting.  He chose to talk to people in that area, he said, because the county has 
“almost a perfect track record” of not only picking the winner of each gubernatorial 
election, but coming “within literally decimal points of the statewide total.”  In other 
words, the voters there were a perfect gauge for how the candidates were performing in 
the contest. 
The role of issues.  Finally, the contest paradigm that seems to dominate the 
thinking of reporters is evident in the way that journalists discussed (or in some cases, did 
not discuss) the role that public policy issues and ideas play in a political campaign. 
                                                 
24 The candidates were not told in advance where they were being taken. The point was to force candidates 
to discuss issues that were important to the public in an unrehearsed, spontaneous format designed to 
uncover the candidate’s true policy positions. 
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While the interviews suggest that reporters believe issues are or should be 
important factors on Election Day, in five of the eight interviews, reporters did not talk 
about issues or ideas when defining the term campaign until the investigator raised the 
subject with them first.  This omission on the part of some reporters may be an indication 
that issues, while considered important, are not the first thing that come to mind for some 
reporters as they approach a campaign. 
In addition, when reporters were asked about the role that issues and ideas play in 
an election, they seemed to value issues mostly in terms of how they might impact the 
contest—in other words, how candidates use policy proposals as a tactic to win public 
support.  Milfred, for instance, agreed that a campaign was “a contest of ideas,” but he 
said that most candidates “package those ideas in extremely narrow and kind of cynical 
and hot button or sound bite ways” to appeal to a certain audience.  Walters said, “Yeah, 
it’s about issues, but it’s about issues that are ginned up and may or may not be valid.” 
In other cases, reporters saw “issues” as just another strategic element of a 
candidate’s run for office.  As Talev illustrates: 
Yeah, it’s a campaign about ideas. It’s also a campaign about tweaking those ideas and 
… targeting those ideas and convincing people that you’re the one with the better kind of 
idea…  Every campaign for governor is gonna be about jobs, education, the environment, 
roads, infrastructure, technology, you know, work force development…  [In] every 
campaign for governor, what they do, you know, is if you look at any statewide poll of 
what issues resonate the most with voters, coincidentally, those would be the main 
talking points in every [candidate] speech. 
 
Such comments imply a certain mindset on the part of the reporters, providing 
further support for the observation that journalists have a contest mentality when it comes 
to campaigns.  However, it is important to point out that other dynamics could be at work 
here.  It may very well be that reporters view issues and ideas mostly as elements of the 
contest because this is actually how politicians use them.  Moreover, reporters indicated 
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that issues are not always at the forefront of their minds because other factors are more 
significant to the outcome of elections.  Again, this suggests that the contest is paramount 
in the reporter’s mind, but it is also an indication that they are making this judgment 
based on outside forces. 
Barabak of the Los Angeles Times stated this point of view most effectively, 
saying: 
You know, the more I do this, the more convinced I am that it is mainly about persona 
and personalities.  And I don’t mean that in a pejorative, superficial sense, but the more I 
do this the more I think people judge people…  In other words, there are individuals who 
have certain issues, but I think they’re the distinct minority.  I think most people have … 
a handful of issues they care about, and I think once they get beyond that and they feel 
that a candidate has a certain level of competency or they trust them on a certain handful 
of issues, I think then what’s much more important is a sense of, “Do I like this person? 
Do I trust him or her? Do I feel they have a good character?” 
 
 
There is also the question of what reporters believe the newspaper audience 
demands.  Throughout the interviews, reporters said that voters—despite what they might 
tell pollsters—are not particularly interested in reading about issues.  The evidence?  
Newspapers publish many issue-related stories throughout the course of a campaign, 
reporters said, but those stories often go unread.  According to Marinucci: 
There is a lot of information out about the candidates and what their positions are and 
where they stand, and many opportunities to see them in person.  But I look at our Web 
site, for instance, [to see] what are the top ten stories everyday that are viewed on the 
Web, and … I can almost guarantee you it’s a Paris Hilton or, you know, the daily dish 
gossip stories.  It’s not the presidential, it’s not the campaign stories that are [being read].  
 
Milfred of the Wisconsin State Journal agreed.  He said most people blame 
reporters for the lack of issues in many gubernatorial campaigns, but he said that is an 
unfair criticism.  “Well, you know, any day you read our paper during a gubernatorial 
campaign, there is some real analysis of issues going on,” Milfred said, adding later that 
in the last gubernatorial election: 
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[O]ne of our debates was about the economy. We sponsored that. But, you know, I don’t 
think the ratings were that great for that debate.  So, whoever saw that debate, I think, 
wow—they got—it was all about ideas. 
 
 Whatever the reason, it appears from these interviews that in the minds of 
reporters, issues have become a means to an end in the overall contest for public office. 
Implications.  The main point here is that from their overt definitions of the term 
campaign to the manner in which they discuss voters and issues, reporters demonstrated a 
strong bias in favor of a contest paradigm when talking about the election season.  This 
journalistic tendency has important implications for third-party candidates and provides 
at least one explanation for why they are either ignored or treated differently by the press, 
as shown in Chapter Four.  Under this definition of the term “campaign,” minor-party 
gubernatorial contenders are inherently less newsworthy in the eyes of journalism 
because they do not contribute anything meaningful to the one aspect of an election that 
is the central focus of the reporter: the contest.  In this sense, the comments made by the 
reporters strongly support Zaller’s (1999) Rule of Anticipated Importance because 
reporters are always looking for the candidates who are likely to have some impact on the 
lives of their readers. 
Reporters said as much.  According to Yamamura, for instance, the Sacramento 
Bee provided good news coverage to Green Party gubernatorial candidate Peter Camejo 
during the 2002 campaign but significantly less coverage during the 2003 recall election 
“because we didn’t feel that he had as much of an impact on the race.”  Talev and 
Marelius made similar comments. 
Said Talev: 
I mean, our role is really to chronicle what’s happening, right?  And if what’s happening 
is that someone’s running in the low single digits, then they’re not, they don’t merit the 
same kind of day-to-day attention…  Your job is to tell people what they need to know 
about a person who could get elected. 
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 Marelius added: 
Some candidates have a chance to win; others do not. Obviously, who falls in which 
category is a judgment that needs to be constantly reevaluated as the campaign proceeds. 
There’s nothing unfair about this. 
 
 
There is no doubt that a major element of any campaign is, in fact, the win-lose 
game.  This is something that has been understood for most of American history and was 
implicit in many of the early election studies, which argued that campaigns had minimal 
effects partially because they had little impact on the outcome at the ballot box—i.e., the 
contest (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, McPhee 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 
1960; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1968).  However, the reporters’ definitions miss 
the more normative, idealistic notions of what a campaign can be—namely that elections 
are an opportunity for representatives to reconnect with their constituents (Alvarez 1997; 
Fenno 1996; Kahn and Kenney 2001; Shaw 1999a), a chance for voters to learn about 
important issues (Bartels 1988; Brians and Wattenberg 1996; Drew and Weaver 2006; 
Dutwin 2000; Franklin 1991; Holbrook 1999; Jamieson, Hagen, Orr, Sillaman, Morse, 
and Kirn 2000; Kahn and Kenney 2001; Lodge, Steenbergen and Brau 1995; Popkin 
1991; Weaver 1996), and a moment when democratic institutions are legitimized 
(Gronbeck 1978; Katz 1997; Pomper 1967).  By focusing so much attention on the 
contest elements of the campaign, reporters may be denying the electorate a chance to 
hear the perspectives of alternative candidates—even if in the end the public chooses not 
to vote for them. 
The results reported here raise several questions.  Would the coverage be different 
if reporters viewed campaigns more in terms of ideas and debate?  Would reporters be 
more inclined to cover minor-party contenders if they defined campaigns as Walters did:  
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public dialogues in which the main goal was to foster political discourse and explore 
alternative solutions to statewide problems rather than to determine which candidate is 
best positioned to win on Election Day?  In other words, would a change in paradigm 
make third-party candidates more newsworthy?  The answers to these questions are 
outside the scope of the present study.  What is certain is that the contest paradigm is 
deeply entrenched in the way reporters think and provides one possible explanation for 
why, as the content analysis showed, third-party candidates are covered differently than 
Democrats and Republicans. 
Objectivity and two-party hegemony 
 The notion of objectivity is an important concept in journalism, and it came 
through strongly in the interviews with the eight political reporters from California and 
Wisconsin.  Although three of the reporters (Callender, Marelius, and Talev) indicated 
that pure objectivity is not possible (and all three plus Yamamura said they aim mostly to 
be fair), in all eight cases, the reporters said they or their editors take numerous steps to 
make sure that their stories are as balanced as possible.  However, the interviews suggest 
that while reporters strive to be neutral in who and what they choose to cover, ultimately 
their comments and choices indicate that they accept the hegemony of the two-party 
system.  When they talk about objectivity, what reporters really mean is being fair to 
Democrats and Republicans.  This section, therefore, will examine the reporters’ notion 
of neutrality more thoroughly by showing (1) the techniques reporters say they use to 
make their stories balanced, (2) why these measures may not be effective at ensuring that 
certain dissenting views get aired, and (3) how reporters readily acknowledge that they 
view the two-party system as a natural part of American politics. 
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 Ensuring objectivity.  The main way that reporters said they guard against bias is 
to interview as many sources as possible to make sure that a wide-range of viewpoints are 
reflected in their stories.  Marelius of the Union-Tribune said he tries to “interview 
enough people until I’m not hearing anything new.” Callender of the The Capital Times 
said reporters need to be “as complete as possible.”  Marinucci said the San Francisco 
Chronicle “bends over backwards to make sure the story has … a variety of voices that 
don’t just represent one side or the other …” 
 Talev put it this way: 
Talk to a lot of people when you report any story, especially an enterprise story or an 
investigative story…  Don’t just call two experts to write on the story and hit send, which 
is a challenge on the campaign trail when you’re short on time.  But I think the best way 
to guard against unfair bias is to make sure that you’re hearing a lot of points of view to 
help you decide what’s the common thinking on someone. 
 
 Other steps are taken as well.  Walters said some editors at the Milwaukee 
Journal-Sentinel will count quotations and paragraphs of campaign stories to ensure that 
coverage is quantifiably equal between candidates.  Barabak of the Los Angeles Times 
said that while he is not always successful at it, he tries to avoid loaded words and labels 
such as liberal or conservative to describe a candidate, while Milfred of the Wisconsin 
State Journal said that when he covered campaigns, he could guard against bias by 
removing any emotional attachment he might have felt toward any of the candidates.  
Said Milfred: 
At the time I really could care less who won … and I suppose that makes me a bad 
citizen.  But that was my mind set, and I’m being honest about that…  I wasn’t like a 
closet conservative or a closet liberal.  So that made it easier too…  That’s how I 
approached the whole objectivity and fairness thing. 
 
These techniques aside, reporters indicated that being objective is not difficult as 
long as a journalist understands the proper way to research and write a news story.  
Barabak explained: 
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The analogy I’ve used before is it’s almost like baking a cake or following a recipe.  It’s 
not to say that all stories are formulaic, but there is a certain formula or way of putting 
together a story.  Getting a set of facts, providing some perspective, presenting all sides 
of an issue within reason.  I mean, you know, I don’t think if I say the sun was shining, I 
need to quote a meteorologist in the story.  You don’t take it to that extreme, but … if 
you bake a cake and you put in too much sugar or you put in too much salt or too much 
baking soda or too much flour, it’s going to taste funny, it’s going to come out funny.  If 
you don’t put in all the right ingredients in a story … then it’s going to be funny. 
 
Ineffective measures?  But while measures like talking to numerous sources, 
counting paragraphs, and understanding the basic formula of balanced news writing may 
be effective at guaranteeing that Democrats and Republicans get to air their views in the 
newspaper, they appear to be far less successful at capturing the perspective of dissenting 
opinions coming from outside the mainstream of American politics.  For one thing, when 
reporters say they ensure balance by calling multiple sources, they do not consider the 
fact that most of those sources are either Democrats, Republicans, or officials from other 
institutions affiliated with the two major parties—something that was documented both in 
the content analysis in Chapter Four (see pages 156 to 162) and the results from the long 
interviews discussed in previous sections of this chapter. 
In addition, all eight reporters acknowledged that they or their newspapers usually 
provide third-party gubernatorial candidates with substantially less coverage than they 
give to their counterparts in the Democratic and Republican parties,25 something that did 
not seem to upset the journalists or strike them as problematic in any way, even when 
discussed in the context of journalistic neutrality.  For example, the three reporters from 
Wisconsin all agreed that while 2002 Libertarian gubernatorial hopeful Ed Thompson did 
not receive the same amount of exposure as did his major-party rivals (one reporter said 
he received about 20 percent of the news stories), they nevertheless described the 
                                                 
25 Reporters used words like “minimal,” “not regular,” and “not equal” to describe how often a minor-party 
gubernatorial contender typically appears in their publications.  
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coverage they gave him as “tremendous,” “aggressive,” and far better than average for a 
typical minor-party contender.  This is interesting because it suggests that reporters 
measure coverage of third-party candidates on a different scale so that even when 
outsiders receive fewer paragraphs, column inches, and overall stories than the Democrat 
or Republican, reporters still believe that the coverage is sufficient.26 
 Two-party hegemony.  In the end, though, it does not matter to reporters that the 
measures they take to guarantee objectivity fail to capture alternative viewpoints because 
unconventional perspectives are not a priority.  If the interviews are any indication, 
reporters consciously—and at times unconsciously—accept the hegemony of the two-
party system as a natural part of American politics.  They consider campaigns to be 
primarily two-person affairs, and they rarely think to question the existing power 
structure or their role in maintaining it.  As the comments that follow indicate, part of this 
is simple practicality—reporters do not have the physical ability to cover everyone.  But 
part of their reality is also ideological, as the two-party system has become deeply 
entrenched in the way reporters conceptualize and talk about politics. 
 For example, in discussing his daily routine on the campaign trail, Walters said, 
“It’s a good day when handlers from both candidates are mad at me.”  Yamamura said he 
knows he has done a good job “if we had complaints on both sides.” Talev said that a 
campaign is “a contest between two people,” and Milfred said that while he appreciates 
third parties because they raise issues the Democrats and Republicans are sometimes 
unwilling to talk about, he nevertheless indicated an unconscious acceptance of two-party 
                                                 
26 In a conversation I had with Ed Thompson during my visit to Wisconsin, the former Libertarian 
gubernatorial candidate said he also felt that his news coverage was fair.  
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hegemony when he said that he tries to push candidates to answer questions even in cases 
in which “neither campaign” wants to talk about a particular issue. 
Marinucci used similar language when discussing the relationship between 
Internet bloggers and newspaper journalists.  In explaining that electronic media critics 
sometimes unfairly condemn the press for writing negative stories about candidates a 
particular blogger supports, Marinucci said: 
It isn’t my job to try to destroy a campaign or to build up a campaign.  [It is] simply to 
tell the truth about what’s going on in the campaign or the candidate, and I do that for 
both sides, and we do [equal coverage] on both sides…  I don’t like bloggers who have a 
very specific point of view…  It’s not my job to support one side or the other… 
 
 The use of such language as “both sides” to describe a campaign strongly 
suggests a subliminal two-party mindset on the part of the journalists.  But while 
reporters are sometimes unconscious of how their Democrat-Republican bias infiltrates 
their thinking, the interviews also indicated that reporters are often fully aware that they 
may be helping to sustain the two-party system through their coverage.  Some reporters 
struggled with the idea that they are supporting the status quo, but others indicated that 
they have simply accepted the existing power structure as a natural part of politics.  They 
neither give it much thought, the interviews suggest, nor do they see it as their role to 
question the system’s underlying premises. 
For example, when asked what the two-party system meant to her, Marinucci 
answered this way:  “I think that’s a system that I’m covering right now, so I don’t–I 
mean, I don’t think it’s my job to have any feelings about it…”  Callender made similar 
remarks:  “Well, I think the two-party system is basically the vehicle through which most 
campaigns are run these days.  You know, it’s sort of the existing superstructure for 
campaigns.  I guess that’s the best way to put it.” 
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Talev went into more detail, indicating that it is not necessarily the job of a 
reporter to challenge the existing political structure.  Talev said: 
I mean, we really do have a two-party system, essentially.  And, the system perpetuates 
itself and I guess to some extent, we perpetuate it by covering it that way, but we also 
cover it that way ‘cause that’s the way it is.  And, I guess, it’s a real question which is 
“should newspapers support the status quo” or “should newspapers seek to shake up the 
status quo”?  But, primarily the way elections are covered, newspapers support the 
political status quo.  I don’t mean in terms of incumbents and helping people stay in their 
jobs, but I just mean in terms of newspapers primarily cover the people who 
demonstratively can win and maybe that bolsters their ability to win.  And I think that’s 
something we always have to be careful about and that if there’s a legitimately strong 
independent candidate, we should cover them.  But, I mean, the question, the test 
becomes, at what point do you know that they’re [a third-party candidate] a real 
candidate, that they’re really in the game–they’re a real player. 
 
Barabak indicated that reporters sometimes question whether they are 
perpetuating the existing power elite, but he said that because the United States operates 
as a two-party system, newspapers ultimately make the right decision for their readers 
when they limit their coverage only to those candidates who are likely to win.  Barabak 
said: 
It is really very difficult to decide who you cover and who you don’t because you realize 
you’re part of this self-perpetuating cycle:  They’re not seen as legitimate, so they’re not 
covered.  They’re not covered, so they’re not seen as legitimate.  It’s very very difficult…  
But you have to make that choice.  You just don’t have the time, you don’t have the 
resources…  To my mind, you’re better serving readers if you give them more 
information on the people most likely to win than a little bit about everybody. 
 
 But how do reporters know which candidates are likely to win? 
 Barabak acknowledged that this is “guesswork,” but he said news organizations 
approach this question knowing that America operates in a two-party system in which 
most people will cast their ballot based on party labels.  Barabak said: 
We do know empirically from studies that something like 75 to 80 percent of people are 
going to vote based on party label.  Mickey Mouse can run as a Republican and Donald 
Duck will run as the Democrat, and people are going to vote for them because they’re the 
Democrat and the Republican.  So, because of the structural and built-in biases in our 
electoral system, you can assume that the two major-party candidates are going to have 
the greatest chance of being elected in a standard election…  So you start with that 




 In Wisconsin, the Journal-Sentinel’s Walters seemed to have reservations about 
third parties being ignored by the news media, but like Barabak he said that newspapers 
must eventually bow to the fact that they are covering a two-party system.  In the 
following exchange, Walters says that one reason minor-party candidates may be ignored 
by the press is because other institutions fail to include them in big news events, such as 
debates.  The interview with Walters went like this: 
Walters:  Sometimes the framers of events … [contribute to a third-party candidate 
being ignored] when they don’t let [Libertarian] Ed Thompson attend a debate.  So if my 
editors are counting eleven graphs for [Democrat Jim] Doyle and eleven graphs for 
[Republican Scott] McCallum [in a debate story], and Ed Thompson is on the outside [of 
the debate hall] … giving sound bites—you know, let me in, let me in—… in that 
situation, I’m giving Ed Thompson four paragraphs.  The organizer of the debate—the 
sponsors of the debate—did not invite Ed Thompson.  [I write a] paragraph [saying] that 
the Libertarian candidate Thompson appeared outside the hall and made the following 
points.  But the news was made inside the hall where Doyle and McCallum, you know, 
squared off. 
 
Investigator:  But if you recognize that the system is rigged that way, why—what stops 
you from saying, “All right, I’m going to cover that debate” but…? 
 
Walters:  History.  History...  It’s been, it’s been a debate—it’s been a government of 
D’s and R’s, and so, unfortunately, I’m probably giving into the historical trends that 
we’ve had a two-party system in Wisconsin.  Even though [Robert] LaFollett was a 
progressive—LaFollett a candidate, former governor, former U.S. senator, candidate for 
president.  Wisconsin has had a history of paying serious attention to third party 
candidates, but that history was in hiatus until Ed Thompson came along.  You know, we 
hadn’t done a lot with third parties post LaFollett.  You know, it was a game between D’s 
and R’s largely. 
 
 The acceptance of two-party hegemony is consistent with the data presented in the 
content analysis, which also found a Democrat-Republican worldview embedded right in 
the texts about gubernatorial campaigns.  It is evident from these interviews that the two-
party bias that was so obvious in much of the reporting about the 2002 campaigns is 
something that occurs both unconsciously as well as with the implicit acceptance of the 
reporters.  Journalists sometimes recognize (and even lament) that they are aiding the 
wishes of the major parties, but they go along with it, the interviews suggest, because that 
is simply the way politics works in the United States. 
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Lack resources 
  The interviews suggest that reporters are growing increasingly concerned with 
their job security as well as the declining resources newspapers are willing to spend on 
campaign coverage.  This is a problem, several reporters said, because campaigns are an 
important part of American democracy that should be scrutinized thoroughly so voters 
are clear about the choices before them on Election Day.  Yet the lack of resources 
affects campaign coverage in that it limits the types of stories reporters can do, it lowers 
morale among reporters, and it sometimes forces journalists to reduce the number of 
candidates they can cover.  This section will focus on the latter concern. 
 The impact of money on the journalistic process was described by Talev, who 
said when she covered politics in California she often had to make coverage decisions 
based on her travel budget.  “From the newspaper’s perspective, the challenge is always 
money,” Talev said, adding: 
You want to be on the road with these people as much as possible, but it’s very 
expensive, especially in a big state, especially if they’re on a lot of airplanes and you 
really have to decide, well, what events are they just doing for TV and what events would 
it be useful—would there actually be a reason to go. 
 
 Marinucci was even more blunt in discussing resource issues: 
I think the existence of these kinds of political campaign jobs may not be around too 
much longer.  I’m the only one left now at my paper and most—every major newspaper I 
know is laying off people that do this kind of work. 
 
Marinucci said that a newspaper like the San Francisco Chronicle does not have 
the financial resources to devote extensive coverage to candidates who have little chance 
of winning.  She said her newspaper will usually do a few pieces about a gubernatorial 
candidate from the Green or Libertarian parties just to let voters know they are on the 
ballot, but the organization cannot justify assigning a full-time reporter to cover a third-
party contender exclusively.  Marinucci said: 
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Our coverage of third-party candidates is not regular by any means…  Let’s say [we] 
have, say, a candidate, a Green Party candidate like Peter Camejo [who ran in 2002].  
We’d certainly do a profile to tell people where he stands on issues.  We certainly 
include, you know, cover him on the debates.  We may do here and there some kind of a 
major take-out on him if he’s saying something.  But in terms of regular coverage like we 
cover Democratic and Republican candidates, we just don’t have the staffing to do it … 
 
 Barabak made similar comments, saying that even a newspaper as big and as 
influential as the Los Angeles Times does not have the resources available to cover every 
candidate in a gubernatorial campaign.  As Barabak put it:  “The thing I always come 
back to is a question of triage…  Even the LA Times with all the kings’ horses and all the 
kings’ men cannot devote equal resources to every candidate.” 
 In addition to a lack of monetary funds, Talev said newspapers have limited news 
holes.  With so many stories competing for space each day, she said, editors are forced to 
make decisions based on such factors as what will be the most important information to 
the largest possible audience.  Unless readers express an increased demand for news 
about third-party candidates, she said, journalists have little incentive to devote limited 
space to them.  The one possible bright spot for minor-party candidates, Talev added, 
could be the Internet.  Here is how she put it:   
I think it’s entirely possible that as newspapers or news organizations develop their Web 
sites, that there could be, if there was an interest in it, a section of coverage devoted more 
to third-party candidates where if you want to learn more about the third-party candidates 
there could be a link for you to click on and there could be reporters who would be 
covering, giving extensive coverage either to one third-party candidate or to a collection 
of third-party candidates…  I think there would be interest, but as long as there’s sort of a 
paradigm for a news organization, a print news organization [with] limited space, limited 
news hole, then what you’re going to see is primarily coverage of, in a primary, the 
leading couple of same-party contenders, then in a general election coverage of the 
Democratic nominee and the Republican nominee… I do think the Internet in theory 
changes a lot if not everything… 
 
 The journalists’ comments reported in this section suggest that print newspapers 
have an economic incentive to limit the field of candidates only to those candidates which 
they perceive to generate the most public interest.  However, this finding requires 
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additional research to fully understand.  It may be true, as the comments indicate, that 
news organizations refrain from covering third-party candidates partially because they do 
not have the money or space to do so.  What is less clear from the interviews is exactly 
how these economic coverage decisions are made in the newsroom—or, if you will, the 
boardroom.  In addition, the paradigm that now governs how third-party candidates are 
covered could soon become—if it hasn’t already—an artifact of the old print medium.  
Future research should look at how news organizations use the Internet to cover 
gubernatorial campaigns and whether electronic news coverage of third parties is 
dramatically different from what has traditionally appeared on the printed page. 
Reporter’s criteria 
 According to the interviews with the eight reporters from California and 
Wisconsin, third-party candidates also have trouble getting the press’s attention because 
they cannot meet the five criteria that are particularly salient with political journalists 
when making coverage decisions.  These criteria include the following: (1) is the 
candidate generating strong public interest, either in the polls or at public events, to make 
them a viable contender who can impact the race; (2) is the candidate raising important 
issues that are resonating strongly with the public; (3) does the candidate have strong 
name recognition or public prestige; (4) is the candidate campaigning seriously and 
actually trying to win; and (5) has the candidate raised substantial funds to compete 
effectively.  All eight reporters mentioned at least one of these criteria (and usually more) 
during the interviews. 
To determine the significance of the criteria, reporters were asked to rank the 
importance of each condition.  The investigator then weighed each criterion with a point 
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system based on how often each standard was ranked first, second, third, or fourth by a 
reporter.27  Criterion that were mentioned by only one or two reporters were dropped 
from the sample so that only those that were used by at least three journalists were 
included.  This was done to establish patterns across all eight reporters. Table 5.2 shows 
the order of importance reporters gave to each of the five criteria as well as the number of 
points each condition received. 
Table 5.2:  Reporters’ newsworthiness criteria 
Criterion Points 
Public Interest in the Candidate 23 
Raising Salient Issues 14 
Name Recognition 12 
Campaigning Seriously 11 
Financial Strength 8 
 
 Public interest.  Public interest/viability was the most important of the criteria that 
reporters cited when judging whether a third-party candidate should be covered more 
extensively.  Seven of the eight reporters mentioned this criterion during the interviews, 
with six ranking public interest as either the first or second most important condition to 
determining coverage levels.  This should not be surprising given that reporters tend to 
view campaigns mostly as a contest. 
                                                 
27 A criterion was given 4 points each time a reporter ranked it as his or her most important condition. In 
addition, a criterion received 3 points each time a reporter ranked it as his or her second most important 
condition, 2 points when it was listed third and 1 point when it was ranked fourth. 
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 The reporters measured public interest in four ways: is the candidate receiving 
enough support in public opinion polls to make him or her a viable candidate; how large 
are the candidate’s crowds during public events like speeches and rallies; how much are 
political insiders talking about the third-party candidate; and does the newspaper’s 
readership have an inherent interest in candidates from outside the political mainstream.  
This criterion lends support to both Zaller’s (1999) Rule of Anticipated Importance as 
well as Meyrowitz’s (1995) journalism logic. 
The Union-Tribune’s Marelius ranked viability as his top criterion.  As he put it:  
“The most important criterion in determining how much coverage to give a third-party or 
independent candidate is whether the candidate has a chance to win or affect the outcome 
of the election in some meaningful way.  This is critical.”  Marinucci of the San 
Francisco Chronicle used similar language.  In determining how much coverage to give 
to a third-party candidate, Marinucci said she looks to see if the candidate has some 
“possibility of viability” and “some indication of widespread support.”  In other words, 
she asks whether “the candidate has either the resources or the people to make any kind 
of impact on the race other than completely marginal, other than marginal.”  Walters 
agreed, saying that in determining whether to take a third-party candidate seriously, he 
looks to see if there are “more than three people at the Dodgeville Supper Club when [the 
candidate] speaks;” and Yamamura said, “It helps if they are actually showing up in the 
polls.” 
Reporters in San Francisco and Madison said that readership interest in third-
party candidates is also a factor that their newspapers will consider when determining 
whether to give a minor-party contender coverage in their news pages.  Marinucci, for 
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instance, said her progressive audience in the San Francisco area is particularly interested 
in hearing from Green candidates such as Peter Camejo.  This is an interesting point 
because the content analysis reported in Chapter Four indicated that the San Francisco 
Chronicle did, in fact, provide Camejo with more coverage than did the other three 
California newspapers that were analyzed (see chart on page 184).  The coverage in the 
Chronicle also tended to be more positive, the content analysis showed. 
Callender said the same is true in Madison, home of the University of Wisconsin 
and a town which has long been considered a progressive hub.  In addition, the fact that 
Ralph Nader carried several wards in the city during the 2000 presidential election, 
Callender said, gave his newspaper an incentive to report on third-party candidates during 
the 2002 gubernatorial election.  Callender said: 
I think in general, our newspaper was an outgrowth of the progressive party.  And … 
progressive and third-party politics in Wisconsin … is a fairly significant element of our 
political culture in a way that it may not necessarily be in the fabric of that in other states.  
So, I think that to some extent, in Wisconsin in general, we will give more attention to 
that.  And again, I mean, it gets back to national politics.  There are some wards in 
Madison, for example, where Ralph Nader carried those wards in the 2000 presidential 
cycle.  So there is, I think, an obligation to some extent to at least give a baseline of 
attention to these third-party candidates simply because, particularly in dealing with our 
market, there is strong support in those quarters—strong reader interest. 
 
 This is also consistent with the content analysis, which showed that Wisconsin 
newspapers gave far more coverage to Libertarian Ed Thompson than California 
newspapers gave to Green Peter Camejo (chart on page 184). 
It should be noted here, though, that public interest alone may not be enough to 
spark press interest in a third-party gubernatorial candidate.  The interviews suggest that 
even in cases in which a minor-party contender is receiving unusual support in the polls 
or drawing large crowds at events, reporters will still remain skeptical about the 
candidate’s true impact on the campaign until they have clear evidence to the contrary.  
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In other words, third-party contenders bear a greater burden of proof that they are serious.  
Unlike Democrats and Republicans, public support does not automatically translate into 
press coverage for a Green, Libertarian, or other alternative candidates. 
Barabak of the Los Angeles Times, for example, said that while it is true that 
Camejo’s 2002 Green Party candidacy was the closest thing California has had to a 
serious third-party challenge in years, reporters were never convinced that his support 
was anything other than a negative reaction to the Democratic incumbent, Gray Davis.28  
Moreover, Barabak said that most of Camejo’s support would have evaporated quickly if 
Democrats feared there was a real chance the Republican challenger, Bill Simon, could 
have won the election.  Barabak said: 
My Yogi Berra formulation is … it wouldn’t have been so close if it had been closer.  
And by that I mean, there were a lot of people in the end who said Gray Davis is going to 
win anyway, so I’m going to vote for Peter Camejo…  I think there were a lot of people 
who figured it was a safe vote to vote for Peter Camejo…   
 
Barabak was also skeptical about some reports that voters in 2002 were more 
willing than usual to consider alternative candidates out of anger at the Democrats and 
Republicans.  He added: 
Yes, the level of dissatisfaction was notably higher in 2002 than in other elections, but 
people are always hoping for some sort of alternative and that’s an idealized candidate.  
It’s not Peter Camejo.  It’s not Ross Perot.  It’s not Michael Bloomberg.  It’s this perfect 
candidate who’s going to come in and is going to make everything great and is going to 
be firm and resolute in their beliefs, which are going to jive 100 percent with my 
beliefs…  And, so again, yes, there was an inordinately high level of voter dissatisfaction 
with Gray Davis and with Bill Simon, but you know, there was an opening for an 
idealized candidate but not for a guy like Peter Camejo, who was good in some ways and 
bad in some ways and … [was] like any other human being. 
 
 
                                                 
28 As the content analysis in Chapter Four showed, California newspapers provided little coverage to 2002 
Green Party gubernatorial candidate Peter Camejo—even though he received 5 percent of the vote on 
Election Day, voters expressed unprecedented displeasure with the major-party candidates throughout the 
campaign, and nearly 69 percent of Californians polled said Camejo should be included in the formal 




Salient issues.  Reporters said they are more likely to cover a third-party candidate 
if that person is talking about issues that are resonating strongly with the public.  This 
was the Number 1 criterion mentioned by Callender, Walters, and Barabak. 
Barabak said he sees campaigns as a narrative that includes characters who 
interact with each other.  If one of those candidates is forcing the others to respond to his 
or her ideas and issues, then that candidate deserves coverage regardless of which party 
nominated them.  Put another way, reporters look for candidates who can shape the 
dialogue of the campaign. 
How a candidate articulates these issues is also important.  In Wisconsin, for 
example, Libertarian Ed Thompson won kudos from the political press corps when he 
addressed two issues of major concern in 2002: corruption in state government and public 
fear over rumors that some deer meat was tainted with Chronic Wasting Disease, a 
neurological condition that produces small brain lesions in infected animals.  Walters 
explained how the dynamic worked and why it was so effective at winning Thompson 
substantial exposure in the news media: 
It was the neatest campaign to cover.  I mean, here’s a guy [who says] I want to talk 
about how dirty state government is, so I’m going to go to Madison’s sewage treatment 
plant.  I want to talk about how I don’t think Chronic Wasting Disease, which affects 
white tailed deer, which is an industry in Wisconsin—I’m not a hunter, I don’t eat 
venison, but I’m aware of how ingrained hunting is—so Ed Thompson says: “I’m not 
afraid of Chronic Wasting Disease. I’m going to go to the heart of deer country and eat 
venison.”  And the cameras–you’ve got to love him.  Ed Thompson, if he would have had 
two to three hundred thousand more [dollars] to raise his profile in some of the major 
media markets, he would have done a lot more damage than 11 percent.  He was fun to 
cover.  He was fun to cover. 
 
Name recognition.  Name recognition was also a significant criterion mentioned 
by four of the eight reporters.  Callender, for instance, pointed out that “if Brett Favre 
(the quarterback of the Green Bay Packers) were to suddenly announce tomorrow that 
he’s decided to join the Libertarian Party, I don’t think, you know, even if he had $10 in 
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the fund raising, I don’t think it would make any difference—I think there would be 
coverage of him.” 
 Talev said that while editors usually determined which candidates get covered, the 
first condition she mentioned was whether the candidate had statewide or national name 
recognition.  As Talev put it: 
Let’s say that [New York City Mayor] Michael Bloomberg runs for president, right.  He 
was a Democrat, he’s mayor as a Republican, now he’s an independent.  He’s worth a 
gazillion billion dollars.  Okay, if he runs, people are gonna cover him.  At least they’ll 
cover him for a while until he flames out or presents himself as a real candidate…  But if 
statewide polls show they’re registering two or three percent, how many times do you 
have to go out on the road with them if that number doesn’t change? 
 
 Wisconsin reporters pointed out that name recognition was a major reason that 
Thompson received substantial coverage for a third-party candidate during the 2002 
gubernatorial campaign in Wisconsin.  This is how Callender of the Capital Times 
explained it: 
Ed Thompson … had the same last name as the longest serving governor in Wisconsin 
history—the guy that ran up the highest margins ever and who had left the office a year 
before [Republican Gov. Tommy Thompson, Ed’s brother].  So, I mean, that in and of 
itself made Ed an extraordinary candidate. 
 
 Campaigning seriously.  Reporters said they pay close attention to the level of a 
third-party candidate’s engagement.  In other words, is the candidate really trying to win 
or is he or she just taking up space on the ballot?  There are several ways reporters 
measure this.  First, reporters look closely at the candidate’s organization to determine if 
it is a well-oiled machine with volunteers and a headquarters or just the candidate and his 
brother; second, they look to see if the candidate is trying to facilitate coverage by 
sending reporters e-mail, press releases, and other communications announcing policy 
positions and dates for campaign events; and third, they look to see if the candidate is 
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doing such things as updating his or her Web site and going out on the campaign trail day 
after day. 
 Milfred said that this type of public engagement is perhaps the biggest factor that 
he uses to determine whether the candidate should receive significant coverage, adding 
that Thompson’s Libertarian candidacy displayed a high level of energy that showed he 
was truly trying to win the statehouse. 
Number one is: Are they running a credible campaign?  You know, in this day and age, if 
you can’t send out an e-mail to a reporter that says you’re even running, that says you’re 
going to have an event, then forget it, especially for a major race…  And it’s pretty clear 
when you look at most third-party candidates that they know they can’t win, they are not 
going to put their life on hold for this campaign, they’re doing it because their third party 
needed somebody to run… 
  
 Other reporters made similar comments.  Yamamura said he looks at a 
candidate’s “level of engagement,” adding that candidates are more likely to get covered 
if “they’re trying actively to get their message out on a daily basis, and if that proves 
effective.”  Marelius said he asks himself whether a candidate has “the wherewithal to 
conduct a credible campaign and get a message out to voters;” and Walters said he looks 
for third-party candidates who attempt to “facilitate coverage” by “letting you know 
where the candidate’s going to be,” adding that one reason many third-party efforts fail to 
get news coverage is because they do not alert reporters about their events. 
 Financial strength.  Finally, how much money a candidate has raised is another 
factor that reporters use to determine whether a third-party contender is serious enough to 
warrant significant coverage in the news media.  However, this criterion seems to have 
uncovered a slight difference between the reporters in California and Wisconsin, 
suggesting that different criteria might emerge in different states.  All five reporters from 
California mentioned fundraising as a criteria without being probed by the investigator.  
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Although each of the California reporters gave different levels of importance to a 
candidate’s financial strength, they all nevertheless thought it was important enough to 
bring up on their own.  Not one of the three Wisconsin reporters discussed a candidate’s 
level of financial support until they were specifically asked about it by the investigator—
and in two of the three cases, the Wisconsin journalists indicated that while they do not 
ignore financing completely when determining who to cover, they do not give it much 
credence because they consider it a fairly weak indication of a candidate’s overall 
support. 
For example, Callender of The Capital Times said that Thompson’s 2002 race 
shows that a candidate with significantly fewer resources than his major-party rivals 
could still compete effectively in Wisconsin.  When asked whether a candidate’s 
financing should be considered as a criterion for determining coverage, Callender said: 
Yeah, to some extent.  I think there has to be at least a sort of a baseline in order for them 
to be able to get—to be able to generate a certain degree of name recognition.  But again, 
you don’t have to have a lot of money as Ed showed in order to get the name—the name 
ID.  It has to be more of either, you know, either personality or the issue. 
  
 This view was seconded by Milfred of the Wisconsin State Journal, who said:  
“We would look at fundraising, but I mean, I wouldn’t say, ‘He hasn’t raised enough 
money for me to cover him.’  I mean, that’s kind of offensive and dumb.” 
 Part of the difference here may rest with the importance of money in each race.  
California has three large media markets in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and San Diego 
that require substantial resources to buy television advertising.  Wisconsin is a smaller 
state with only one comparable market in Milwaukee.  Travel costs are also higher in 
California.  In this sense, then, money may be a bigger fact of life in California politics 
than it is in Wisconsin. 
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Discussion 
 The data presented here suggests that there are practical and ideological reasons to 
explain why third-party candidates receive news coverage that is substantially different 
from that given to Democrats and Republicans.  From a practical standpoint, reporters 
must deal with the reality of limited resources, a busy electorate, and a political structure 
that makes it difficult for even the most serious minor-party contender to compete 
effectively for elected office.  In addition, the interviews suggest that reporters are 
particularly skeptical of third-party aspirants and do not want to be drawn into covering 
candidates who are not taking the campaign seriously. 
 But there also appear to be ideological reasons to explain the coverage 
differences.  Reporters clearly see campaigns mostly as a contest in which third-party 
candidates are inherently less newsworthy because they usually have little impact on the 
race.  Moreover, the interviews strongly suggest that reporters have a deep-seated bias in 
favor of the two-party system.  They view two-person campaigns as normal and 
multicandidate races as odd; and they accept the Democrats and Republicans as the 
natural holders of political power in America. 
 The long interviews also provide lessons for both third-party candidates and 
political journalists.  For those who would run against “the system” via the Green, 
Libertarian, or other minor-party ticket, the criteria discussed by newspaper reporters 
provide alternative candidates with a road map for how they might traverse the 
challenging media landscape before them and work their way onto the news agenda.  
 As for journalism, these results should make reporters pause and take stock.  It is 
true that the reporters who participated in this study made several excellent points that 
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indicate the practical necessity of news organizations to use their resources wisely and 
provide information that will be useful to their readers.  But the interviews also revealed 
some inherent biases that raise questions about the concept of objectivity and strongly 
suggest that reporters have allowed themselves to be co-opted by those in power to 
protect their hold on government.  Political journalists should consider this lesson and ask 
themselves whether they are really serving democracy when they consistently ignore 
certain voices or frame them in ways that make them less salient or serious with the 
electorate. 
That said, it is not my intention to judge whether political journalists are doing the 
right or wrong thing in how they cover gubernatorial campaigns.  Rather my hope is to 
draw attention to some of the factors that may contribute to the process reporters follow 
on the campaign trail so as to open a broader debate in journalism circles about the 
manner in which elections are viewed.  Is it true, for instance, that readers are better 
served by receiving substantial information about a small group of candidates rather than 
minimal information about many more contenders?  Or is the electorate hurt when certain 
perspectives on a matter of public importance are not heard because they are not being 
voiced by those in power?  Will the Internet change the way third-party candidates are 
covered by the mainstream media?  If so, how? 
These are difficult questions to answer.  One thing seems certain in the short-run, 
though.  If we can use these interviews as a gauge, third-party gubernatorial candidates 






Chapter 6: Conclusions 
It is no secret that third-party presidential candidates are often ignored by the 
news media (Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus 1984; Sifry 2003; Stempel 1969; Stempel 
and Windhauser 1984; Stovall 1985; Zaller and Hunt 1994; Zaller 1999)—and this study 
shows that the same is true at the gubernatorial level.  But the main purpose of this 
project was not to assess story volume but rather to examine how minor-party candidates 
are covered by the news media when they do receive coverage.  In essence, this 
dissertation’s primary question is:  What is the nature of press coverage of third-party 
gubernatorial candidates and how is it similar to and different from the treatment of 
Democrats and Republicans? 
The content analysis in Chapter Four shows that newspaper coverage of Greens 
and Libertarians is significantly different from the text about the major parties.  Third-
party candidates are featured less prominently in headlines, lead paragraphs, and entire 
stories than are Democrats and Republicans; sources from within minor parties are 
quoted much less frequently than are officials from the major parties; the news frames 
adopted by the news media often come from a two-party perspective; and third-party 
candidates are often separated from their major-party rivals—both in terms of their 
physical location on the printed news page as well as from the public policy debate that 
makes up the campaign. 
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The data analysis also found that reporters use different language when conveying 
messages about the roles minor- and major-party aspirants play in an election campaign.  
For example, Democrats and Republicans who are lagging in the polls are called 
“underdogs,” but third-party candidates are called “spoilers” or “long shots.”  In addition, 
when third-party candidates do well in the polls, reporters question why and look for 
explanations from within a two-party paradigm.  More often than not, the news media 
conclude that citizens voted for a Green or Libertarian only to express anger at the 
Democrats and Republicans.  Such explanations are reported as fact, even in cases in 
which there is no supporting evidence to corroborate it.  Left unexplored is whether the 
third-party candidates themselves had a natural constituency or whether they had raised 
issues that resonated with the public. 
Given these results, the content analysis and supporting qualitative observations 
show that reporters are heavily influenced by the two-party system—a system they see as 
“the natural way of things.”  Rarely in the newspaper coverage that was analyzed in 
Chapter Four did news accounts in California, Oregon, and Wisconsin even think to 
question the dominance of the Democrats and Republicans.  It was simply taken for 
granted.  This was particularly surprising in Wisconsin, which has a history of 
progressive third-party politics in Robert LaFollett and others.  In many ways, the 
newspapers in these states (but particularly those in California and Oregon) treated third-
party candidates as abnormal phenomenon that disrupted rather than legitimately 
challenged “the system.”  In short, the hegemony of the Democrats and Republicans was 
imbedded directly in the text of news stories through the language, news frames, sources, 
and story structures used by reporters to represent the reality of the campaign.  Looking at 
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how gubernatorial elections were covered, it is clear that reporters have been co-opted by 
the major parties, thus becoming one more factor that helps Democrats and Republicans 
maintain their control over American politics. 
Such reporting practices carry serious ramifications for the American political 
process and journalism as a profession.  For one, the news media’s tendency to protect 
the status quo acts to stifle political discussion by making it impossible for anyone with 
viewpoints perceived to be “unconventional” from infusing their opinion into the 
campaign.  The press essentially becomes a barrier to political discourse rather than an 
institution that encourages free flowing debate.  As long as reporters ignore or ridicule 
those who challenge the two major parties, Democrats and Republicans will feel little 
pressure to engage the body politic in a serious dialogue about the important issues that 
face American society—particularly sensitive issues that threaten to divide key 
constituencies such as moderates or their base supporters on the left and right.  In such an 
environment, civil society is denied the ability to have an honest and comprehensive 
discussion about the issues. 
In addition, research presented in Chapters Four and Five suggests that citizens 
who are looking for fresh perspectives and alternatives to established political 
organizations are marginalized and alienated from the political process.  Rather than 
acting as an independent force that challenges the dominant narratives constructed by the 
political establishment, reporters go along with elites and are complicit in creating 
political storylines that automatically push aside viewpoints that attempt to challenge 
fundamental assumptions about the American political order.  In this sense, the news 
media is just one more cog in the nation’s political power structure, and the notion that 
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journalism is suppose to comfort the afflicted and afflict the comfortable is turned on its 
head.   
The exception to this hegemonic coverage was found in the Maine press.  It is 
here that further research is warranted to determine whether the equal coverage afforded 
to third-party candidates in Maine newspapers can truly be attributed to the historical and 
legal reasons cited in the content analysis—namely that Maine may be more sympathetic 
to minor parties because (1) it has elected several independent governors throughout its 
recent history and (2) the state has a generous public financing law that provides hefty 
sums of money to third-party contenders who can demonstrate substantial support from 
the electorate.  Future studies should take a broader look at how the Maine news media 
cover third-party candidates at various levels with an eye toward examining whether all 
minor-party candidates are treated equally or whether some are provided more coverage 
than others.  In addition, future studies should examine the exposure third-party 
candidates receive in the Maine press across elections to see whether the 2002 
gubernatorial contest was an aberration or a typical way that the press there approaches 
campaigns.  Finally, reporters in Maine should be interviewed to determine whether they 
view campaigns differently than reporters in other states and whether they use different 
criteria for deciding which candidates to cover. 
In any event, one thing seems perfectly clear:  From the perspective of third 
parties, Maine newspapers did it right in 2002.  News reports in the Portland Press 
Herald, Bangor Daily News, and Kennebec Journal generally treated Green Party 
candidate Jonathan Carter as an equal of the Democrat and Republican.  While these 
newspapers frequently reported poll numbers showing Carter far behind his major-party 
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rivals, they rarely handicapped the race by labeling the Green’s chances as next to 
nothing.  They simply let the numbers speak for themselves.  In addition, the Maine 
newspapers integrated all four gubernatorial candidates into the text so that minor-party 
contenders were not physically separated from the Democrats and Republicans;29 and all 
three newspapers provided in-depth coverage of each candidate’s issue positions.  
Finally, news reports in Maine refrained from using language that sidelined third-party 
aspirants.  For example, when referring to the gubernatorial contenders, the newspapers 
in Portland, Bangor, and Augusta typically used language such as “Maine’s four 
gubernatorial candidates.” By contrast, newspapers in the three other states tended to 
refer to third-party aspirants as “other” or “alternative” politicians while Democrats and 
Republicans were labeled as “both candidates” or sometimes “all of the candidates.”  In 
short, the press in Maine did what journalism is suppose to do: reporters presented the 
facts without loaded terms such as “long shot” and “spoiler,” thus allowing the voters to 
decide which candidate was best. 
The 2002 campaign coverage in Maine provides a road map for how third-party 
gubernatorial candidates can be covered by the press, thus undermining reporters’ 
arguments that a lack of resources makes it impossible for news organizations to write 
about every candidate in a race.  The press in Maine faces many of the same challenges 
as newspapers in other states, yet somehow the newspapers there found the money, staff, 
and news space needed to paint a more complete picture of the election campaign. 
In addition to the type of coverage third parties receive in the news media, this 
dissertation builds on the research of Meyrowitz (1995) by asking whether a difference 
                                                 
29 In addition to Green candidate Jonathan Carter, state Rep. John Michael ran for governor as an 
independent in 2002. He was not part of the content analysis coding in this study. 
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exists between how national and regional newspapers cover minor-party gubernatorial 
hopefuls.  As the research reported in Chapter Four shows, the short answer is a qualified 
yes. 
Like Meyrowitz—whose study of the 1992 Democratic presidential primary in 
New Hampshire concluded that national reporters operate under a campaign logic that 
seeks to narrow the field of candidates to be covered while regional journalists tend to be 
slightly more sympathetic to unconventional politicians—this study found that (1) 
regional newspapers gave significantly more coverage to minor parties then did national 
newspapers and (2) local reporters were less likely than national journalists to label and 
ridicule third parties.  However, the findings here must be qualified because the sample of 
national press reports was small, with only six stories out of 132 mentioning third-party 
candidates.  On the one hand, this dearth of coverage in the national press suggests that 
journalists at large newspapers such as the New York Times and USA Today see little 
value in writing about candidates who they do not believe can win, thus lending support 
to Meyrowitz’s theory of a national journalistic logic.  On the other hand, the sample of 
actual stories was too small to definitively draw any general conclusions about the nature 
of national coverage of third-party candidates—at least at the gubernatorial level. 
Part of the reason that national newspapers may have devoted so little coverage to 
these gubernatorial campaigns is that three of the four states in this study (Oregon, 
Wisconsin, and Maine) are relatively small states that do not normally generate much 
national attention.  To better assess the differences between actual coverage of third-party 
gubernatorial candidates in the national and regional press, a future study should choose a 
statewide campaign involving a third-party contender with strong enough name 
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recognition that he or she would naturally attract a good amount of national 
consideration.  A campaign that comes readily to mind is Jesse Ventura’s successful 1998 
campaign for governor in Minnesota.  Examining a campaign such as this might provide 
a better understanding of the differences that exist between regional newspapers and the 
national press. 
This dissertation also asked how political journalists view their role during an 
election campaign and what obligations, if any, they felt toward the larger community.  
According to the long interviews reported in Chapter Five, journalists envision their role 
as that of informer or educator.  In other words, the reporters said that they have a strong 
obligation to their readership to synthesize the events of the campaign and provide in-
depth information about the candidates so that citizens can make educated decisions at 
the ballot box.  Reporters acknowledged Lippmann’s (1922) assertion that they are the 
primary way in which most citizens will learn about the candidates for elective office, 
and their comments reflected the seriousness with which they take this responsibility.  
However, as will be discussed later in this chapter, reporters view this role exclusively 
from a two-party perspective, thus limiting their ability to broaden public discourse 
beyond the confines established by the Democrats and Republicans. 
The long interviews provide support to Zaller (1999) and Meyrowitz’s (1995) 
contention that reporters cover candidates based on such factors as public support, 
fundraising ability, and backing from party elite.  In addition to citing campaign officials, 
political strategists, and senior party leaders as valuable sources of political information, 
the reporters who were interviewed identified five candidate newsworthiness criteria that 
they use to judge whether a political contender for governor should receive substantial 
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coverage in the press.  In order of importance, reporters said a gubernatorial candidate is 
more likely to get on the news media’s agenda when he or she (1) demonstrates a high 
degree of public support, both in opinion surveys and campaign events; (2) shows that his 
or her issues resonate strongly with the voters; (3) has public prestige and name 
recognition; (4) is running a serious campaign; and (5) has raised enough money to be 
competitive in the general election. 
These criteria are a significant finding of this study for two reasons.  First, they 
serve as guideposts to third-party political candidates who are truly trying to win public 
office, telling them what they need to do to have a chance of being taken seriously by the 
news media.  More importantly, though, the five criteria shine a light on how reporters 
think about politics and demonstrate how journalists have been socialized and trained to 
view campaigns from a perspective that helps the Democrats and Republicans maintain 
their hold on power.  The five candidate newsworthiness criteria are more than just 
practical standards to make a journalist’s job more manageable—they point to the 
reporter’s mindset and reveal the ideological underpinnings reflective of the dominant 
Democrat-Republican paradigm so accepted by the press.  In this way, journalists are 
both unconsciously and reflexively in collusion with the two major parties, establishing a 
set of standards for newsworthiness that play directly to the strengths of established 
elites. 
Under the first three criteria, for example, reporters are essentially saying that 
they will only commit resources to political aspirants who are already known and 
supported by the public.  Not only do these criteria give Democrats and Republicans a 
clear advantage over Greens and Libertarians—who are less likely to have strong public 
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support in the early stages of an election campaign because most voters will not have 
heard of them or their policy proposals—they create a chicken-and-egg dilemma: third-
party candidates are not covered by the news media because they have little public 
support and name recognition, but they cannot generate public support and name 
recognition because they are not covered by the news media.  What such criteria fail to 
consider is the possibility that a candidate may gain support and influence the debate if 
only given the chance to consistently air his or her views in the press.  These three criteria 
also play to the strengths of Democrats and Republicans, who have had ample 
opportunity to build support and name recognition in their capacity as state legislators, 
attorneys general, or other public officeholders well before they enter a major campaign 
such as that for governor. 
In addition, the news media’s tendency to look at fund raising ability as an 
indication of a candidate’s seriousness also helps the well-financed Democratic and 
Republican parties keep the Greens and Libertarians at bay.  This criterion acts to both 
exclude poorly financed third-party aspirants—thus making it even more difficult for 
them to raise money—and creates a system under which wealthy donors establish the set 
of candidates who are then presented to the voters by the news media as legitimate 
contenders for public office.  Since these contributors to political campaigns are unlikely 
to give money to candidates who challenge their social and economic status, third-party 
candidates and other voices from the fringe will remain financially weak and thus viewed 
by reporters as less legitimate.  Put another way, rather than challenging the dominant 
political narrative that is constructed by those who finance the American electoral 
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process, reporters look to those with financial muscle to tell the news media which 
narrative to write. 
Still, editorial choices must be made.  Reporters need some standards with which 
to judge candidates.  As the long interviews indicate, there is no question that journalists 
should assess the seriousness with which each candidate is campaigning and exclude 
from coverage those who are simply putting their name on the ballot but doing little else 
to organize.  However, if reporters truly see themselves as informers who educate the 
public about the candidates and policy choices before them, then the news media should 
place less emphasis on things such as poll results, name recognition, and fundraising 
ability, and look to criteria designed more to foster debate and give qualified but 
otherwise lesser known candidates a chance to win over voters.  I would recommend 
three standards for determining which candidates are covered. 
First, reporters should consider providing substantial coverage to any candidate 
who outlines a detailed plan for tackling major social, economic, and political problems, 
whether those ideas are resonating with the public in the early stages of a campaign or 
not.  As part of this analysis, journalists should examine the specifics behind the plan as 
well as any previous experience the candidate may have in implementing such proposals.  
Rather than determining seriousness by looking at opinion surveys and campaign finance 
forms, reporters should examine the thoughtfulness behind each candidate’s ideas and 
worldview to determine which political hopefuls are substantive and reflective and which 
ones are shallow and reactionary.  Reporters should then commit to covering these 
“serious” candidates thoroughly for several weeks or months so that the public has a 
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chance to hear their ideas.  If, after a period of time, certain candidates still fail to register 
in the polls, reporters might then consider dropping them from the regular coverage. 
Second, reporters should place more emphasis on a candidate’s professional and 
personal background to determine whether his or her previous experiences match that of 
the office being sought.  In addition to looking at a candidate’s past positions in elective 
government, though, journalists should consider a candidate’s background in the private 
sector as well as the nonprofit world, volunteer work, and other community service.  Just 
as a potential employer checks with the references of a job applicant, reporters should 
conduct their own background checks on political aspirants by talking to the candidates’ 
coworkers, former supervisors, and other associates to determine what kind of skills the 
political hopeful might bring to elective office and whether their previous experience 
makes them qualified for public service. 
Finally, rather than using public opinion surveys to determine coverage decisions, 
reporters should use public interest polls.  In other words, news organizations should ask 
their audiences which candidates the voters are interested in learning about and then 
devote more resources to those contenders who score the highest numbers.  This would 
give more control to readers and voters and reduce the influence of party insiders and 
campaign contributors.  Such a criterion might help a candidate like Peter Camejo of 
California, who consistently registered low numbers in public opinion polls during the 
2002 gubernatorial election even as voters said they were interested in hearing more 
about his policy positions.  The press must move away from the notion that the only 
candidates worth covering are those who can win.  By focusing on candidates that the 
public is interested in, reporters could provide third-party contenders a chance to win 
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public backing and influence the larger political debate while also giving the electorate 
exposure to a wider range of ideas.  In short, journalists should view campaigns as a 
chance to break from the conventional Democrat-Republican way of covering public 
policy and broaden the dialogue beyond the tiny confines of mainstream thought.  
In addition to identifying the journalists’ criteria for determining candidate 
coverage, this study found strong support at the gubernatorial level for Zaller’s (1999) 
Rule of Anticipated Importance, which suggests that reporters—faced with limited time 
and resources—narrow the field of candidates to be covered by focusing most of their 
attention on politicians who they anticipate will have importance in the future.  Zaller 
used this theory to explain why third-party presidential candidates as well as second-tier 
major-party contenders receive far less coverage than Democrats and Republicans who 
are perceived to be frontrunners.  In the research reported in this dissertation, it was clear 
that a similar dynamic is also at work with reporters covering statewide politics.  As the 
long interviews suggest, reporters view campaigns mostly as a contest between different 
political camps, and they devote their resources mostly to those candidates who are likely 
to win.  In addition, the political journalists who were interviewed echoed the points 
Zaller made in his 1999 study when they said (1) most voters do not have the time or 
inclination to know about every candidate on the ballot and look to reporters to tell them 
which ones are worthy of their attention, and (2) even news organizations as large as the 
Los Angeles Times simply do not have the resources to cover every candidate in a race.  
In many ways, the five criteria identified in this study (public support, issue salience, 
name recognition, campaign seriousness, and financial strength) are specifically designed 
to help journalists anticipate which gubernatorial candidates are likely to have the most 
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importance in the future.  Why else gauge public support and fundraising ability if not to 
predict which candidates are likely to be competitive on Election Day? 
Having said that, though, there is also evidence from the interviews that reporters 
have been socialized and trained to accept the two-party system as the natural way of 
things—a finding that is consistent with the results of the content analysis.  While 
reporters believe that their main responsibility is to educate and inform the public, they 
tend to define this role from a two-party perspective.  From the sources reporters turn to 
for information to the language they use to describe campaigns, it is evident that political 
journalists both consciously and at times unconsciously accept the hegemony of the 
Democrats and Republicans.  Although some of the reporters seemed to struggle with this 
and questioned whether they should take a more active role in challenging the status quo, 
in most cases the journalists were unapologetic about any contribution they may make to 
boosting the two-party system.  In the comments that were gleaned from the long 
interviews, the reporters indicated that they either give little thought to how third-party 
candidates are treated or they stated flatly that politicians from smaller political 
organizations do not deserve equal coverage with Democrats and Republicans because 
they represent small constituencies.  In this sense, reporters do not value the contribution 
that third-party candidates might make to the public policy debate because they were not 
perceived to be true contenders in the contest. 
The data also strongly suggest that journalists construct a certain campaign 
narrative that may not always comport with reality.  Campaigns, for instance, are not only 
about the contest, yet this is the one aspect of an election that dominates the news 
coverage.  In addition, the gubernatorial campaigns that were analyzed in this dissertation 
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included third-party candidates who actively engaged the electorate and campaigned 
aggressively—if not to win, then to try to influence the public agenda.  In all cases but 
Maine, those minor-party hopefuls were nearly invisible from the news pages or framed 
as hopeless outsiders who should not be taken seriously because of lagging poll numbers.  
This kind of reporting represents a constructed reality that reflects one aspect of the 
campaign—the contest—over all other potential truths.  It also hurts democracy by 
reducing debate and possibly alienating segments of the populations not associated with 
the major parties. 
As a research methodology, the interviews nicely complemented the content 
analysis by explicating the process reporters follow when covering gubernatorial 
elections that involve minor-party hopefuls.  While the content analysis was able to show 
how the coverage between Greens and Libertarians differed from that provided to 
Democrats and Republicans, the long interviews explained why that coverage was 
different.  One contribution of this research, then, is to show how the mixing of 
qualitative and quantitative methods can add a depth to results that would otherwise be 
missing if only one methodology had been used. 
At the very least, these findings should place a new burden on journalism 
educators to recognize that the current state of campaign coverage represents a problem 
for American discourse that needs to be addressed in the classroom.  It is vital that the 
next generation of political reporters be taught to think more critically about the 
fundamental assumptions of American politics and to continuously ask themselves “how 
do I know what I know.”  Whether they are taking a news writing, communication 
theory, or journalism history course, students must learn to challenge the dominant 
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narrative of American politics—to hold conventional wisdom under a microscope and 
question who benefits most from the current system.  It is no longer enough for reporters 
to simply accept the two-party framework as a natural part of the American system—they 
must ask themselves why the Democrats and Republicans dominate and what role the 
press plays in perpetuating that system.  Perhaps most importantly, reporters need to 
understand that certain political narratives become so ingrained in their psyche that they 
do not even think to question them.  It is the job of the journalist to recognize these 
biases, break free from the parameters established by those in power, and move America 
toward a more truly democratic discussion that encompasses as many perspectives as 
possible. 
Limitations to the study 
 One limitation to this study is the fact that no reporters from Maine were 
interviewed to explain why the coverage of third-party candidates in the Pine Tree State 
was so different from that of California, Wisconsin, and Oregon.  The main reason for 
this was that Maine political reporters were not immediately available to conduct 
interviews during that phase of this project in the summer of 2007.  For example, one 
reporter declined to participate, and two others indicated that while they were interested 
in sitting down with the investigator for a one-on-one interview, their schedules and mine 
made it difficult to coordinate such a meeting.  It is my hope to add to this research later 
by including the Maine reporters in this analysis. 
 In addition, there are limitations to the long-interview format that should be 
recognized.  First, although there is no reason to believe that any of the reporters who 
were interviewed for this project intentionally misled the investigator, there is always the 
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possibility that subjects may exaggerate certain facts or alter their attitudes to fit with 
what they may believe to be the goals of the investigator.  Because there was no 
component of this study that called on the investigator to observe reporters on the job, 
there is no way this study can compare what was said during the interviews with how 
reporters actually performed their work.  I overcame this limitation by asking extensive 
follow-up questions to test the reporters’ portrayal of their attitudes and to challenge them 
on any inconsistencies.  I have no reason to believe that the reporters were anything but 
honest and forthcoming in their responses. 
Second, some might argue that while news is produced by a team that includes the 
reporters, assignment editors, and publishers, this study fall short because it includes only 
the attitudes and insights of the reporters.  I compensated for this potential problem by 
questioning reporters about their level of independence at their news organizations.  In 
addition, reporters are a vital element in deciding what is news.  They are the ones on the 
front lines of a campaign, and most of the reporters indicated during the interviews that 
they have a tremendous amount of autonomy and exert significant influence over which 
stories are eventually covered.  Moreover, while editors can decide, among other things, 
where a story appears in the newspaper, the size of the headline, and whether a 
photograph will be published along side it, they frequently turn to reporters for advice on 
what is news given that it is the reporter who has the most contact with the “outside 
world.”  In this light, the insights provided by the interviews here offer a comprehensive 
picture of the news gathering process and tap the knowledge of the one group of 
journalists who have a tremendous influence over the final news product: the reporter. 
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Third, although the reporters spoke easily about the 2002 gubernatorial campaign 
as if it had recently occurred, it is possible that reporters may have faulty memories or 
inaccurate notions of their own ability, leading them to unintentionally under- or 
overstate how they actually covered the campaign.  Again, I took this into account by 
asking numerous follow-up questions to check for any inconsistencies in reporters’ 
answers. 
Finally, there is always the possibility that the presence of an investigator may 
“create as well as measure attitudes” (Webb et al. 1966, 1).  Denzin (1978) points out that 
“the presence of an observer is a potentially reactive factor, since the observer may 
produce changes in behavior that diminish the validity of comparisons” (257).  This 
potential problem was overcome by taking a nonjudgmental posture, allowing the subject 
to speak freely, and trying to understand the subject’s views from his or her perspective.  
In-depth follow-up questions were also asked throughout the interview to measure 
consistency in responses.  There was no indication from the interviews that any of the 
reporters were uncomfortable or trying to give the investigator what they believed he 
wanted. 
Future research  
 In addition to the suggestions made earlier, there are several other possible 
research projects that could shed additional light on the intersection of third-party politics 
and the press, both today and in the past.  First, future research should compare the 
difference between mainstream and alternative media in the coverage of third-party or 
fringe candidates and ideas.  Such a study might indicate that America has a marketplace 
of ideas after all.  Although the mainstream media may not report on third-party 
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candidates, it may be that third party ideas make it into the public debate through other 
means, such as alternative newspapers and broadcast programs such as Pacifica Radio’s 
Democracy Now.  Along these lines, it would be interesting to analyze online media, 
specifically blogs and other electronic news sources, to determine how they perceive 
third-party aspirants.  Do they challenge the mainstream media or follow it? 
Second, a future research project should compare the difference in third-party 
coverage between the American and European press.  Such a project might shed light on 
the role that a country’s election system plays in influencing which candidates and ideas 
are reflected in the news media. 
 Third, the long interview format that was used in this study could be expanded to 
a case study of a gubernatorial campaign involving a strong third-party candidate in 
which the investigator covers the campaign in real time over several months.  Such a 
study could focus on the third-party candidate as he or she campaigns around a state so 
that the investigator can witness first hand how seriously the politician is taking the race 
as well as the reception he or she is receiving.  Such a study could include extensive and 
multiple interviews with the candidates, political reporters, and editors.  Because such a 
study would have great immediacy, it would provide valuable insight into how news 
organizations actually make coverage decisions at the moment in which those decisions 
are actually being made. 
 Fourth, it might be valuable to determine whether different ownership structures 
affect the type of candidates and ideas that get into the news. For example, one might 
compare the St. Petersburg Times, which is owned by the not-for-profit Poynter Institute 
for Media Studies, and the Tampa Tribune, a commercial enterprise, to see how they each 
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cover campaigns generally as well as those involving third-party candidates.  Would a 
newspaper like the St. Petersburg Times, which has less pressure from profit-driven 
corporate executives, approach a third-party candidate differently than a news 
organization using a traditional business model? 
 Finally, it is imperative to determine whether news coverage of third-party 
candidates somehow affects the actual vote totals these candidates receive on Election 
Day.  Future research should employ an experimental design to see how different groups 
of voters respond to news stories about minor-party candidates, with one group reading a 
news report in which a Green or Libertarian hopeful is portrayed as a spoiler or long shot 
while another group reads a story in which the candidate is painted as a serious 
contender.  A major question to explore is whether voters decide not to vote for a third-
party candidate because of the messages they receive in the news media. 
Closing comments 
This study has its genesis in the 1987 mayoral campaign in the small town of 
Wallingford, Connecticut—a race I covered as a young political reporter for the Meriden 
Record-Journal newspaper, circulation 33,000.  The four-man race included the one-term 
Republican incumbent, his Democratic challenger, a former Democratic mayor who was 
running as an independent, and a retired Portuguese immigrant named Pasquale Melillo 
who ran a one-man operation from his small house against what he called the corruption 
of the two-party system. 
From the beginning of that campaign, I made an editorial judgment that Melillo 
had little to no chance of winning.  There was no doubt that he was dedicated—he had 
spent several weeks during the hot summer months going door-to-door to get enough 
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voter signatures on his petition to get his name onto the ballot—but from his unshaven 
face to his ragged clothes and odor-filled home, Melillo did not come across as the 
typical candidate who was likely to generate significant interest from this central 
Connecticut community.  Moreover, he was running against three strong candidates who 
were all well known in town and well financed. 
With this in mind, I devoted most of my coverage to the three “major” candidates, 
either ignoring Melillo altogether or providing him with one or two paragraphs, usually at 
the end of my article.  The decision was simple for me: With only 12 to 15 column inches 
in which to tell my story, I could not justify significant coverage to a man who had no 
serious campaign operation and was, by all accounts, the quintessential small-town 
gadfly with little popular support. 
Yet something bothered me about this.  Was I acting to promote debate or shut it 
down?  What right did I have as a journalist to decide which candidates would have 
access to the news pages?  And what impact did my coverage have on the race?  Was 
Melillo receiving little coverage because he had no chance of winning, or did the 
independent mayoral candidate have no chance to win because he received little 
coverage?  The questions nagged at me throughout the fall campaign, and they were 
intensified by Melillo’s frequent telephone calls to me to complain about his lack of 
coverage—phone calls that could last 20 to 30 minutes and at times become fairly 
philosophical. 
Melillo lost, of course, finishing fourth in an election that saw the incumbent 
mayor win re-election by a mere 33 votes.  But the 1987 campaign has always stuck with 
me, and over the years I have observed the coverage of third-party candidates from afar.  
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At first, I was fairly sympathetic to the decisions that political reporters made when they 
decided to give minimal exposure to Greens, Libertarians, or other minor-party hopefuls, 
figuring they were facing the same choices I did when I covered the Wallingford election 
20 years ago.  But as time went by, I began to see this differently. 
Today, I believe that American democracy is in crisis—not because our 
institutions are about to crumble or that we are on the verge of succumbing to 
dictatorship, although some activists have made that argument (Wolfe 2007), but because 
the country lacks a healthy discourse that allows many voices to be heard in the so-called 
marketplace of ideas.  There are many reasons for this, of course.  But the one that 
interests me most is the role played by the news media, the one institution perhaps best 
positioned to foster debate and engage the larger body politic in a wide-ranging discourse 
about the problems and potential solutions before us. 
Instead of opening their pages and airwaves to a variety of viewpoints during an 
election season, news organizations cover campaigns mostly as a contest in which voices 
that are perceived to lack public support are either ignored or sidelined.  This attitude 
assumes that only those perspectives that can win at the ballot box have any importance 
in the public debate.  I fundamentally disagree.  In my view, the public has a right to hear 
as many voices as possible so that they can sift through the various ideas that are before 
them and choose the ones they believe are best.  Yet the public is consistently denied this 
right by the press, which decides for itself which issues can be legitimately aired in the 
public sphere based on criteria that have more to do with the game of politics than with 
the public discussion, or dialogue, as the Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel’s Steven Walters 
put it. 
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This is not to say that the press has to include all voices.  There is no question that 
resources, space, and time will force news organizations to make crucial choices each day 
about which stories to publish or air and which ones to ignore.  There is no way around 
this.  The real question becomes, where do you draw the line?  And right now, this 
research and the studies highlighted in Chapter Two show that this line is currently being 
drawn too narrowly.  Rather than looking for reasons to exclude certain candidates from 
its coverage—as the news media currently do—a healthy communication system should 
be looking for ways to expand our discourse, to include as many perspectives in the 
debate as possible. 
It may very well be, as Mark Barabak of the Los Angeles Times and John 
Marelius of the San Diego Union-Tribune contend, that the public is better off receiving 
more information about a few candidates than less information about many.  But is that 
really the case?  Would the public really miss out on substance if one or two additional 
candidates were to be included in election coverage?  Given the enormous attention the 
press gives to the horse race today, it seems that the public is not receiving much 
substance anyway.  Perhaps if news organizations redirected the abundance of column 
inches now devoted to contest-related stories and instead used them for issue pieces, 
reporters and editors would find that they have more than enough space to include the 
positions of third-party candidates and others from the so-called fringe.  With the 
Internet, we may be moving in that direction anyway. 
In any case, this dissertation can serve as a starting point to a broader debate 
among journalists about the way that third-party candidates and other manifestations of 
dissent are covered at all levels.  As I know from my experience as a political reporter, 
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there are practical decisions that must be made on the campaign trail.  But journalists 
must also recognize their ideological predisposition toward the two-party system; and 
they must debate the ramifications of these biases on the quality of political discourse.  
The press has a special responsibility in our society.  It is the place citizens go to expand 
their world beyond their immediate experience.  We look to the press to inform and foster 
public debate.  Reporters must keep this in mind too when evaluating what to do with 
these voices from the fringe. 
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Appendix A: 
Codebook – Content Analysis 
 
 
Variable    Category Names and Codes 
number 
 
V01     Story ID number 
 
V02     Candidate 
     01. Ed Thompson (Libertarian) 
     02. Scott McCallum (Republican) 
     03. Jim Doyle (Democrat) 
     04. Peter Camejo (Green) 
     05. Bill Simon (Republican) 
     06. Gray Davis (Democrat) 
     07. Jonathan Carter (Green) 
     08. Peter Cianchette (Republican) 
     09. John Baldacci (Democrat) 
     10. Tom Cox (Libertarian) 
     11. Kevin Mannix (Republican) 
     12. Ted Kulongoski (Democrat)    
 
V03     Campaign ID 
     1. California 
     2. Maine 
     3. Oregon 
     4. Wisconsin 
 
V04     Newspaper 
     01. New York Times 
     02. Washington Post 
     03. USA Today 
     04. Los Angeles Times 
     05. San Francisco Chronicle 
     06. Sacramento Bee 
     07. San Diego Union-Tribune 
     08. Portland Press Herald 
     09. Bangor Daily News 
     10. Kennebec Journal-Morning Sentinel 
     11. The Oregonian (Portland) 
     12. The Register-Guard (Eugene) 
     13. Statesman Journal (Salem) 
     14. Milwaukee Journal Sentinel 
     15. Wisconsin State Journal (Madison) 
     16. Capital Times (Madison) 
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V05     Newspaper Circulation 
     1. Under 50,000 
     2. 50,000 to 99,999 
     3. 100,000 to 249,999 
     4. 250,000 to 499,999 
     5. 500,000 to 1 million 
     6. More than 1 million 
      
 
V06     Date of Story 
     1. September 
     2. October 
     3. November – before election 
     4. November – Election Day or after    
 
V07     Placement of campaign story 
     1. Front Page 
     2. Inside Front Section 
     3. Front Page of Local Section 
     4. Inside Local Section 
     5. Front Page of Feature Section 
     6. Inside Feature Section 
     7. Other 
 
V08     Story type—Defined by headline and lead 
     1. Horse Race (polls/fund raising/strategy/endorsement) 
     2. Formal Candidate Debate 
     3. Candidate speech/press conference 
4. Informal issue debate/candidate sparring 
     5. Voter reaction 
     6. Political analysis 
     7. Political profile 
     8. Political rally/convention 
     9. Other 
 
V09     Story Length 
     1. Less than 250 words 
     2. 250 to 499 words 
     3. 500 to 749 words 
     4. 750 to 999 words 
     5. 1,000 to 1,499 words 
     6. 1,500 to 1,999 words 





V10     Which candidate mentioned first 
     1. Democrat 
     2. Republican 
     3. Green 
     4. Libertarian 
     5. Other 
 
 
V11     Candidate who is the prime focus of story 
     1. Democrat 
     2. Republican 
     3. Third Party 
     4. Democrat-Republican equally 
     5. Democrat-Third Party equally 
     6. Republican-Third Party equally 
     7. Democrat-Republican-Third Party equally 
     8. Other 
 
V12     When is candidate’s name first mentioned 
     01. The headline 
     02. The lead 
     03. Second paragraph 
     04. Third paragraph 
     05. Fourth paragraph 
     06. Fifth paragraph 
     07. Sixth paragraph 
     08. Seventh paragraph 
     09. Eighth paragraph 
     10. Ninth paragraph 
     11. Tenth to fifteenth paragraph 
     12. Sixteenth to twentieth paragraph 
     13. Twenty-first paragraph or beyond 
     14. One-paragraph story 
  
V13     Which third of story is candidate first mentioned 
     1. First third of story 
     2. Second third of story 
     3. Final third of story 
     4. Last paragraph 
 
 
V14     How is candidate first defined 
     1. Candidate is defined in terms of himself 




V15     How is the candidate’s campaign role portrayed 
     1. Serious contender (chance to win) 
     2. Spoiler (no chance to win, but can impact who wins) 
     3. Long shot or plays no role 
     4. Role not mentioned 
     5. Protest Vote 
 
V16     Is the ideology of the candidate discussed (liberal/cons) 
     1. Yes 
     2. No   
 
V17     Portrayal of candidate’s ideology/ideas 
     1. Mainstream liberal  
     2. Moderate 
     3. Mainstream conservative 
     4. Extremist 
     5. Ideology not discussed 
      
V18     Tone of coverage toward candidate (based on overall story) 
     1. Positive 
     2. Neutral 
     3. Negative 
 
V19     How many times does candidate’s name appear 
     1. 1 to 5 times 
     2. 6 to 10 times 
     3. 11 to 20 times 
     4. 21 or more times 
      
     Sources used (other than candidates) 
 
     Party of source  Yes  No 
 
V20     Democratic officials  1  2 
V21     Republican officials  1  2 
V22     Green officials  1  2 
V23     Libertarian officials  1  2 
V24     Voters    1  2 
V25     Unaffiliated analysts  1  2 








V27     Other candidates mentioned in the story 
     1. Democrat 
     2. Republican 
     3. Green 
     4. Libertarian 
     5. Democrat-Republican 
     6. Democrat-Green/Libertarian 
     7. Republican-Green/Libertarian 
     8. No other study candidates mentioned 
 
V28     Is the candidate’s message delivered in the story 
     1. Yes 
     2. No 
 
     If yes, who delivers the candidate’s message 
 
     Source     Yes No NA 
 
V29     Candidate (or campaign)  1 2 3 
V30     Supporters not part of campaign 1 2 3 
V31     The press    1 2 3 
V32     Opponent (or opponent’s campaign) 1 2 3 
V33     Opponents not part of campaign 1 2 3 
 
 
V34     Is the candidate described in any way 
     1. Yes 
     2. No 
 
     If yes, who describes the candidate 
 
Source     Yes No NA 
 
V35     Candidate (or campaign)  1 2 3 
V36     Supporters not with campaign 1 2 3 
V37     The press    1 2 3 
V38     Opponent (or campaign)  1 2 3 
V39     Opponents not with campaign 1 2 3 
 




4. Not described 
5. Sometimes mainstream, sometimes offbeat/extreme 
 272 
 
V41     Are the candidate’s issue positions outlined 
     1. Yes 
     2. No 
 
V42     News coverage given to candidate’s positions 
     1. Zero paragraphs: Issues not covered 
2. 1 to 5 paragraphs 
     3. 6 to 10 paragraphs 
     4. 11 to 15 paragraphs 
     5. More than 16 paragraphs 
 
V43     How the candidate’s key issues are framed 
     1. Mainstream 
     2. Offbeat 
     3. Extreme 
     4. Some mainstream, some extreme/offbeat 
     5. Not framed – not discussed 
 
V44     Theme: First issue mentioned by candidate 
01. No issues 
02. Tax and Budget 
03. Abortion 
04.  Education 
05. Healthcare 
06. Civil Rights 





12. Government corruption 
13. Immigration 
14. Other  
15. Crime 
 
V45     Theme: Second issue mentioned by candidate 
01. No issue mentioned second 




06. Civil Rights 






12. Government corruption 
13. Immigration 
14. Other  
15. Crime 
 
V46     Party of Study Candidate 
     1. Democrat 
     2. Republican 
     3. Green 










V01  Story ID number 
Record the three-digit identification number that is handwritten in the upper right-hand 
corner of each story. The first story will have an ID number of “001.” The one-hundred 
and first story will have an ID number of “101.” 
 
V02  Candidate 
Record the two-digit code to identify the candidate whose coverage is being evaluated by 
this study. This variable is designed to identify from which sample the story comes. It is 
NOT designed to identify the candidate who is the main focus of the story. Stories that 
come from the “Ed Thompson sample” are coded “01.” Stories that come from the “Ted 
Kulongoski sample” are coded “12.” 
 
V03 Campaign ID 




Record the two-digit code to identify the newspaper in which the story appeared. 
 
V05 Newspaper Circulation 
Record the one-digit code to identify the circulation of the newspaper in which the story 
appeared. The circulation figures for each newspaper are included at the end of this 
codebook and are based on the numbers provided by the Editor and Publisher 
International Yearbook, 85th Edition. The numbers include daily circulation for M-F. 
They do not include Sunday figures. 
 
V06 Date of Story 
Record the one-digit code to identify the month in which the article appeared in the 
newspaper. 
 
V07 Placement of campaign story 
Record the one-digit code to identify where the story appeared in the newspaper. Lexis-
Nexis stories display the section and page number of the story just above the body of the 
news story. Stories obtained from other archives also identify the placement of the story. 
 
V08 Story type – Defined by headline and lead 
Using the headline and the lead as your guide, record the one-digit code to identify the 
type of story that is under evaluation. Use the following definitions: 
 
1. Horse Race: Any story with a headline or lead that stresses poll numbers, financial 
strength of the candidates, the campaign strategy, a candidate’s general level of 
support, or political endorsements. These are stories with headlines and leads that 
stress who is winning and who is losing or who has a good or bad political strategy. 
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2. Formal Candidate Debate: Any story that covers a formal debate involving at least 
two of the candidates for governor. 
 
3. Candidate speech or press conference: Any story in which the candidate has given a 
speech or held a press conference to discuss public policy issues or any other matter 
involving the campaign. This would not include stories in which an incumbent 
governor holds a press conference about issues unrelated to the campaign. A story of 
this nature should be removed from the sample and replaced with another story about 
the campaign. Use the story as your guide. If the story places the press conference or 
speech in the context of the election, then the story should be counted as a candidate 
speech or press conference. In general, these should include speech stories or press 
conferences that cover a wide range of issues raised by the candidate. The candidate 
may attack or criticize his or her opponent, but the story includes only a quick 
response from the opponent. The primary focus of the story is on the candidate’s 
speech or comments during the press conference. 
 
4. Informal issue debate/candidates sparring: Any story in which the candidates are 
quoted in opposition to each other discussing public policy issues, campaign issues or 
attacking each other on the campaign trail. These include enterprise stories (initiated 
by the reporter) about a particular issue in which the reporter quotes each candidates’ 
campaign about where the candidate stands on that issue; stories in which candidates 
release written statements or are interviewed and quoted criticizing their opponents; 
press conferences in which each candidate is criticizing his or her opponent or 
responding to criticism. The primary focus of these stories are the back and forth 
debate between the candidates. 
 
5. Voter reaction: Stories in which the primary focus is how average voters who are not 
associated with any campaign are responding to the candidates. This would include 
person-on-the-street stories or other stories in which voters are quoted. This would 
NOT include rallies or other public demonstrations involving a candidate’s 
supporters. 
 
6. Political analysis: Stories in which the newspaper steps back from the day-to-day 
events of the election and provides an in-depth analysis of the campaign. The 
newspaper will usually label these stories “analysis.” 
 
7. Political profile: Stories that feature primarily one candidate. These stories will give 
personal, professional and political background on the candidate. They are designed 
to give an in-depth profile of the candidate. 
 
8. Political rally/convention: Stories about the party’s nominating convention and 
stories about a candidate’s political supporters holding a rally. This includes street 
demonstrations and other forms of public gatherings by a candidate’s supporters. 
 





V09 Story Length 
Record the one-digit code that indicates the length of the story by number of words. 
LexisNexis and most other archives display the number of words of each story just above 
the body of the article. If the number of words is not displayed, please count the words of 
the story. 
 
V10 Which candidate mentioned first 
Record the one-digit code for the candidate who appears first in the story. 
 
 
V11 Candidate who is the prime focus of the story 
Record the one-digit code to indicate the candidate(s) who is the main focus of the story – 
regardless of the sample from which the story comes. For example, a story should be 
coded “1” for Democrat if the Democratic candidate is the main subject of the story, even 
if that story comes from the Green Party candidate’s sample. The coder may use the 
headline and lead as a guide to identify the main subject(s) of the story. In general, the 
candidate(s) who appears most often in the story is the main subject(s). The code “8,” or 
“Other,” should be recorded when the primary focus of the story is on a candidate who is 
not a member of the Democrats, Republicans, Greens or Libertarians. 
 
V12 When is candidate’s name first mentioned 
Record the two-digit code that best indicates in which paragraph the candidate under 
study (the candidate identified in Variable 02) appears in the story. For example, if the 
story you are coding is from the “Ed Thompson” sample, then you would record the 
paragraph in which Ed Thompson is first mentioned, even if the bulk of the story is about 
another candidate. 
 
V13 Which third of story is candidate first mentioned 
Record the one-digit code that best indicates in which third of the story the candidate 
under study (the candidate identified in Variable 02) appears in the story. To determine 
which third of the story the candidate appears, count the number of paragraphs in the 
story and divide the story into three equal parts. Take note that you should record the 
code “4” (last paragraph) rather than “3” (final third of story) if the candidate under study 
appears in the last paragraph of the story. 
 
 
V14 How is candidate first defined 
Record the one-digit code that best describes how the candidate under study is defined when he 
first appears in the story. Use the following definitions for your evaluation: 
 
1. Candidate is defined in terms of himself: When the name of the candidate under study is first 
reported in the story, it appears alone in the sentence; or, when the name of the candidate 
under study first appears in the story, it appears in the same sentence as another candidate, 
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but both candidates are treated as completely independent entities with no relationship to one 
another. 
  
2. Candidate is defined in terms of opponent: When the name of the candidate under study is 
first reported in the story, it appears in the same sentence as another candidate in the race and 
is related directly to that other candidate. For example, a candidate who is described as an 
opponent of another candidate would be coded as “defined in terms of opponent.” 
 
 
V15 How is the candidate’s campaign role portrayed 
Record the one-digit code that best describes how the article portrays the role that the candidate 
is playing in the campaign. Use the following definitions: 
 
1. Serious contender: The article portrays or implies that the candidate under study as either 
having a serious chance of winning the election or having broad support in the electorate. 
The article may also indicate that even if the candidate is likely to lose the election, he or she 
is a major candidate under consideration by voters. To determine whether a candidate is 
being portrayed as a serious contender, look for language that suggests that the candidate is 
in first or second place in the polls, that the candidate is in third place but within striking 
distance of the leader, that the candidate is drawing big crowds at events, that the candidate 
has raised significant money, that the candidate has the support of major political leaders in 
the state, or any other language that the reporter uses to justify the contention that the 
candidate should be considered a serious player. The coder should infer that the candidate 
under study is being portrayed as a “serious contender” if the article focuses at least half the 
article on that candidate without otherwise suggesting that the candidate is a spoiler or 
nonfactor in the campaign. 
 
2. Spoiler: The article portrays the candidate under study as having no chance of winning, but it 
reports that the candidate may be able to determine the outcome of the election by drawing 
enough votes away from another candidate in the race. 
 
3. Long shot or plays no role: The article portrays the candidate as playing no role in the 
campaign at all. The candidate is said to be a long shot, the candidate is said to have no 
chance of winning, and the candidate’s level of support is believed to be so low that he or she 
will not swing the election in favor of any other candidate in the election. 
 
4. Role not mentioned: The story does not mention the role that the candidate is playing in the 
election. The candidate is mentioned so infrequently in the story (perhaps only once or twice) 
that the coder can not infer whether the candidate is being portrayed as a serious contender, 
spoiler or nonfactor in the election.  
 
5. Protest vote: The candidate’s support is said to come from people who wish to make a 
statement against “the system.” The story reports that voters are unhappy with the Democrat 




V16 Is the ideology of the candidate discussed (liberal/conservative) 
Record the code for “yes” if any source or the reporter in his or her voice identifies the ideology 
of the candidate under study. In this context, ideology means that the candidate has been labeled 
a liberal, conservative, extremist, socialist, communist, far right wing, far left wing or any other 




V17 Portrayal of candidate’s ideology/ideas 
If the answer to Variable 16 is yes, then the coder should record the one-digit code that best 
describes how the article portrays the candidate’s ideology. Use the following definitions: 
 
1. Mainstream liberal: The candidate under study is described by sources or the reporter in his 
or her own words as a liberal. The label is used without any adjectives to indicate that the 
candidate is outside the mainstream. 
 
2. Moderate: The candidate under study is described by sources or the reporter in his or her own 
words as a moderate, middle of the road or any other term used to indicate that the candidate 
is mainstream, but neither liberal nor conservative. 
 
3. Mainstream conservative: The candidate under study is described by sources or the reporter 
in his or her own words as a conservative. The label is used without any adjectives to indicate 
that the candidate is outside the mainstream. 
 
4. Extremist: The candidate under study is described by sources or the reporter in his or her own 
words as having an ideology that is outside the mainstream. Such terms would include 
extreme right wing, radical, socialist, communist, far left wing. 
 
5. Ideology not discussed: The candidate under study is not branded with any ideological label. 
Choose this code if the answer to Variable 16 is “no.” 
      
      
V18 Tone of coverage toward candidate (based on overall story) 
Using the headline and first four paragraphs of the story, record the one-digit code that best 
describes the overall tone of the coverage of the candidate who is under study. Use the following 
definitions: 
 
1. Positive: The candidate under study is generally portrayed in a favorable light. Use the 
headline and lead to get an overall impression of the coverage. Use this code if the candidate 
is either praised by sources, appears confident or is shown taking bold or innovative positions 
on issues. This could include stories in which the candidate is described as ahead in the polls, 
connecting with voters, running a strong campaign, being a good administrator, having a 
proven track record, being successful in past campaigns, putting his or her opponent on the 
defensive, being free of special interests, being innovative and bold, or any other adjective 
with positive connotations. 
 
 279 
2. Neutral: The candidate under study is portrayed in neither a positive nor negative light. 
While some sources might disagree with the candidate’s issue positions, the candidate is 
allowed to answer that criticism. The article uses few, if any, adjectives that lead to value 
judgments about the candidate or his or her issue positions. The story is balanced. 
 
3. Negative: The candidate under study is portrayed in a negative light by sources or the 
reporter in his or her own voice. This would include stories in which the candidate is under 
attack for mistakes made during the course of the campaign as well as stories in which the 
candidate is described as on the defensive, far behind in the polls, disorganized, having 
trouble connecting with voters, being booed during a rally, or performing poorly in a debate 
or while giving a speech. This would also include stories that point out general failures in the 
candidate’s ability as an administrator, legislator or candidate. Look for any use of adjectives 
with negative connotations. 
 
V19 How many times does candidate’s name appear 
Record the one-digit code that indicates how many times the name of the candidate under study 
appears in the story. For example, if the story comes from the “Ed Thompson” sample, then you 
would count each time Thompson’s name appears in the story. Do NOT count pronouns 
referring to the candidate. 
 
V20 to V26 Sources used (other than candidates) 
Record the one-digit code (Yes or No) that best describes the type of sources used in the story. 
For example, if one or more Democratic Party officials are quoted in the story, you would record 
the code “1,” or “Yes,” for “Democratic officials.” If a political science professor who is not an 
official leader of any political party is quoted in the story, then you would record “1,” or “Yes,” 
for “Unaffiliated analyst.”  Record the code “2,” or “No” for any sources who do not appear in 
the story. 
 
V27 Other candidates mentioned in the story 
Record the one-digit code that best describes which candidate(s) other than the candidate under 
study is reported in the story. For example, if the story under evaluation comes from the 
Democratic candidate’s sample, the coder should determine whether the Republican, Green, or 
Libertarian party candidates also appeared in the story. If both the Republican and Green party 
candidate appeared in the story, then choose code “6” for “Republican-Green/Libertarian.” If the 
Republican candidate appears but the Green or Libertarian candidate is omitted, then choose 
code “2” for Republican only. If no other candidates who are part of the study appear in the 
story, then choose “8” for “No other study candidates mentioned.” 
 
V28 Is the candidate’s message delivered in the story? 
Record the one-digit code (Yes or No) that best indicates whether some version of the study 
candidate’s message appears in the story. The candidate’s message could be his or her position 
on a particular issue of public policy or it can be any point that the candidate is trying to make in 
the story. For example, the coder would code “Yes” if the story reports that the Democratic party 
candidate’s supporters carried brooms during a rally to symbolize how their candidate will 
“sweep away corruption,” since ending corruption would be the candidate’s message.  
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V29 to V33 If yes, who delivers the candidate’s message 
If the answer to V28 is “No,” then record “3,” or “Nonapplicable,” for V29 through V33. If the 
answer to V28 is “Yes,” then record the codes that best describe who delivers the study 
candidate’s message. The study candidate’s message could be delivered by the candidate, the 
candidate’s campaign, the candidate’s supporters, the press or the candidate’s opponents. For 
example, the candidate’s opponents might take a portion of the study candidate’s message and 
seek to distort it or frame it in a way that will hurt the study candidate in the election. Likewise, 
the press might outline the candidate’s overall campaign message without quoting any sources. 
This variable is designed to identify which candidates had control over their message and which 
ones saw their message framed by their opponents or the press. 
 
V34 Is the candidate described in any way 
Record the one-digit code (Yes or No) to indicate whether the candidate has been described in 
any way in the article. In this context, description is defined as any physical or personal 
description of the candidate under study. This includes any description of how the candidate 
looks or acts in public as well as descriptions of the candidate’s personal and/or political style, 
speaking abilities, governing skills, leadership abilities, hair style, clothing, facial expressions, 
lifestyle or any other physical or personal depiction. 
 
V35 to V39 Who describes the candidate 
If the answer to V34 is “No,” then record “3,” or “Nonapplicable,” for V35 through V39. If the 
answer to V34 is “Yes,” then record the codes that best describe which sources describe the 
candidate in the story. The candidate could be described by himself, his supporters, the press, or 
opponents. The press describes the candidate when the reporter, in his or her own voice, gives a 
description without quoting any source. This variable is designed to identify which candidates 
had control over their image and which ones saw their image controlled by the press or their 
opponents. 
 
V40 How the candidate is described 
If the answer to V34 is “No,” then record the code “4,” or “not described” for V40. If the answer 
to V34 is “Yes,” then record the one-digit code that best describes how the study candidate is 
described in the story. Use the following definitions: 
 
1. Mainstream: The candidate’s physical appearance, personal habits or lifestyle choices are 
described as being typical for an American politician. There are no adjectives or descriptions 
that carry value judgments or indicate that the candidate is odd or offbeat in any way. The 
coder should infer that the candidate’s physical appearance, personal habits or lifestyle 
choices are considered mainstream if they are described without any indication that they are 
considered offbeat or extreme. 
 
2. Offbeat: The candidate’s physical appearance, personal habits or lifestyle choices are 
described as slightly eccentric. Look for adjectives that indicate the candidate is somehow 
different from mainstream politicians or society. For example, a candidate’s clothing or hair 
might be described as rumpled. In other cases, the story might point out that a candidate has 
certain habits or has made certain lifestyle choices that are different from the “typical” 
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American family, such as driving a battery-powered automobile or living in a house powered 
exclusively by solar energy. 
 
3. Extreme: The candidate’s physical appearance, personal habits or lifestyle choices are 
described as significantly different from the average American. Look for adjectives with 
strong connotations. A candidate might be described as being overly emotional – he gives a 
fiery speech; or the candidate might be described as making extreme lifestyle choices, such 
as living on a commune, shaving his head or covering his body with tattoos. 
 
 
V41 Are the candidate’s issue positions outlined 
Record the one-digit code (Yes or No) that best indicates whether the study candidate’s 
opinion on issues of public policy are described in the story. Code “1,” or “Yes,” only if 
the candidate, the candidate’s campaign, the candidate’s supporters or the press provide 
at least a brief description of the candidate’s opinion on at least one issue. Code “2,” or 
“No,” in the following two circumstances: 1) No issues are reported in the story; or 2) An 
issue is raised in the story, but the article does not explain the candidate’s opinion on that 
issue. For example, code “No,” if the story reports that the Democratic candidate spoke 
about “education and tax issues,” but it does not specify what the candidate would do 
about education and taxes. This variable is designed to identify which candidates were 
successful in having their opinions expressed through the news media and which ones 
failed to get their opinions explained. 
 
V42 News coverage given to candidate’s positions 
Record the one-digit code that best explains how many paragraphs are devoted to 
explaining the study candidate’s position on issues of public policy. If the answer to V41 
is “No,” then the code for V42 should be “1,” or “zero paragraphs.” 
 
V43 How the candidate’s key issues are framed 
If the answer to V41 is “No,” then record the code “4,” or “Issues not framed or 
discussed,” for V43. If the answer to V41 is “Yes,” then record the one-digit code that 
best describes how the study candidate’s opinions are framed in the story. To determine 
how an issue is framed, look for adjectives and descriptions used by the reporter to 
explain the opinion of the candidate under study. The reporter can frame an issue in his or 
her own words or by quoting certain sources who comment on the study candidate’s 
opinions. The story’s frame is determined NOT by the study candidate’s opinion itself, 
but rather how that opinion is described or labeled by the reporter. An opinion can be 
framed as mainstream, offbeat or extreme. Use the following definitions for these terms: 
 
1. Mainstream: The study candidate’s proposals and opinions about matters of public 
policy are described by the reporter as being typical for American politicians. There 
are no adjectives or descriptions that frame the issues or proposals as in any way odd 
or offbeat. The issues raised by the study candidate are described by the reporter as 
being a “typical” part of the political debate in America, such as abortion, capital 
punishment, protecting the environment, improving education, and reforming 
healthcare; the study candidate’s opinions and proposals on these issues are depicted 
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by the reporter as being typically moderate, liberal or conservative; and/or the study 
candidate’s opinions and proposals are described as being acceptable to existing 
institutions, both private and public. In general, the framing of the study candidate’s 
issues should be coded as “mainstream” if the issues are simply reported in the story 
without any value judgment attached by the reporter. The reporter can attach a value 
judgment either in his or her own words or in the sources he or she chooses to use in 
the story. 
 
2. Offbeat: The study candidate’s opinions and proposals on matters of public policy are 
framed as slightly outside the mainstream. Look for adjectives that suggest that the 
candidate’s opinions and proposals are impractical, unrealistic, eccentric, amusing, 
and are generally described as lacking credibility. The story depicts the study 
candidate’s opinions and proposals as being a slight challenge to existing institutions; 
the issues raised by the study candidate are described by the reporter as issues that are 
not typically discussed during political campaigns; the study candidate’s opinions and 
proposals on major public policy issues are described as “unusual” for a typical 
politician in America; and/or the candidate’s opinions and proposals on major public 
policy issues are outside the paradigm in which these issues are typically discussed. 
 
3. Extreme: The study candidate’s opinions and proposals on matters of public policy 
are described as far outside the mainstream. Look for strong adjectives that suggest 
the candidate’s opinions and proposals are dangerous, unreasonable, 
ideological/dogmatic, foreign, and/or to the far right or left. The study candidate is 
described as raising issues that are almost never discussed in political campaigns; the 
study candidate’s opinions and proposals are described as a major threat to American 
institutions; the study candidate’s opinions and proposals are described as 
fundamentally altering some form of the American social, political or economic 
system; and/or the story describes the candidate’s opinions and proposals as being far 
beyond what the “typical” American would accept. 
 
4. Some mainstream, some extreme/offbeat: The study candidate’s opinions and 
proposals on matters of public policy are described in different ways throughout the 
story. In some cases, the candidate’s viewpoints are portrayed as mainstream. In other 
cases, they are portrayed as extreme or offbeat. 
 
V44 Theme: First issue raised by the study candidate 
Record the two-digit code that best describes the first public policy issue that is attributed 
to the study candidate, the candidate’s campaign or the candidate’s supporters. The coder 
should record this code even if the details of the study candidate’s opinion on that issue 
are not discussed. For example, if the story says that the Green Party candidate 
“discussed education and abortion during the debate,” then the coder should record “04,” 
or “education,” as the first issue attributed to the candidate in the news story – even if the 
story does not elaborate on the Green Party candidate’s opinion on education. This 
variable is designed to identify which issues are raised first by Democrats, Republicans, 
Greens, and Libertarians. 
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V45 Theme: Second issue raised by the study candidate 
Record the two-digit code that best describes the second public policy issue that is 
attributed to the study candidate, the candidate’s campaign or the candidate’s supporters. 
The coder should record this code even if the details of the study candidate’s opinion on 
that issue are not discussed. For example, if the story says that the Green Party candidate 
“discussed education and abortion during the debate,” then the coder should record “03,” 
or “abortion,” as the second issue attributed to the candidate in the news story – even if 
the story does not elaborate on the Green Party candidate’s opinion on abortion. This 
variable is designed to identify which issues are raised second by Democrats, 
Republicans, Greens, and Libertarians. 
 
Use the following definitions for V44 and V45: 
 
1. No issues: No issue is attributed to the study candidate, the candidate’s campaign or 
the candidate’s supporters. 
2. Tax and Budget: The story quotes the study candidate, the candidate’s campaign or 
the candidate’s supporters talking about taxes, budgets, government spending,  
government revenue, budget surpluses or deficits. 
3. Abortion: The story quotes the study candidate, the candidate’s campaign or the 
candidate’s supporters talking about abortion – for example, taking a pro-choice or 
pro-life position. 
4. Education: The story quotes the study candidate, the candidate’s campaign or the 
candidate’s supporters talking about public school and higher education in any way. 
5. Healthcare: The story quotes the study candidate, the candidate’s campaign or the 
candidate’s supporters talking about the state’s or country’s healthcare system, 
including health insurance or access to healthcare etc… 
6. Civil Rights: The story quotes the study candidate, the candidate’s campaign or the 
candidate’s supporters talking about civil or human rights of any group, including 
African Americans, homosexuals, religious minorities, children, immigrants, etc… 
7. Political Process/System: The story quotes the study candidate, the candidate’s 
campaign or the candidate’s supporters talking about their complaints about or 
proposed changes, improvements or reforms to the process under which the country 
chooses its elected leaders. 
8. Housing: The story quotes the study candidate, the candidate’s campaign or the 
candidate’s supporters talking about any issues related to housing, including booming 
real estate prices, building affordable housing, or improving the conditions of housing 
for the poor. 
9. Labor: The story quotes the study candidate, the candidate’s campaign or the 
candidate’s supporters talking about the needs of labor unions and blue-collar 
workers, including protections for union organization, raising or lowering the 
minimum wage, or working conditions in factories. 
10. Environment: The story quotes the study candidate, the candidate’s campaign or the 
candidate’s supporters talking about protection of the environment, including such 
issues are urban sprawl, pollution, global warming, and open space preservation. 
11. Economy: The story quotes the study candidate, the candidate’s campaign or the 
candidate’s supporters talking about the overall condition of the state’s economy. 
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12. Government corruption: The story quotes the study candidate, the candidate’s 
campaign or the candidate’s supporters talking about ways to end government 
corruption or blaming an incumbent for corruption. 
13. Immigration: The story quotes the study candidate, the candidate’s campaign or the 
candidate’s supporters talking about legal or illegal immigration. 
14. Other: The story quotes the study candidate, the candidate’s campaign or the 
candidate’s supporters talking about issues not mentioned above. 
15. Crime: The story quotes the study candidate, the candidate’s campaign or the 
candidate’s supporters talking about crime or police. 
 
V46 Party of Study Candidate 









Los Angeles Times   902,164 
The Sacramento Bee   293,705 
San Francisco Chronicle  400,000 + 




Bangor Daily News   62,462 
Portland Press Herald   77,788 
Kennebec Journal and  




The Oregonian (Portland)  324,836 
Statesman Journal (Salem)  53,366 




Milwaukee Journal Sentinel  227,387 
The Capital Times (Madison)  21,611 




USA Today    2.6 million 
New York Times   1.05 million 
Washington Post   661,124 
 
 
Source: Editor and Publisher International Yearbook: The Encyclopedia of the Newspaper Industry, 85th Edition (2005). 
All figures are daily circulation: Monday through Saturday. (Does not include Sunday circulation)
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Appendix C: 





1. What is it like for you to cover a big political campaign, such as a campaign for 
governor? 
a. What do you like best about covering campaigns? 
b. What do you like least about covering campaigns? 
 
2. How would you define the term “campaign”? 
a. What is the primary function of a campaign? 
b. To what extent is a campaign a contest between candidates? 
c. To what extent is a campaign a contest of ideas? 
d. As you see it, is a campaign primarily a contest between candidates or a contest 
of ideas or something else? Explain your answer. 
e. How would you define the term “election”? 
 
3. Could you explain to me what you do during the typical day on the campaign trail 
when covering a major campaign, such as a campaign for governor? 
a. How do you typically schedule your time during the day? 
b. Who would you typically meet with and/or talk to when covering a campaign? 
c. Who initiates most of the contact between you and sources associated with a 
campaign? 
 
4. What do you see as your role as a political reporter during a gubernatorial political 
campaign? 
a. How do you know when you are playing that role effectively? 
b. How do you know when you may not be playing that role effectively? 
 
5. As a political reporter, what would you say your responsibilities are, if any, to the 
broader society when you are covering a gubernatorial political campaign? 
a. How do you know when you are meeting those responsibilities? 
b. How do you know when you may not be meeting those responsibilities? 
 
6. What does it mean to you to be objective when covering a political campaign, such as 
a campaign for governor? 
a. *** Get examples from 2002 to illustrate this 
b. How do you know when you’ve covered all sides of a story in a campaign? 
c. What procedures, if any, do you follow to make sure that all sides of a campaign 
story are covered fairly 
d. How do you guard against your own biases? 
 
7. How much of a campaign do you typically observe first-hand? 
a. How often are you physically with the candidate? 
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b. How often are you covering speeches or other events that involve the candidate? 
 






1. There are times when a gubernatorial campaign involves multiple candidates, such as 
when independents or third parties challenge the Democrats and Republicans. 
Looking back on the gubernatorial campaigns you have covered that involved a third-
party candidate, how would you assess the coverage you gave to that third-party 
candidate? 
a. Ask for examples 
 
2. When a campaign involves more than the two major-party candidates, what criteria 
do you use to determine whether the third-party candidate should receive substantial 
coverage? 
a. When deciding whether to give substantial coverage to a third-party candidate, 
how much weight do you give to 
i.  the candidate’s support as measured by public opinion surveys? 
ii. the candidate’s chance of winning? 
iii. how much money the third-party candidate has raised? 
iv. what political sources tell you about the third-party candidate? 
v. the third-party candidate’s ideas? 
vi. the third-party candidate’s ideology? 
vii. the third-party candidate’s political and professional credentials? 
viii. the third-party candidate’s public demeanor? 
 
3. In the preceding question, we discussed criteria you use to determine whether to give 
a third-party candidate substantial coverage. Can you rank those criteria in order of 
importance to you? 
a. How did you come to this ranking? 
 
4. Where would you say these criteria come from?  In other words, how did you as a 
reporter come to use these criteria? 
 
5. As a political reporter, what kind of a third-party gubernatorial candidate would you 
say makes a good story? 
a. What kind of Democrat or Republican makes a good story? 
 
6. As a political reporter, what kind of a third-party gubernatorial candidate would you 
say does not make a good story? 
a. What kind of Democrat or Republican would you say does not make a good story? 
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7. As a political reporter, what kind of third-party gubernatorial candidate would you 
give equal coverage to that given to the Democratic and Republican candidates? 
 
8. As a political reporter, what kind of third-party candidate would you completely 
ignore? 
a. As a political reporter, what kind of Democratic or Republican candidate would 
you completely ignore? 
 




INFLUENCES ON NEWS COVERAGE 
 
1. Think back on the gubernatorial campaigns you have covered. Which specific sources 
did you regularly go to when covering those campaigns? 
a. Ask for examples from the 2002 gubernatorial campaign 
 
2. Think back on the gubernatorial campaigns you have covered. From where did your 
ideas for stories come? In other words, list for me the sources of your story ideas, 
being as specific as possible. 
a. Democratic Party officials or candidates? 
b. Republican Party officials or candidates? 
c. Third party officials or candidates? 
d. Other reporters? 
e. Editors 
f. Enterprises stories generated solely by you? 
g. Voters or readers 
h. Others? 
 
i. Can you explain the importance of each of these sources relevant to each other? 
 
3. Think back on the gubernatorial campaigns you’ve covered. How did you decide 
which issues to write about during those campaigns? 
 
4. To what extent, if any, do other reporters influence the types of stories you write 
about during a campaign? 
a. Generally speaking, how much do political reporters from various news 
organizations talk to each other about what the main story of the day is during a 
campaign? 
b. Generally speaking, can you discuss with me any ways in which reporters at other 
news organizations influenced what you covered and what you did not cover 
during a campaign? 
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Appendix D: Subject Form 










Staff size (Number of reporters) 
 
 
Number of political reporters 
 
 
Number of reporters typically assigned to 

















Years at newspaper 
 
 
Years as news reporter 
 
 
Number of governor races 
covered at this newspaper 
 
Number of governor races 
covered in career 
 
Number of campaigns 
covered at this newspaper 
 
Number of campaigns 
covered in career 
 







Page 1 of 3 
Initials ______ Date _____ 
 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
Philip Merrill College of Journalism 
University of Maryland – College Park 
 
Project name On the Fringe: Third-Party Gubernatorial Candidates and the Press 
 
Project purpose This is a research project conducted by John Kirch and Kathy McAdams at 
the Philip Merrill College of Journalism, University of Maryland, College 
Park. The project is part of John Kirch’s doctoral study and dissertation 
research. We are inviting you to participate in this research project because 
you are a political reporter with experience covering gubernatorial elections 
that involve third-party candidates. The purpose of this research project is to 
identify the criteria political reporters use to determine which candidates and 
events to cover during gubernatorial election campaigns in which a third-
party candidate is on the ballot. 
What will I be 
asked to do? 
You will be asked to answer questions during a taped interview that lasts 
about 60 to 90 minutes.  The interview will be conducted at a location 
convenient to you. This could include your office, a hotel lobby, or coffee 
shop. During that interview, you will be asked to answer questions regarding 
your approach toward covering gubernatorial campaigns. For example, 
questions will cover such topics as how you define campaigns, which sources 
you typically use when writing about an election, and how you determine 
which third-party candidates are newsworthy. In the course of that interview, 
there may be one or two questions regarding the 2002 gubernatorial election 
in your state. 
Confidentiality We are asking for your permission to use your name and the name of your 
newspaper in the text of the dissertation. However, the use of your name and 
the name of your newspaper in the dissertation is voluntary and completely 
within your control. You may opt at any point during the study to remain 
anonymous, meaning that your name and the name of your newspaper will 
not appear in the dissertation. If you wish to have your name and the name of 
your newspaper to remain anonymous, we will do our best to keep your 
personal information confidential. To protect your confidentiality, the 
following procedures will be applied: 
1. I will begin each interview by collecting personal information about you 
(Name, Position, Job Responsibilities, and Institution). This information 
will be entered on a Subject Form, which will be filed at the investigators 
home office in a separate and secure file. 
2. Your Subject Form will then be assigned a code number. 
3. The code number will be the only identifying information placed on the 
tape cassette used to record our conversation as well as on the written 
transcript of the interview. 
The cassette tapes will be stored at the investigator’s home office separate 
from the Subject Form. The hard copy of the written transcript will also be 
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Initials ______ Date _____ 
 
 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 




4. The electronic copy of the written transcript will be stored on the 
investigator’s computer hard drive as well as a compact disc. The 
transcript will be filed only under your code number. 
5. Cassette tapes and electronic and hard copies of each transcript will be 
destroyed two months after the dissertation has been approved by John 
Kirch’s dissertation committee. 
6. Code numbers will be set up so that the investigator can identify only the 
state where you work—but not the newspaper. For example, California 
reporters would be labeled CA1, CA2 while Wisconsin reporters would 
be labeled WI1, WI2. 
7. Each code number will be randomly assigned a first-name-only 
pseudonym, which will be used in the text of the dissertation in place of 
your name. 
 
Potential risks? There are no known risks associated with participation in this research 
project. 
What are the 
potential 
benefits of this 
project?  
The study is not designed to help you personally but to help the investigator 
learn more about how reporters cover gubernatorial campaigns involving 
third-party candidates. The study may help journalism in general by 
suggesting ways newspapers can improve their coverage of election 
campaigns.  
Do I have to be 
in this 




Your participation in this research is completely voluntary. You may choose 
not to take part at all. If you decide to participate in this research, you may 
stop participating at any time. If you decide not to participate in this study or 




If you have any questions regarding the research project, please contact: John 
Kirch, Philip Merrill College of Journalism, University of Maryland, College 
Park, MD, 20742; (e-mail) JFK909us@aol.com; (telephone) 301-681-0033 
 
Kathy McAdams, Associate Dean for Undergraduate Studies, 2130-J 
Mitchell Building, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742; (e-
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If you have questions about your rights as a research subject or wish to report 
a research-related injury, please contact: Institutional Review Board Office, 
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This research project involves making an audiotape of you. We are also 
asking for your permission to use your name and the name of your newspaper 
in the dissertation. You may opt for your name and the name of your 
newspaper to not be used in the dissertation. Please check the appropriate 
lines below: 
 
_____ I agree to be audiotaped during my participation in this study. 
 
_____ I do not agree to be audiotaped during my participation in this      
study. 
 
_____ I grant the investigator permission to use my name and the name of my 
newspaper in the dissertation. 
 
_____ I do not grant the investigator permission to use my name or the name 
of my newspaper in the dissertation. 
Statement of 
age of subject 
and consent 
Your signature indicates that: 
1. You are at least 18 years of age 
2. The research has been explained to you 
3. Your questions have been fully answered 
















I am a doctoral candidate at the University of Maryland’s Philip Merrill College of 
Journalism who is working on a dissertation that examines how the news media covers 
third-party gubernatorial candidates. 
 
I am writing to request an interview with you as part of my study, which will include the 
comments of newspaper reporters who have covered gubernatorial campaigns in which 
either a Green or Libertarian candidate was on the ballot. My research indicates that you 
covered the 2002 gubernatorial campaign in (Wisconsin or California), when Democrat 
(Jim Doyle or Gray Davis) defeated Republican (Scott McCallum or Bill Simon) and 
(Libertarian Ed Thompson or Green Peter Camejo).  Because of your experience, I am 
particularly interested in your perspective on how you cover campaigns generally, as well 
as campaigns that involve third-party candidates.   
 
The 60- to 90-minute taped interview would be conducted later this summer, depending 
upon your availability. It would be conducted in person, at your work or other location 
convenient for you.  Most of my questions are general in nature and deal with such topics 
as how you define campaigns, which sources you typically use when writing about an 
election, and how you approach campaigns that involve third-party candidates. It is also 
possible that one or two questions may come up regarding how you covered the 2002 
gubernatorial campaign in (Wisconsin or California).  
 
Your participation in this study is voluntary, and you may opt out of the study at any 
point before, during, or after the interview. In addition, although I would like to use your 
name and the name of your newspaper in the text of my dissertation, you may opt to 
remain anonymous. 
 
Your thoughts and perspective will allow me to better understand the methods and 
criteria reporters use to determine how they cover political campaigns.  This study has 
potential to provide important insights about media coverage that may help reporters 
decide how to inform their readers about political campaigns in the future. 
 
Thank you in advance for your consideration of my request.  As a former reporter, I 
appreciate how busy you are and will work with you to accommodate your schedule.  I 
will contact you by telephone within the next day or so – or please feel free to contact me 
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